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Critics of litigation seeking to establish the right of same-sex couples to marry
argue that it has produced a backlash undercutting the movement for marriage
equality. In this account, movement lawyers emerge as agents of backlash: naively
turning to the courts ahead of public opinion, ignoring more productive political
alternatives, and ultimately hurting the very cause they purport to advance by securing
a court victory that mobilizes opponents to repeal it. This Article challenges the
backlash thesis through a close analysis of the California case, which contradicts
the portrait of movement lawyers as unsophisticated rights crusaders and casts doubt
on the causal claim that court decisions upholding same-sex couples' right to marry
have harmed the movement.
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INTRODUCTION
The movement to achieve marriage equality for same-sex couples has
been called "the last great civil rights struggle."' The analogy to the civil rights
movement for racial equality in the 1950s and 1960s is deliberately asserted
by activists and, in some respects, quite apt.2 Both groups comprise a minority
of the population in the United States and have been subject to systematic
1. ADVOCATE, Dec. 2008 (quoting the cover).
2. See Craig J. Konnoth, Note, Created in Its Image: The Race Analogy, Gay Identity, and Gay
Litigation in the 1950s-1970s, 119 YALE L.J. 316 (2009).
discrimination. And, crucially, both have turned to courts to protect rights
thwarted by majoritarian political institutions. As one result of civil rights liti-
gation, there is a close legal precedent for marriage equality activists: Loving v.
Virginia,' the 1967 U.S. Supreme Court decision that overturned prohibitions
on interracial marriage.4 But beyond Loving, the two movements have shared
a deeper history in which lawyers have been important leaders and litigation has
loomed large as a strategy for policy reform. Much like the iconic role played
by the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. (LDF) in the
movement for racial equality, lawyers from elite public interest organizations--
Lambda Legal, the ACLU Lesbian Gay Bisexual & Transgender (LGBT)
Project, the National Center for Lesbian Rights (NCLR), and Gay & Lesbian
Advocates & Defenders (GLAD)-have been pivotal in shaping the path
toward marriage equality.
Critics of the civil rights analogy are quick to point out the historical,
political, and legal differences between the marriage equality and civil rights
movements,' summed up in the wry phrase "gay is not the new black."6 Yet the
pull of the civil rights framework is strong, not just as a way of legitimizing
the marriage equality movement's use of litigation, but also as a way of judging
it. For scholars of law and social change, the emergence of marriage equality
as a seminal post-civil rights progressive legal reform movement has provided
an opportunity to test the contemporary validity of theories based on the now-
dated civil rights paradigm. The result has been a renewed-and vigorous-
debate over the promise and perils of social change litigation, with the marriage
equality movement at the center.
This debate has revolved around the explanatory power of the "backlash
thesis"--the proposition that litigation does more harm than good for social
change movements by producing countermobilization that makes reform goals
more difficult to achieve. The thesis is most closely identified with two scholars,
University of Chicago political scientist Gerald Rosenberg and Harvard legal
3. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
4. On the power of the antimiscegenation analogy, see Stephen Clark, Same-Sex but Equal:
Reformulating the Miscegenation Analogy, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 107 (2002); Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex
Marriage and Public Policy: The Miscegenation Precedents, 16 QuINNiPIAc L. REV. 105 (1996); Catherine
Smith, Queer as Black Folk?, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 379; James Trosino, American Wedding: Same-Sex
Marriage and the Miscegenation Analogy, 73 B.U. L. REV. 93 (1993).
5. See Randall Kennedy, Marriage and the Smuggle for Gay, Lesbian, and Black Liberation, 2005
UTAH L. REV. 781, 792.
6. Irene Monroe, Gay Is Not the New Black, HUFFINGTON POST, Dec. 16, 2008, http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/irene-monroe/ay-is-emnotem-the-new-blb-l 51573.html.
7. Thomas M. Keck, Beyond Backlash: Assessing the Impact of Judicial Decisions on LGBT
Rights, 43 LAW & SOCY REV. 151,152 (2009); see also Linda J. Lacey & D. Marianne Blair, Coping With
the Aftermath of Victory, 40 TULSA L. REV. 371 (2005).
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historian Michael Klarman, each of whom has developed a backlash analysis
of Brown v. Board of Educaion, and applied the backlash framework to evaluate
the impact of crucial marriage equality cases.' In general, the backlash account
emphasizes the institutional role of courts and the political reaction that their
decisions produce: Courts establish new rights ahead of public opinion, politi-
cal opponents mobilize to undercut the new rights, and the movement suffers.
We focus primarily on Rosenberg's work since he has offered the fullest
elaboration of backlash in the marriage equality context and has been the most
strident in his criticism of marriage litigation and, by extension, the lawyers
who have brought it.'" His rebuke of lawyers is especially noteworthy given
their limited role in his scholarly narrative. Because Rosenberg's approach to
backlash is positivist in nature-he aims to test the impact of court decisions
on social outcomes"-the perspectives and motivations of the lawyers involved
are not central to the story. Rosenberg refers generically to same-sex marriage
"litigation," and when it is necessary to identify actors, he makes reference to
"Progressives," "proponents, '2 "litigants," or "activists."' 3 Yet it is clear from the
context of Rosenberg's analysis that LGBT movement lawyers are important
targets of his critique: His analysis of marriage for same-sex couples is part of a
broader examination of impact litigation campaigns orchestrated by cause-
oriented groups like LDF;" he refers to a litigation "campaign" and "movement,"
which assumes ideologically motivated lawyers as the driving force;" and when
he needs an example of misguided "proponents," he points to the movement
lawyers.6 Although the backlash story omits the motivations and decisionmak-
ing processes of the lawyers who bring social change cases-as well as the
differences among the lawyers involved across cases-it is presented as an indict-
ment of their efforts. Specifically, Rosenberg concludes that same-sex marriage
8. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
9. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? (2d ed. 2008); Michael Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV.
431 (2005).
10. Indeed, Klarman recently qualified his backlash claim, conceding that although Goodridge
caused a short-term backlash, it "very likely contributed, in the mid-term, to a dramatic acceleration
in the move to gay marriage." Michael Klarrnan, Marriage Equality: Are Lawsuits the Best Way?, HARV.
L. BULL., Summer 2009, at 7, 9.
11. Gerald N. Rosenberg, Positivism, Interpretivism, and the Study of Law, 21 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 435 (1996) (book review).
12. See ROSENBERG, supra note 9, at 342-43.
13. See id. at 343, 347.
14. See id. at 91-93.
15. Id. at 340.
16. Id. at 339 (quoting then-Lambda Legal attorney Evan Wolfson on the significance of Baehr
v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993)).
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"proponents," "succumbing to the 'lure of litigation,' ' 7 "confused a judicial
pronouncement of rights with the attainment of those rights. The battle for
same-sex marriage would have been better served if they had never brought




Yet, to be defensible, such an indictment must be able to prove the
empirical validity of a set of underlying assumptions about why litigation is
brought in the first instance, what the alternatives to litigation are, and what
would have occurred in the absence of litigation. In particular, in order for the
backlash thesis to work as a critique of movement lawyer strategy, we should
be able to look back at the historical record and find that three premises hold:
(1) movement lawyers defined the legal right for same-sex couples to marry
as a unitary goal ex ante and launched an impact litigation campaign to advance
it; (2) litigation was the lawyers' preferred, if not only, strategy; and (3) the liti-
gation itself was the cause of political backlash resulting in negative movement
outcomes, which would have been avoided by staying out of court and pursuing
a political strategy."
A number of scholars have already begun to challenge these premises,
drawing upon national data to question the assumptions that lawyers naively
turned to courts, 2 lacked a coordinated advocacy strategy,21 and produced
negative outcomes that would not otherwise have occurred. This scholarly
engagement has aided in understanding the overall impact of marriage equality
advocacy. It has also helped to clarify the key terms of disagreement between
critics and supporters of litigation's role in the movement. What is missing,
however, is a context-specific examination of the challenges movement
lawyers have faced, the strategic choices they have made, and the outcomes
they have achieved. Case study analysis would contribute to our understanding
17. Id. at 419.
18. Gerald N. Rosenberg, Courting Disaster: Looking for Change in All the Wrong Places, 54
DRAKE L REV. 795, 813 (2006) [hereinafter Rosenberg, Cooting Disaster]; see also Gerald N. Rosenberg,
Saul Alinsky and the Litigation Campaign to Win the Right to Same-Sex Marriage, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
643, 643 (2009) [hereinafter Rosenberg, Saul Alinsky].
19. For a cogent analysis of this point, see Darn E. Purvis, Evaluating Legal Activism: A Response
to Rosenberg, 17 BUFF. J. GENDER, L. & SOC. POL'Y 1 (2009).
20. See ELLEN ANN ANDERSEN, OUT OF THE CLOSET AND INTO THE COURTS: LEGAL
OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE AND GAY RIGHTS LITIGATION (2004); see also Andrew Koppelman, The
Limits of Strategic Litigation, 17 LAW & SEXUALITY 1 (2008).
21. See Purvis, supra note 19, at 49-50; see also Laura Beth Nielsen, Social Movements, Social
Process: A Response to Gerald Rosenberg, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 671 (2009).
22. Keck, supra note 7; see also Carlos A. Ball, The Backlash Thesis and Same-Sex Mange: Learning
from Brown v. Board of Education and Its Aftennath, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1493 (2006); Jane
S. Schacter, Sexual Orientation, Social Change, and the Courts, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 861 (2006).
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of important aspects of the lawyering process, such as how lawyers constructed
goals, decided among tactical options, and responded to opponents' efforts.
Our aim, therefore, is to analyze the power of the backlash thesis-and
particularly its assignment of movement lawyer culpability-through a close
study of the marriage equality movement in California.23 California is a key
theater of marriage equality activism: It has the largest population of same-
sex couples of any state (nearly eighty-five thousand, constituting 15 percent
of U.S. same-sex couples) and is home to some of the country's leading LGBT
advocacy organizations.24 California lawyers play a leadership role in the
national movement, and what happens in California is often viewed as a
bellwether of national trends. Moreover, the California campaign itself, which
spans roughly the last decade, has provided a civics lesson in how law can be
made, with legal rules governing same-sex couples created through the judicial,
legislative, and initiative processes. And, crucially, after the 2008 passage of
Proposition 8-the state constitutional amendment barring marriage for same-
sex couples-California has become both a prominent symbol of backlash
and a key battleground for future activism. Focusing on movement lawyering
in California allows us to assess outcomes by the goals that were set, and modi-
fied, by the lawyers themselves. We do this through a close reading of the
movement's history, based on the legislative and litigation record, secondary
source coverage of the campaign, and the insights of key movement actors.
Our general claim is that, while California has indeed experienced a
backlash against same-sex marriage culminating in a constitutional ban, the
reasons for backlash have less to do with deficient legal strategy and judicial
overreaching than with the unpredictability of events and the implacability
of opposition to marriage for same-sex couples. More specifically, our review of
the record of same-sex marriage in California shows that the premises of the
backlash thesis do not accurately describe the way that movement lawyers
conceived and implemented their advocacy campaign.
First, movement lawyers did not define the legal right to marry as their
immediate objective and initiate a litigation campaign to achieve it. Rather,
comprehensive domestic partnership was the initial goal. Affirmative liti-
gation was not the vehicle of choice. The backlash presumption that lawyers
23. By undertaking this study, we do not mean to suggest that marriage is normatively preferable
to other types of family forms for same-sex couples. It is of course true that the push toward marriage
may have a domesticating impact on the LGBT rights movement more broadly, allocating energy and
resources away from other worthy goals, and prioritizing an institution that has been roundly (and justi-
fiably) critiqued for its negative impact on women. Our project does not take sides in this debate, but
rather attempts to show how one side-those sympathetic to marriage-pursued its ends.
24. GARY J. GATES, WILLAMS INST., SAME-SEX SPOUSES AND UNMARRIED PARTNERS IN THE
AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY, 2008, app. tbl.2 (2009).
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succumbed to the "lure of litigation" obscures the reasons for court intervention
in California and omits the crucial role of countermovement organizations,
like the Alliance Defense Fund (ADF) and Liberty Counsel, in shaping legal
cases. California now has a constitutional barrier to marriage for same-sex
couples, but this has occurred in spite of the movement lawyers' leadership-
not because of it.
Second, the lawyers did not give litigation tactical priority. To the
contrary, since its inception, the California campaign generally sought to avoid
affirmative litigation in favor of a legislative and public education approach-
with litigation used defensively to block challenges to successfully enacted
bills. Movement lawyers also intervened to shape the trajectory of litigation
they did not initiate in order to mitigate the risk of bad outcomes. The backlash
account thus obscures the deliberate turn away from a singular focus on litigation
as a route to achieve marriage equality toward a much more nuanced and
multidimensional advocacy approach. At least in California, the portrait of
movement lawyers as naive rights crusaders who fail to adequately invest in
alternative advocacy strategies is inaccurate and demeaning.
Finally, we find that the evidence in support of the backlash account's
causal claim is weak. It is not clear that court decisions, either in Hawaii and
Vermont in the 1990s or in California in 2008, led to the passage of two
antigay California initiatives-Proposition 22 in 2000 and Proposition 8 in
2008. By focusing solely on court decisions, the backlash thesis fails to account
for the influence of nonjudicial factors. Specifically, the legislative push for
domestic partnership in California motivated, at least in part, the statutory
prohibition on marriage for same-sex couples embodied in Proposition 22. And
during their television advertising campaign, Proposition 8 proponents empha-
sized the specter of same-sex marriage being taught in schools over the fact
that the right to marry for same-sex couples derived from a court decision,
suggesting that the schools issue resonated more powerfully with voters.
Furthermore, there has been significant progress toward the goals set by
movement lawyers. A decade ago, the state provided no rights to same-sex
couples. California now has comprehensive domestic partnership-a goal that
movement lawyers worked strenuously to achieve. Of course, Proposition 8
constitutionally banned marriage for same-sex couples, making it more difficult
to attain. But there are still married same-sex couples in the state: eighteen
thousand legally married couples prior to Proposition 8 and more out-of-state
couples given legal status under a state law passed in its wake." Moreover, given
25. See S.B. 54, 2009-2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009); Janet Komblum, Bans on Gay Marriage
Gain Ground, USA TODAY, Nov. 5, 2008, at A18.
Lawyering for Marriage Equality 1241
57 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1235 (2010)
the ease with which the California Constitution may be amended by initiative,
it is far from clear that the last word has been spoken.
This analysis leads us not only to challenge the validity of the backlash
thesis in the California case, but also to question more broadly the scholarly
emphasis on litigation as the sine qua non of social change lawyering. We
do not reject litigation as a social change tool-to the contrary, we view it as
an essential component of what we call "multidimensional advocacy," defined
as advocacy across different domains (courts, legislatures, media), spanning
different levels (federal, state, local), and deploying different tactics (liti-
gation, legislative advocacy, public education). We draw a key lesson from
the California marriage equality campaign: Efforts to isolate court-centered
strategies from the broader advocacy context in order to fit litigation into
the standard binary framework-is litigation good or bad?-are artificial and
antiquated.26 Though the singular focus on litigation may have been warranted
in an earlier era, the relevant question now for appraising social change
lawyering is: How does litigation relate to the range of other strategies that
lawyers deploy to advance reform goals? We may still conclude, after an analysis
of the evidence of these integrated strategies, that multidimensional advocacy
for marriage equality has backfired or that litigation has played an outsized
(and detrimental) role. But we should be able to understand the tradeoffs and
pinpoint the miscues across the range of strategic choices-a task that has not
yet been undertaken.
Part I explicates the backlash debate. Part II offers a detailed account of the
legal and political movement in California to establish the legal right to marry
for same-sex couples. Part III then uses the California case to challenge the
backlash thesis in particular, and the scholarly focus on litigation more generally.
I. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: THE BACKLASH DEBATE
The backlash thesis in the marriage equality context begins with a series
of significant court decisions: the Hawaii Supreme Court's 1993 decision in
Baehr v. Lewin,27 which ruled that the state's marriage restriction discriminated
based on sex and thus needed to be analyzed by the trial court under a strict
scrutiny standard; the Vermont Supreme Court's 1999 decision in Baker v.
State, 8 which declared that same-sex couples were entitled to the rights and
benefits of marriage and which ultimately led to the nation's first civil union
26. See Nielsen, supra note 21, at 682.
27. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
28. 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
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regime; and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's 2003 decision in
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,29 which ruled that the Massachusetts
Constitution required recognition of the right to marry for same-sex couples.
Gerald Rosenberg contends that these court decisions caused political
countermobilization that resulted in statutory or constitutional limitations
on marriage for same-sex couples-and thus that the court decisions did
more harm than good. After Baehr, Congress passed the Defense of Marriage
Act (DOMA), which foreclosed federal recognition of same-sex marriages.30
Hawaii voters adopted a constitutional amendment that allowed the legislature
to prohibit same-sex marriage, and Alaska voters amended their state consti-
tution to explicitly ban marriage for same-sex couples. In addition, thirty states
barred same-sex couples from marriage by statute.3' Additional responses fol-
lowed the Baker decision, with two states adopting constitutional bans and
eight others passing statutory restrictions on marriage for same-sex couples
(and, in some cases, nonmarital same-sex relationships) between 2000 and
2003.32 Then, after the Goodridge decision-the first actually to produce
the right to marry for same-sex couples---another twenty-three states passed
constitutional prohibitions by 2006,33 bringing the total number of bans to
forty-five (twenty-seven of which were by constitutional amendment). 34 In
addition, the backlash account suggests that voter initiatives aimed at restricting
the rights of same-sex couples encouraged social conservatives to vote in large
numbers,35 contributing to the reelection of President George W. Bush and to
the election of conservative legislators hostile to LGBT claims.36 On the basis of
this record, Rosenberg concludes that the marriage equality movement "has
been a disaster.
37
The backlash thesis in the marriage equality context relies on three
premises that together operate to paint a picture of movement lawyer culpa-
bility for negative outcomes produced by litigation. First, the backlash thesis
makes a motivational assumption: that LGBT rights lawyers set marriage as
the movement goal and then affirmatively pursued litigation to achieve it,
29. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
30. ROSENBERG, supra note 9, at 357 tbl.13.1.
31. Keck, supra note 7, at 153.
32. See id. at 172 tbl.5.
33. Id. at 153.
34. See ROSENBERG, supra note 9, at 362-63.
35. See id. at 370; Klarman, supra note 9, at 467-69.
36. See ROSENBERG, supra note 9, at 375, 382. For an analysis showing that such initiatives
did not contribute to Bush's victory, see Stephen Ansolabehere & Charles Stewart III, Tnth in Numbers,
BOSTON REV., Feb./Mar. 2005, at 40.
37. Rosenberg, Courting Disaster, sup'ra note 18, at 824.
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along the lines of LDF's legal campaign in Brown v. Board of Education.38
Rosenberg, for instance, ignores the different postures of same-sex marriage
suits-whether those suits were brought by movement lawyers, by sympathetic
nonmovement lawyers, or by countermovement lawyers. Instead, he asserts that
"same-sex marriage proponents adopted litigation as a main strategy to win
the right to marriage."39 This framing also suggests that there is only one measure
of success: the establishment and enforcement of the legal right to marry. Secon-
dary victories or indirect effects are viewed as failing to advance the marriage
goal. 40 Indeed, it is because Rosenberg views marriage equality as the "self-
stated goal" of "litigants and litigators" that he concludes the movement has
been a failure.4"
Next, the backlash account rests on a tactical premise: that LGBT rights
lawyers have preferred litigation to other tactics and accordingly shifted
resources to litigation and neglected political avenues. The tactical premise
reinforces lawyer culpability by locating advocacy squarely within the courts,
which Rosenberg criticizes, and minimizing or even ignoring political work,
whether it is legislative advocacy or community education.a2 Indeed, Rosenberg
goes so far as to suggest that movement lawyers are insincere when they contend
that they engage in "multi-tiered" advocacy, arguing that although they "give
lip service" to the idea of integrating litigation into a broader political effort,
their actual allocation of resources toward litigation undermines that claim.43
As a result, lawyers are blamed for bad litigation outcomes, but given no credit
for good outcomes in other advocacy domains.
Blaming lawyers for litigation backlash requires a third-causal-assump-
tion: that litigation provokes countermobilization-which would not have
occurred but for judicial intervention-and that the harms from such coun-
termobilization outweigh any good outcomes flowing from the litigation.
Countermobilization, in this account, is caused by the unique negative public
reaction to decisions by courts, which are countermajoritarian institutions
with less democratic legitimacy. In this framework, "a legislative strategy would
38. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
39. ROSENBERG, supra note 9, at 340.
40. See Purvis, supra note 19, at 12-13. As Rosenberg suggests, "If the goal is improving the lives of
gay men and lesbians, then there is a good deal to celebrate. On the other hand, if the goal of the litigation
is marriage equality, then little has been achieved and major obstacles have been created." ROSENBERG,
supra note 9, at 368.
41. ROSENBERG, supra note 9, at 368.
42. See Rosenberg, Saul Alinsky, supra note 18, at 656 ('ambda Legal, Gay & Lesbian Advocates
& Defenders ('GLAAD') [sic], and the Human Rights Campaign ('HRC') ... are elite-based groups
that have approached same-sex marriage through litigation. They have rarely engaged in the kind of
public protests around marriage equality that build mass organizations.").
43. Rosenberg, Courting Disaster, supra note 18, at 818.
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[be] less likely to produce backlash." Rosenberg views the results of marriage
equality litigation through this lens, arguing that "the 'one step forward,
two steps back' view... accurately describes the situation" resulting from liti-
gation." Although Rosenberg acknowledges that there have been significant
legislative victories, such as civil unions and domestic partnerships, he views
these as either irrelevant (since they are not marriage), outweighed by marriage
setbacks, or unrelated to the litigation campaign.46
An emerging scholarship, drawing upon national data, has painted a
different picture of the nature and impact of the marriage equality movement,
challenging the central backlash premises.47 First, with respect to lawyer moti-
vation, it has emphasized the distinction between litigation initiated by
movement and nonmovement lawyers. For instance, in the early 1990s,
LGBT movement lawyers did not affirmatively pursue litigation to achieve
the right to marry in Hawaii. Instead, they decided to participate in litigation
that, while in direct contravention of movement strategy, was nonetheless
moving forward.48 While Rosenberg portrays Baehr cocounsel Evan Wolfson-
then at Lambda Legal-as a naive rights crusader who has litigated with
"disastrous results," 9 Wolfson joined the Baehr team in order to shape the legal
strategy after efforts to dissuade the main lawyer from taking the case had
failed. As Dara Purvis demonstrates, in Hawaii and other states, the lawyers
made the best of a bad situation.1
Second, contrary to the premise that litigation is given tactical priority,
scholars have documented how movement lawyers in fact have deployed
multiple techniques to advance not just marriage, but a range of relationship
recognition regimes. For instance, Thomas Keck has argued that marriage
44. ROSENBERG, supra note 9, at 417.
45. Id. at 368; see also Kenneth K. Hsu, Why the Politics of Marriage Matter: Evaluating Legal and
Strategic Approaches on Both Sides of the Debate on Same-Sex Marriage, 20 BYUJ. PUB. L. 275, 279 (2006).
46. At one point, Rosenberg argues that progress for same-sex couples in the policy domain derives
not from litigation but from "a changing culture." ROSENBERG, supra note 9, at 415; see also Klarman,
supra note 9, at 462.
47. This scholarship generally relies on legal mobilization theory that emphasizes how actors
involved in movements understand and interpret the events around them, and how these understandings
shape the trajectory of movements. See MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY
REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION 10-11 (1994) [hereinafter MCCANN, RIGHTS
AT WORK]; see also Michael W. McCann, How Does Law Matter for Social Movements?, in How DOES
LAW MATTER? 76, 83-84 (Bryant G. Garth & Austin Sarat eds., 1998); Michael McCann, Causal
Versus Constitutive Exqlanations (or, On the Difficulty of Being So Positive ... ), 21 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY
457 (1996).
48. See MARTIN DUPUIS, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, LEGAL MOBILIZATION, & THE POLITICS OF
RIGHTS 49-50 (2002).
49. Rosenberg, Courting Disaster, supra note 18, at 824.
50. See Purvis, supra note 19, at 20.
51. See id. at 20-21.
Lawyering for Marriage Equality 1245
litigation produced the very possibility for legislatively enacted nonmarital
relationship recognition. Litigation introduced the concept of civil unions
and cast nonmarital regimes as a moderate, compromise position, which advo-
cates actively pursued in state legislatures. 2
Finally, this new scholarship takes issue with the causal claim that
underlies the backlash thesis. Rather than link backlash exclusively to litigation
and argue that political tactics would have avoided such backlash, Keck argues
that legislative gains produce backlash as well. For example, he explains that
citizen referenda have been "repeatedly used to repeal gay rights policies
that have been enacted by elected officials" and that "the legislative expansion
of partnership rights for same-sex couples has repeatedly sparked coun-
termobilization."" Similarly, Jane Schacter argues that "backlash against courts
is best understood within the larger category of political backlash rather than as
being sui generis."' 4 Advocates themselves see the movement/countermovement
struggle play out across institutional domains. For instance, GLAD litigator
Mary Bonauto notes that the opposition has historically used direct democracy
to counter any and all LGBT advances." Through this lens, backlash is merely
a moment of mobilization in an already-existing countermovement poised to
respond to any LGBT advances, in whatever branch of government they arise. 6
Furthermore, scholars contend that the progress made on LGBT rights
issues has been substantial and, crucially, that such progress derives in part
from litigation. For example, Keck argues that litigation has played an important
role in expanding the rights of LGBT people across multiple domains and
that it is far from clear that a nonlitigation strategy would have been more
successful.57 Similarly, Purvis argues that if the goal is viewed more broadly as
52. See Keck, supra note 7, at 158-59, 170-71; see also Dupuis, supra note 48, at 164.
53. Keck, supra note 7, at 179, 180; see also Donald P. Haider-Markel, Alana Querze & Kara
Lindaman, Lose, Win, or Draw? A Reexamination of Direct Democracy aid Minority Rights, 60 POL. RES. Q.
304 (2007).
54. See Jane S. Schacter, Courts and the Politics of Backlash: Marriage Equality Litigation, Then
and Now, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1153, 1158 (2010).
55. See Mary L. Bonauto, Goodridge in Context, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 65 (2005)
[hereinafter Bonauto, Goodridge in Context]; see also Barbara Gamble, Putting Civil Rights to a Popular
Vote, 41 AM. J. POL. SCd. 41 (1997). Moreover, Bonauto points out that countermovement forces
have not only responded to LGBT advances, thus leading to backlash, but they also have preemptively
deprived LGBT individuals of baseline rights, a phenomenon Bonauto simply refers to as "lash."
See Memorandum From Mary Bonauto, Civil Rights Project Dir., GLAD, to Douglas NeJaime, Assoc.
Professor, Loyola Law Sch., Los Angeles, at 1-2 (Mar. 5, 2010) (hereinafter Bonauto Memo].
56. See Schacter, supra note 54, at 1213.
57. See Keck, supra note 7, at 167-82. Keck shows that between May 1993-the time of
the Baehr decision-and November 2008, much has changed: While twenty-three states criminalized
consensual sodomy in 1993, none do so today; while eleven states had hate crimes laws that included
sexual orientation and gender identity, thirty-two do today; and while eight states had sexual orientation
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the achievement of "a legal right of gays and lesbians to receive recognition
of their intimate relationships in the same way that heterosexual relationships
[are] recognized," then that goal has been "more fully realized." 8
The scholarly challenge to the backlash thesis has significantly recast
the impact of litigation-and, by extension, the role of lawyers-in the marriage
equality movement, undercutting Rosenberg's assertion that the legal strategy
has been "disastrous." Nonetheless, by attempting to meet the backlash thesis
on its own terms, this scholarship has by necessity largely avoided detailed
analysis of specific campaigns in favor of a macro-level appraisal of national
movement trends and outcomes. While this national data is crucial, it obscures
the on-the-ground understandings and pragmatic choices that shape legal strat-
egy and, ultimately, must factor into an accurate accounting of its results. A
qualitative examination-incorporating the views of key actors-focused on the
genesis, trajectory, and culmination of marriage equality legal campaigns is
therefore a helpful supplement to our understanding of what litigation was
designed to achieve, the constraints against which it was deployed, and its results.
Toward this end, we turn here to examine the movement lawyers' construction
and execution of legal strategy through a detailed case study of the pivotal
California campaign.
1I. CASE STUDY: THE CALIFORNIA MARRIAGE
EQUALITY MOVEMENT
The California campaign has spanned more than a decade, roughly
bookended by two antigay statewide initiatives: the first imposing a statutory
bar to the recognition of marriage for same-sex couples and the second incor-
porating that bar into the California Constitution. This general trajectory is
consistent with the core backlash notions of policy regression and the erection
of increasingly more formidable barriers to marriage equality. Yet, as we have
suggested, how we understand these initiatives in relation to legal strategy
depends on the conditions under which litigation occurred and the available
alternatives. This Part aims to situate the decade-long arc of California marriage
equality activism in the broader legal and political context in order to better
assess its impact.
The California campaign is framed by three overarching dynamics. The
first is movement lawyers' resistance to affirmative litigation and the influence
employment nondiscrimination laws, twenty do today. Id. at 174-75 & tbl.6; see also Schacter, supra
note 54, at 1220.
58. Purvis, supra note 19, at 34-35.
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of external events and countermovement actors in ultimately drawing
lawyers into court to challenge the marriage ban. In California, the legal
rights campaign to establish marriage equality through judicial decree began,
paradoxically, as an effort by LGBT rights advocates to pursue a legislative
strategy. The second related dynamic is LGBT rights advocates' deliberate
attempt to coordinate their efforts across the litigation, legislative, and orga-
nizing domains. Throughout the campaign, lawyers not only pursued multiple
avenues of reform, but did so with an eye toward how advocacy in one arena
would impact advocacy in another. Third, the record of policy achievements
in support of same-sex relationships was substantial: from no laws recognizing
same-sex couples in the late 1990s to comprehensive domestic partnership in
2005 to some legally recognized marriages by 2010. It is true that by the end of
the decade, Proposition 8 and the federal challenge to it overshadowed these
developments, but this occurred over the objection of movement lawyers-
not because of them.
A. The Lessons of Litigation Past: Before California
While many trace the modem marriage equality movement to the early
1990s litigation in Hawaii, that was not the first time that same-sex couples
sought the right to marry.59 In the 1970s and early 1980s, lesbians and gay men
in numerous states asserted the right to marry the partner of their choice.
State courts in Washington, Minnesota, and Kentucky held, with little analysis,
that there was no constitutional right to marry for same-sex couples. 60 LGBT
legal organizations were not involved in these early attempts at marriage
equality, which were brought by private lawyers.6' Indeed, the leading LGBT
litigation organizations were just sprouting up around this time. Lambda Legal,
NCLR, and GLAD formed in 1973, 1977, and 1978, respectively. The fourth
leading LGBT rights group, the ACLU LGBT Project, formed in 1986. Rather
than litigate affirmative rights claims, like the right to marry, lawyers at these
organizations undertook more defensive work in their early years, such as
59. For a comprehensive history, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage,
79 VA. L. REV. 1419 (1993); see also Scott Barclay & Shauna Fisher, Cause Lawyers in the First Wave
of Same Sex Marriage Litigation, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 84 (Austin Sarat &
Stuart A. Scheingold eds., 2006).
60. See Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d
185 (Minn. 1971); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. App. 1974); see also Adams v. Howerton,
673 F.2d 1036, 1041-42 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that a same-sex "spouse" did not qualify as an
immediate relative for federal immigration purposes); DeSanto v. Barnsley, No. 81-1746, 1982 WL 1406,
at **5-6 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (holding that a same-sex couple could not have a common law marriage
for divorce purposes).
61. See NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE 48 (2008).
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GLAD's effort to defend gay men arrested in a raid on the Boston Public
Library. 2
As lawyers became leading forces in the LGBT movement, they began
to consider the strategic position and normative desirability of marriage as a
movement goal. In the late 1980s, Lambda Legal's Executive Director, Tom
Stoddard, and Legal Director, Paula Ettelbrick, debated the merits of the
marriage question in a series of articles in an LGBT publication. Stoddard
argued that the right to marry was essential to lesbian and gay citizenship and
that marriage itself could remedy many of the inequities lesbian and gay families
faced. 3 Ettelbrick, on the other hand, urged the movement to continue to serve
diverse family forms rather than prioritize marriage, which historically had
been steeped in gender stereotypes.' As this debate underscored, there was
.no consensus within the LGBT activist community on the goal of marriage."
Moreover, after the movement's loss in Bowers v. Hardwick,66 the 1986 U.S.
Supreme Court decision upholding Georgia's antisodomy statute, it was clear
that the traditional model of federal court impact litigation was not the route to
vindicate LGBT rights. Lawyers could not convincingly argue that the federal
Constitution provided protection to lesbians and gay men at the same time that
it permitted the criminalization of the conduct that generally defined the group.67
Accordingly, LGBT rights lawyers turned their attention to state courts and state
law claims, eager to make gains they could shield from Supreme Court review.'
Lawyers experienced some success with this state-based strategy. Indeed, of the
62. See GLAD, GLAD is Founded in 1978 in Response to a Sting Operation at the Boston
Public Library, http://www.glad.org/30years/casejan.html (last visited June 6, 2010).
63. See Thomas B. Stoddard, Why Gay People Should Seek the Right to Marry, OUT/LOOK,
Fall 1989, at 9.
64. See Paula L. Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, OUT/LOOK, Fall
1989, at 14.
65. See Mary C. Dunlap, The Lesbian and Gay Marriage Debate, A Microcosm of Our Hopes
and Troubles in the Nineties, 1 LAW & SEXUALITY 63, 64 (1991). Compare Nan D. Hunter, Marriage,
Law, and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, 1 LAW & SEXUALITY 9, 17 (1991), and William N. Eskridge,
Jr., A Social Constructionist Critique of Posner's Sex and Reason: Steps Toward a Gaylegal Agenda,
102 YALE L.J. 333, 353 (1992), with Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why
Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not "Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every
Marriage", 79 VA. L. REV. 1535, 1536 (1993). Some advocates sought a compromise position that
recognized the importance of access to marriage while also deemphasizing marriage as family policy.
See Family Bill of Rights (Evan Wolfson Draft, Sept. 14, 1989), reprinted in Nancy D. Polikoff,
Equality and Justice for Lesbian and Gay Families and Relationships, 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 529, 560-65
(2009) [hereinafter Polikoff, Equality and Justice].
66. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
67. See, e.g., Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cit. 1987). But see Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620 (1996).
68. See Steven A. Boutcher, Making Lemonade: Turning Adverse Decisions Into Opportunities for
Mobilization, AMIci, Fall 2005, at 8, 12.
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eleven states that decriminalized sodomy after Bowers, eight did so by judicial
decree.69 State courts demonstrated a willingness to interpret state constitutions
to protect lesbians and gay men in a way that the federal Constitution did not,
and the results of one state court decision began to bleed into the next."
While movement lawyers were making impressive strides on a variety of
fronts in state courts, they continued to resist a full-fledged marriage challenge.
In the early 1990s, a group of same-sex couples in Hawaii sought representa-
tion from the ACLU and Lambda Legal, but both groups, fearful of unfavorable
precedent and political backlash, declined." The couples instead found a pri-
vate attorney, Dan Foley, to represent them.72 But once it was clear that the
state supreme court was going to weigh in, Lambda Legal joined the effort.73 To
the surprise of many within the LGBT movement, the Hawaii Supreme Court
held in Baehr v. Lewin74 that the marriage restriction made a sex-based classifi-
cation, which merited the most rigorous form of scrutiny under the Hawaii
Constitution. On remand, the trial court found that the restriction failed
this searching review.7" The unlikely events in Hawaii catapulted marriage
onto the national LGBT rights agenda.
After the Hawaii Supreme Court's decision, political forces reacted. Voters
in Hawaii passed a constitutional amendment reserving the issue of same-sex
marriage for the legislature, which had already decided that marriage should
be limited to different-sex couples.76 But as part of the compromise to put the
constitutional amendment to voters, the legislature adopted a reciprocal bene-
ficiary regime, allowing individuals, including lesbians and gay men, to designate
another individual to whom a limited set of rights and responsibilities would
run." Hawaii's new legislation represented the first statewide relationship recog-
nition regime for same-sex couples in the United States.78
69. See, e.g., Jegley v. Picado, 80 S.W.3d 332 (Ark. 2002); Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842
S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992); Doe v. Ventura, No. MC 01-489, 2001 WL 543734 (D. Minn. May 15, 2001);
see also ANDERSEN, supra note 20, at 100-01.
70. Compare Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112,121 (Mont. 1997) (finding the state antisodomy law
unconstitutional), with Snetsinger v. Mont. Univ. Sys., 104 P.3d 445, 452 (Mont. 2004) (finding uncon-
stitutional a university's policy giving insurance benefits to different-sex, but not same-sex, couples).
71. See DuPUIS, supra note 48, at 49-50.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
75. See Baehr v. Miike, CIV. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cit. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996). Also
around this time, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals rejected a same-sex couple's marriage claim.
See Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d at 307 (D.C. Ct. App. 1995).
76. See RAW. CONST. art I., § 23.
77. See RAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572C (LexisNexis 2005).
78. See Bettina Boxall, A New Era Set to Begin in Benefits for Gay Couples, L.A. TIMES, July
7, 1997, at A3; Susan Essoyan, Hawaii Approves Benefits Package for Gay Couples, L.A. TIMES, Apr.
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B. Litigation Avoidance: The Legislative Pursuit of Domestic Partnership
1. After Hawaii: The California No-Litigation Strategy
The California campaign, born in the shadow of Baehr, deliberately sought
to avoid its outcome. What would ultimately become one of the most litigation-
focused marriage equality campaigns in recent history-in which courts were
involved in nearly every phase of the movement-began as an effort to avoid
courts at all costs.
The statutory framework for marriage in California has long been a
source of controversy. In 1971, a California code revision deleting gender-
specific language in statutory minimum-age laws led to the reformulation of
the marriage laws to read that "[any unmarried person of the age of 18 years
or upwards, and not otherwise disqualified, is capable of consenting to and
consummating marriage."79 Although not intended to invite same-sex couples
to marry, some same-sex couples in the 1970s took advantage of the revision to
seek marriage licenses. ° To prevent this from occurring, the California legis-
lature, at the request of the County Clerks' Association,8' again amended the
marriage definition in 1977 to clarify that "[m]arriage is a personal relation
arising out of a civil contract between a man and a woman."82 This change
demonstrated an intent (stated in the legislative findings) to deny the right
to marry to same-sex couples."
Several years later, the announcement of Baehr and the subsequent politi-
cal reaction in Hawaii had two major impacts, both of which drove California
advocacy into the legislative arena. First, it mobilized opponents of marriage
for same-sex couples to attempt to legislate stricter bans in California. Second,
it persuaded LGBT rights lawyers to stay out of court for fear of provoking a
similar constitutional amendment in California.
The first impact of Baehr-conservative countermobilization against same-
sex marriage-was quickly evident. In the immediate aftermath of the Hawaii
decision, LGBT rights lawyers found themselves acting defensively against
30, 1997, at A3. The District of Columbia created a domestic partnership registry in 1992. See POLIKOFF,
supra note 61, at 51.
79. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 408 (Cal. 2008).
80. Id. at 409.
81. Id.
82. CAL CiV. CODE § 4100 (West 1977) (repealed and continued without substantive change at
CAL FAM. CODE § 300 (West 2010). Democratic Governor Jerry Brown signed this amendment into law.
83. Telephone Interview With Jennifer Pizer, Dir., Marriage Project, Lambda Legal (Dec. 16,
2009); Geoff Kors, Executive Dir., Equality California, Remarks at the Seminar on Problem Solving in
the Public Interest, UCLA School of Law (Sept. 3, 2009) [hereinafter Kors Remarks].
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opponents to thwart the passage of a marriage ban. Baehr raised the specter that
Hawaii would be the first state in the country to legalize marriage for same-
sex couples." That possibility, in turn, caused opponents to worry about its
potential to undermine state law bans by requiring the recognition of validly
performed Hawaii marriages under the U.S. Constitution's Full Faith and
Credit Clause as well as state principles of marriage reciprocity.8" In 1996,
Congress passed, and President Bill Clinton signed, the federal DOMA, which
both defined marriage (under federal law) as between a man and a woman,
and asserted that "[n]o state.., needs to treat a relationship between persons
of the same sex as a marriage, even if the relationship is considered a marriage
in another state."'
Californian opponents of marriage for same-sex couples began to develop
their own state-law "mini-DOMA" to bar the recognition of out-of-state
marriages. After the Baehr remand,87 California Assembly Member William
"Pete" Knight, a Republican from Palmdale and a fierce same-sex marriage
opponent, introduced Assembly Bill (AB) 1982, designed to prevent California
from recognizing the out-of-state marriages of same-sex couples." Although
AB 1982 passed the assembly, Bay Area Democratic Senator Bill Lockyer
killed the legislation by introducing a "poison pill" amendment.89 While not
changing the prohibition on marriage, the amendment would have established
a registry for domestic partners, making them eligible for a limited range of
benefits, including hospital visitation rights, a preference for domestic partners
in conservator appointments, and authorization for state and local employers
to include domestic partners under family health plans.' Rather than counte-
nance any legal recognition of same-sex unions, Republicans turned against
AB 1982, which barely passed the state senate in August 1996 after Lieutenant
84. See ANDERSEN, supra note 20, at 178.
85. See Peter Hay, Recognition of Same-Sex Legal Relaticnships in the United States, 54 AM. J. COMP.
L. 257, 261 (2006).
86. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738C (2006)).
87. Baehr v. Miike, CIV. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996).
88. Ed Bond, Irreconcilable Differences on Gay Marriage, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 20,1996, at B3. Some
also suspected that the bill was introduced to mobilize socially conservative voters in a presidential
election year. See Carl Ingram, Senate Panel OKs Bill Targeting Gay Marriages, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 13,
1996, at A3.
89. Carl Ingram, Bill Opposing Gay Marriages Weakened, L.A. TIMES, July 11, 1996, at A3.
90. See ASSEM. B. 1982,1995-96 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1995) (amended in Senate, July 11, 1996);
Ingram, supra note 89.
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Governor Gray Davis, in his role as president of the senate, made a special
appearance to break a 20-20 tie." Knight subsequently withdrew the bill.92
While AB 1982 underscored the importance of the legislative arena as a
site of struggle over marriage, it also augured the increasing appeal of domestic
partnership. The second impact of the Hawaii case was that it prompted LGBT
rights lawyers in California to adopt an affirmative legislative campaign in favor
of a comprehensive domestic partnership law. Particularly as it became clear
that the Hawaii case was moving toward reversal via state initiative, advocates
concluded that litigation was too risky in California and therefore shifted their
strategy toward the pursuit of "marriage in all but name" through the state
legislature.93
The tactical decision to deemphasize marriage and avoid courts was
devised by a group of leading LGBT rights lawyers in California.9 Lawyers
affiliated with the key LGBT legal organizations-Lambda Legal, NCLR,
and the ACLU--combined elite academic credentials with deep experience in
the LGBT movement. At Lambda Legal, the main lawyers were Jon Davidson
and Jennifer Pizer9 Davidson, a Yale Law School graduate, had been a partner
at the Los Angeles law firm of Irell & Manella until 1988, when he left to
become the head of the ACLU of Southern California (ACLU-SC) Lesbian
and Gay Rights Project; he joined Lambda Legal as Supervising Attorney in
1995 and subsequently became its Legal Director.96 Pizer was a 1987 graduate of
the New York University School of Law, where she received a public interest
fellowship. She was Legal Director at the National Abortion Rights Action
League in Washington, D.C., before becoming a litigation associate in a small
plaintiffs' firm in San Francisco. Pizer began volunteering at Lambda Legal and
eventually became a board member. She joined Lambda Legal's staff in 1996
and became its National Marriage Project Director in 2008.9' At NCLR, Kate
Kendell was appointed Legal Director in 1994 (after several years at the ACLU
of Utah) and became Executive Director in 1996. She was joined by Shannon
91. See Carl Ingram, Davis Breaks Tie, Backs Domestic Partner Registry, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 20,
1996, at B8.
92. Carl Ingram, Senate OKs Benefits for Same-Sex Partners, L.A. TIMES, May 26,1999, at A3.
93. See generally William C. Duncan, Avoidance Strategy: Same-Sex Marriage Litigation and the
Federal Courts, 29 CAMPBELL L. REV. 29, 29 (2006).
94. Jennifer Pizer, Dir., Marriage Project, Lambda Legal, Remarks at the Seminar on Problem
Solving in the Public Interest, UCLA School of Law (Oct. 8, 2009) [hereinafter Pizer Remarks].
95. Lambda Legal attorney Myron Quon, who joined the organization in 1996, also worked on
marriage equality issues during this period. Email From Myron Quon, Executive Dir., Asian Pac. Am.
Legal Res. Ctr., to Professor Scott L. Cummings, UCLA Sch. of Law (Feb. 13, 2010).
96. Taylor Flynn, a Columbia Law School graduate, succeeded Jon Davidson at the ACLU-
SC and stayed on as a staff attorney until 1999.
97. Telephone Interview With Pizer, supra note 83.
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Minter, who came in 1993 from Cornell Law School as a National Association
for Public Interest Law Fellow, founding a project to provide legal services
to LGBT youth.9 In 1995, Matt Coles became the Director of the ACLU's
national Lesbian and Gay Rights Project, having moved from the ACLU of
Northern California (ACLU-NC), where he had led campaigns to pass a
statewide employment antidiscrimination law, as well as domestic partner ordi-
nances in Berkeley and San Francisco.' These lawyers worked in a national
coalition with their East Coast counterparts, particularly GLAD's Bonauto in
Boston, and Lambda Legal's Wolfson in New York."W
One lesson that these lawyers took away from the Hawaii litigation was
that they had to develop a proactive strategy--or risk continuously being
placed in defensive postures by private lawyers who initiated litigation against
their judgment. From a movement perspective, Hawaii was a case of the "tail
wagging the dog," unleashing "forces [lawyers] weren't ready to deal with."' '
Additionally, the lawyers read Baehr to mean not that litigation was always a
strategic negative, but rather that it should only be used in states where it could
be adequately defended.
With the "crushing loss" of Bowers in the U.S. Supreme Court still fresh,
advocates reached a consensus that the marriage campaign had to proceed state-
by-state."2 After Congress passed DOMA, movement lawyers had invitations
to litigate marriage in other states but had declined for strategic reasons."°3 They
only wanted to litigate in a state that already had strong LGBT protections, a
sympathetic public and judiciary, and a constitution that was difficult to
amend.'°4 Toward this end, Wolfson and Professor Barbara Cox at California
Western School of Law coordinated a formal fifty-state marriage analysis to
determine the states in which marriage could be won and preserved against
attack.' 5 GLAD supervised a similar analysis for the New England states,
focusing more on relationship recognition than marriage per se.' 6 Lawyer-
activists Beth Robinson and Susan Murray took the lead in Vermont, where
they had been laying the groundwork for a legal challenge for several years.
98. Notable Equal Justice Works Alumni, at http://www.equaljusticeworks.org/communities/
alumni/notable (last visited June 6, 2010).
99. Telephone Interview With Matt Coles, Dir., ACLU LGBT Rights Project (Feb. 17, 2010).
100. See Polikoff, Equality and Justice, sura note 65, at 535 ("In the mid-1980s, gay rights litigators
from around the country began 'roundtable' meetings. At these gatherings, the movement's lawyers shared
information on test cases, coordinated legal strategies, and established priorities.").
101. Pizer Remarks, supra note 94.
102. Telephone Interview With Pizer, supra note 83.
103. See Dupuis, supra note 48, at 62.
104. Pizer Remarks, supra note 94.
105. Telephone Interview With Jon Davidson, Legal Dir., Lambda Legal (Feb. 17, 2010).
106. See Bonauto Memo, supra note 55, at 3.
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On the basis of their analysis, and with the support of other advocates, GLAD
chose to litigate a test case in Vermont.1"7
In sharp contrast, it was clear from the outset that "California would not
be the place" where marriage litigation was launched." California had some
factors in its favor: For instance, its supreme court had held as a constitutional
matter that the state could not discriminate in employment on the basis of
sexual orientation;'09 the state's labor and public accommodations laws prohib-
ited sexual orientation discrimination;" 0 its hate crimes law applied to crimes
committed because of a person's sexual orientation;. and there was some
favorable (although mixed) case law in support of the parental rights of lesbians
and gay men."'
However, there were two issues that weighed heavily against California
litigation. One was the specter of judicial elections. California Supreme Court
justices are appointed by the governor but subject to reconfirmation by the
electorate at the next general election and every twelve years afterwards."' In
1986, California voters rejected Chief Justice Rose Bird and her allies Cruz
Reynoso and Joseph Grodin for their opposition to the death penalty."4 Within
the marriage equality movement, there was concern that the justices-all but
one of whom were appointed by a Republican governor-would be reluctant
to get too far in front of public opinion on the marriage issue for fear of meeting
a similar fate."5
By far the most important factor militating against litigation, however,
was the ease with which California's Constitution could be amended to erase
any gain won through the court. The key question was: "If we were to win in
the supreme court, what would we need to do to hold on to it?"116 In California,
the rules for amending the state constitution through popular initiative are
relatively easy, requiring a small percentage of voter signatures to qualify for
107. See id.
108. Telephone Interview With Pizer, supra note 83; see also Maura Dolan & Lee Romney, S.F.
Wedding Planners Are Pursuinga Legal Strategy, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2004, at Al.
109. See Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458 (1979).
110. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.1 (repealed 1999); Beaty v. Truck Ins. Exch., 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d
593 (Ct. App. 1992) (interpreting CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51, 52 (2010)).
111. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.7 (2003) (amended 2004).
112. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Birdsall, 243 Cal. Rptr. 287 (Ct. App. 1988) (holding that a gay
father was entitled to visitation rights); In re Brian R., 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 768 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding
that a lesbian couple could not be disqualified from adopting a foster child).
113. See CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 16(a)-(d).
114. See Robert Lindsey, Deuonejian and Cranston Win as 3 Judges Are Ousted, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6,
1986, at A30.
115. Id.
116. Pizer Remarks, supra note 94.
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the ballot and a majority vote to pass. 17 Because of this, lawyers determined
at the outset to avoid provoking an amendment. They knew the polling data
and calculated that, while marriage would very likely ultimately pass in
California, that time was still in the future. This decision angered some LGBT
activists, who argued that members of their community were "hurting because
of an unjust law" and wanted to pursue the Hawaii path."8 At the moment
that advocates were fighting AB 1982 in the legislature, they were also "fending
off those who wanted to litigate in court."" 9 However, as this debate played
out against the backdrop of Baehr's initiative-driven reversal, the lawyers were
able to persuasively show the risks of litigation, and their position prevailed.
2. Legislative Incrementalism and Countermobilization: From Domestic
Partner Registry to Proposition 22
The legislative strategy eventually coalesced around the goal of establishing
a comprehensive domestic partnership regime, which would confer all the rights
and benefits of marriage on same-sex couples without its imprimatur. Yet this
"marriage in all but name" strategy was by no means settled in the late 1990s.
Rather, its evolution was shaped by the complex interaction of local efforts
to expand rights for same-sex couples, increasingly strident opposition to same-
sex marriage, and ongoing marriage litigation in states like Hawaii and Vermont.
The movement for a statewide domestic partner law built on prior local
and statewide legislative initiatives that had emerged in the 1980s. For many,
the push for domestic partnership represented an effort to challenge the domi-
nance of marriage by creating a range of relationship formats, with different
rights and benefits attaching to each. Toward this end, domestic partnership was
often available to same-sex and different-sex couples. 2 ' Domestic partnership
also responded specifically to the AIDS crisis affecting the gay community."'
"It was such an enormous problem with people dying .... They were legal
strangers [who] couldn't visit in the hospital. The other partner's family would
come in and take the kids-take everything."'22 Berkeley was the first city to
117. To qualify for the ballot, a petition needs the signatures of electors equal to 8 percent of those
who voted in the governor's race in the last election. CAL. CONST. art. 1I, § 8.
118. Pizer Remarks, supra note 94.
119. Id.
120. See POLIKOFF, supra note 61, at 49; see also Craig A. Bowman & Blake M. Cornish, Note,
A More Perfect Union: A Legal and Social Analysis of Domestic Parmership Ordinances, 92 COLUM. L. REV.
1164, 1188-95 (1992).
121. Kors Remarks, supra note 83.
122. Id.
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enact a domestic partner registry in 1984, and by 1999, twelve California
cities had adopted some type of domestic partner legislation. '23
The passage of the 1996 San Francisco Equal Benefits Ordinance repre-
sented a significant new step in the evolution of domestic partnership. The
ordinance, authored by Supervisor Leslie Katz and signed in November 1996
by Mayor Willie Brown, required all businesses with a city contract to provide
health benefits to their workers' unmarried partners.2 4  The motive force
behind the bill was Geoff Kors, a Stanford Law School graduate who had worked
at the ACLU in Chicago and was at the time a partner in the San Francisco
civil rights firm Wotman, Kors & Clouiter, as well as Katz's chief of staff.'25
Kors conceived of the bill as a way to push the Salvation Army, which had
received city contracts to provide meals to AIDS victims despite antigay policies,
to adopt a more progressive approach toward the gay community.2 6  The
ordinance had a broad impact, covering large businesses like United Airlines
at the city-owned San Francisco Airport, and thus "changed the landscape
of what domestic partner benefits were," showing that they could be used to
legislate greater equality for same-sex couples even within the private sector.'
27
These local efforts, in turn, fed into the statewide pursuit of domestic
partnership, which was accelerated after the 1998 election of Governor Gray
Davis, a Democrat who campaigned in support of gay rights.'28 In 1998, there
were still no statewide laws recognizing a same-sex couple as a family.'29 A
domestic partner registry bill had been passed by the state legislature in
1994, but was vetoed by Republican Governor Pete Wilson; similar legislation
was introduced in 1995 and then again in 1997, but neither bill made it out
of the assembly."'
The first successful step toward a state domestic partnership law came
in 1999, when Los Angeles Democrat Kevin Murray, who had just moved from
the assembly to the state senate, reintroduced the domestic partner bill that
123. Ingram, supra note 92.
124. Mayor Signs Domestic Partner Law for Firms Dealing With S.F., L.A. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1996,
at A20.
125. Telephone Interview With Shannon Minter, Legal Dir., Nat'l Ctr. for Lesbian Rights (Dec.
17, 2009). The ACLU's Matt Coles also worked on the bill with Kors. Telephone Interview With Coles,
supra note 99.
126. Kors Remarks, supra note 83.
127. Id.
128. See Governor Gray Davis, Accomplishments: Opportunity for All Californians: Gay [sic]
and Lesbians, http://www.gray-davis.com/Page.aspx?PagelD=27 (last visited June 6, 2010).
129. David Codell, Principal, The Law Office of David Codell, Remarks at the Seminar on Problem
Solving in the Public Interest, UCLA School of Law (Sept. 17, 2009) [hereinafter Codell Remarks].
130. Ingram, supra note 92.
had been defeated in 1997.' Carol Migden, a Democrat from San Francisco,
introduced its assembly counterpart, AB 26, which began to move first and
thus became the focal point of advocacy. The registry bill was the first piece
of legislation sponsored by a newly formed group, the California Alliance for
Pride and Equality (CAPE), which was started in 1998 to advance LGBT-
friendly legislation."2
The debate around AB 26 reflected two different visions of what domestic
partnership should be. One viewed domestic partnership as a way to move the
legal status of same-sex couples incrementally closer to marriage, eventually
setting the stage for marriage equality. The second viewed domestic partnership
as a true alternative to marriage: "a kind of 'family diversity model' that would
create a system of legal protections that made sense for people who were not
necessarily a romantic intimate couple."'' As AB 26 made its way through the
assembly, these two visions vied with one another for primacy, reflecting
ambivalence within the LGBT rights community about the ultimate purpose
of domestic partner laws. For Lambda Legal's Davidson and the ACLU's
Coles, the goal was "to have a world in which marriage would be open to
everyone, and something that provided a less highly defined but still significant
safety net-like domestic partnership---would also be available to everyone. '
"Different people had different ideas.""' There was "not an agreement that
[advocates would] keep adding [to domestic partnership] until you got marriage
[as opposed to] adding what made sense until you had another status available
to everybody."'36
The tension between these competing visions was reflected in negotiations
leading up to the bill's enactment. Davidson and Coles were involved in the
initial drafting with the goal of getting "the concept accepted under California
law" by "start[ing] small, including things that only people seen as mean spirited
[would] deny, like hospital visitation."'3 They reviewed the Probate Code and
sought to modify existing statutes by focusing on "places where people [were]
really getting hurt" and thinking about what changes would be "the hardest
131. See Mark Gladstone, Davis Likely to Sign Domestic Partners Bill, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1999,
at A3.
132. CAPE replaced Life Lobby, which had served as a statewide umbrella for the many organi-
zations doing work around LGBT advocacy and HIV/AIDS in the 1990s. Telephone Interview With
Pizer, supra note 83.
133. Telephone Interview With Davidson, supra note 105.
134. Telephone Interview With Coles, supra note 99.
135. Id.
136. Telephone Interview With Davidson, supra note 105.
137. Id.
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to argue for or argue against. 1.8 Because they "were working at the time on
AIDS, [they] were hyper-attuned to intestate succession issues and guardi-
anship. Those are hard things to argue against."'39 In contrast, they held back
on community property because "it was a tougher sell-more marriage-like,"
and they "weren't sure the gay community was ready for it."'"
AB 26 supporters initially attempted to craft the bill as one that would
apply to both same- and different-sex couples for whom marriage was either
unavailable or did not meet their immediate needs, preventing it from being
ignored "as a gay people's thing."'' But this effort to widen the status to include
all different-sex couples drew a strong reaction from Governor Davis, who did
not want to be seen as weakening marriage by creating a competing scheme
that everyone could access. To allay Davis's concerns, Migden modified her
bill to only cover different-sex senior couples, contending that there was no
procreation argument in favor of their marriages and that, in some cases,
requiring senior couples to marry would deprive them of important social
security and pension benefits from prior marriages.'42 The specific addition of
seniors provided a new political constituency to support the bill and "gave
politicians cover" by linking the bill to an uncontroversial population.' The
change persuaded Governor Davis to sign AB 26 on October 2, 1999, thereby
establishing a registry that allowed domestic partners to have hospital visitation
rights and provided health benefits for partners of government employees
covered by the state retirement system.'" While it provided relatively meager
benefits, the registry bill was so controversial that legislators were forced to
add a provision declaring that "[riegistration as a domestic partner under this
division shall not be evidence of, or establish, any rights existing under law
other than those expressly provided to domestic partners" in the bill.14
Although significant-AB 26 was the first time a state had enacted a
domestic partnership bill in the absence of a judicial opinion requiring same-
sex partner recognition-the bill was incremental and some advocates were
skeptical of its impact. NCLR's Minter, though "supportive, thought it




142. Telephone Interview With Davidson, supra note 105; see also Ingram, supra note 92.
143. Interview With Matt Coles, Dir., ACLU LGBT Project, at UCLA Sch. of Law (Feb. 19,
2010).
144. Assem. B. 26, 1999-2000 Cal. Legis. Serv. 3372-3378 (West); see also Amy Pyle, State Begins
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didn't get us anything. We got hospital visitation and that was it. 'Is that
all?' I asked.' 46
Opponents of marriage for same-sex couples took a much different view.
To them, the pursuit of domestic partner legislation signaled a troubling
advance toward marriage. Even before AB 26 was introduced, the "Protection of
Marriage Committee," formed after the demise of AB 1982 by Pete Knight (who
was elected state senator in 1996), succeeded in qualifying Proposition 22 for
the March 7, 2000 ballot.'47 The passage of AB 26 gave Proposition 22 propo-
nents a new sense of urgency. Proposition 22 sought to accomplish through
initiative what Knight failed to do through legislation: amend the Family
Code to prohibit California from recognizing any marriage other than between a
man and a woman."' By the time Proposition 22 was introduced, Hawaii voters
had decided to amend their constitution to authorize the legislature to prohibit
same-sex marriage, and thus no state had legally married same-sex couples
for California to recognize. 49 Nonetheless, the Yes on 22 campaign, supported
by Christian Right groups like the Campaign for California Families, pressed
on with Proposition 22, arguing that the ongoing efforts to establish marriage
for same-sex couples in states like Vermont required immediate action."o
The Proposition 22 campaign was expensive and divisive. The Yes on 22
side raised over $8 million, much of it coming early in the campaign, from
the Catholic and Mormon Churches, along with thousands of individual
donors, many from out of state.' The No on 22 campaign had a slower
fundraising start, with only $2 million by January 2000 (compared to nearly
$5 million on the Yes side);'52 as a result, the No on 22 campaign did not air
television advertisements until mid-February.'" While the Yes on 22 forces
sought to display the proposition as threatening "traditional" marriage and
targeted specific ethnic groups, particularly Latinos, the No side initially aired
ads suggesting that the proposition would increase discrimination against gays
and lesbiansl 54-sticking with its mantra of "It's divisive. It's intrusive. It's
146. Telephone Interview With Minter, supra note 125.
147. See Carl Ingram, Measure to Ban Gay Marriages OKd for Ballot, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1998,
at A3; Jenifer Warren, Marriage Initiative Authors Challenge Its Renaming, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1999, at A3.
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Jan. 21, 2000, at A3.
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unfair." 5 Proposition 22 opponents also argued that precluding marriage for
same-sex couples would have negative impacts on adults and children in same-
sex-couple-headed families; these individuals would be deprived of legal rights
and forced to endure legal uncertainty. '56 The No campaign attempted to coun-
teract the organized Christian Right movement's support of Proposition 22 by
coordinating a multi-faith religious coalition opposed to the initiative."7 And
No forces portrayed Proposition 22 as Senator Knight's personal vendetta against
his gay son. ' Yet the No campaign faltered in its messaging and failed to do
significant targeted outreach to communities of color.59 With money streaming
in during the month before the election (the No on 22 campaign received
over half of its total funds during this time), the No forces stepped up their
attacks, airing a provocative ad showing "a single image: anti-gay protesters
holding signs that read 'God Hates Fags' and 'Faggots Bum in Hell.""'  But
it was too late. Proposition 22 passed by an overwhelming 61 percent to 39
percent margin.I"
The success of Proposition 22 prompted immediate disagreement about
next steps. For some, it was a repudiation of the incrementalist strategy formu-
lated by LGBT rights lawyers. The Los Angeles Times ran a story quoting West
Hollywood City Councilman Steve Martin, who rejected the counsel of gays
"in self-appointed leadership positions" arguing that "we choose our battles
carefully and steer away from the issue of marriage because it's too divisive";
instead, he stated that "[w]e're going to lay siege and storm the castle."'62 By
outlawing marriage, Proposition 22 had the effect of increasing the importance
of marriage as a movement goal. Yet, at least in the short term, Proposition
22 reinforced the movement lawyers' decision to downplay marriage and
avoid affirmative litigation in favor of a legislative strategy to expand domestic
partnership.'63 The lawyers chose not to challenge the constitutionality of
155. Toni Broaddus, Vote No If You Believe in Marriage: Lessons From the No on Knight/No on
Proposition 22 Campaign, 15 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 5 (2000).
156. See MICHAEL S. WALD, THE STANFORD INST. FOR RESEARCH ON WOMEN & GENDER &
THE STANFORD CR. ON AIX)LESCENCE, SAME-SEX COUPLES: MARRIAGE, FAMILIES, AND CHILDREN:
AN ANALYSIS OF PROPOSITION 22, THE KNIGHT INITIATIVE 19 (1999).
157. See Margaret Ramirez, Coaltion Rallying Against Initiative to Ban Gay Marriages, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 22, 2000, at B2.
158. See Jenifer Warren, Initiative Foes Turn to Author's Son, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2000, at A3.
159. See Broaddus, supra note 155, at 10.
160. Id. at 7.
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Proposition 22 at the time."6 This decision was partly based on a calculation
of how likely it was that such a lawsuit would succeed in court. It was also
informed by the lawyers' analysis of precisely what Proposition 22 had done.
Although it was true that Proposition 22 had barred the recognition of out-
of-state marriages by same-sex couples, at that point no states outside of
California had created such a marital status-and thus the bar, while anathema
to the movement lawyers' goals, was (for the moment) an empty letter. In
addition, from the movement lawyers' perspective, there was ambiguity about
whether Proposition 22 prohibited the state of California from itself deciding
to create the legal right to marry for same-sex couples. 65 Movement lawyers
pointed to ballot materials circulated with Proposition 22 stating that it would
"not take away anyone's rights to inheritance or hospital visitation" and,
instead, was only designed to close "legal loopholes" that "could force California
to recognize 'same-sex marriages' in other states."'"66 It was on this interpretation
of Proposition 22-proscribing California's power to recognize out-of-state
marriages, but not affecting its power to enact its own relationship recognition
laws-that advocates decided to proceed with their legislative strategy.
167
3. Stepping Stones: Planning for Marriage by Winning
Domestic Partnership
One lesson of the Proposition 22 campaign was the need for a stronger
political organization to advance legislation and run campaigns. In addition
to coordinating among legal, policy, and grassroots groups, CAPE was a major
fundraiser for the No on 22 campaign. However, Proposition 22 tested the
fledgling coalition, which was criticized for lacking strong central leadership
and the ability to effectively coordinate statewide efforts." For LGBT activists,
there was a sense that the No on 22 campaign had "lost both the battle and
the war, by not moving the education forward. ,,69 After the initiative
passed, CAPE's leader stepped down and was replaced by Geoff Kors as Interim
Director; Kors formally became the Executive Director the next year as the
organization, which would change its name to Equality California, became
164. Telephone Interview With Coles, supra note 99.
165. Codell Remarks, sup'ra note 129.
166. OFFICE OF THE SEC'Y OF STATE OF CAL, VOTER iNFORMATION GUIDE FOR MARcH 7,2000
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168. See DANIEL R. PINELLO, AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 96 (2006).
169. Id. (quoting Equality California's Molly McKay, Associate Executive Director of Equality
California).
1262
Lawyering for Marriage Equality
the public education and legislative advocacy arm of the marriage equality
movement. Its long-term focus was on "doing the positive educational work
about [the] lives and relationships [of same-sex couples] that's eventually
going to make [marriage] winnable in California."'' 0 In the near term, the
organization's goal was to become a major force within state politics. Equality
California did this by spearheading the drive for comprehensive domestic
partnership benefits-not simply as a goal in its own right but as a stepping stone
for moving incrementally closer to marriage. AB 26, the domestic partner
registry that took effect in January 2000, was the vehicle for this strategy-
turning "into a train that very rapidly moved in California."'7
Yet not everyone was on the train at the outset. The decision to use
domestic partnership as a stepping stone to marriage was in tension with
the position, held by Davidson and Coles, that domestic partnership should
be available as an independent status in its own right, separate and apart
from marriage. Coles, in particular, believed that most people in the LGBT
community "wanted some rights and ways to structure their relationships legally
but didn't really care how that happened.' 7 2 Those who "wanted marriage
and didn't want anything else," however, were a motivated group that consis-
tently advocated for marriage as the definitive legal status.'73 In the wake of
Proposition 22, the model of using domestic partnership as a means of winning
marriage increasingly gained sway.'74 Although many advocates did not abandon
domestic partnership as an independent status and, indeed, were still committed
to a diversity of legal relationship forms, the focus on domestic partnership as
an end in itself receded in the fight for marriage equality.
Beginning in 2000, advocates sponsored a series of bills that would culmi-
nate in the achievement of nearly equal rights and benefits. After adding the
right to secure senior housing in 2000, advocates succeeded in passing AB 25
in 2001, which among other things included the right of domestic partners to
adopt a partner's child using the stepparent adoption process, to make medical
decisions for a partner, and to use sick leave to care for a partner or a partner's
child.'75 In addition, AB 25 authorized the right to sue for the wrongful death
of a partner.'76 This last right was codified after the high-profile legal case of
Sharon Smith (brought by NCLR's Minter), whose partner was mauled to death
170. Id.
171. Kors Remarks, supra note 83.
172. Telephone Interview With Coles, supra note 99.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Jenifer Warren, Bill Expanding Domestic Partners' Rights Signed, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2001,
at B6.
176. See Julie Tamaki, Domestic Parmer Bill Clears Assembly, L.A. TIMES, June 7, 2001, at BI.
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by their neighbors' dogs in the hallway of their apartment building. The case
generated outrage that Smith had no clear rights under California's wrongful
death statute."'
At the time the legislation was passed, Governor Davis indicated that
he would veto giving domestic partners the right of inheritance, prompting
supporters to drop that provision from the bill. 7 However, less than one month
after AB 25 was signed into law, the September 11 attacks occurred. One of the
victims, a flight attendant on the first American Airlines flight to crash into
the World Trade Center, was the registered domestic partner of a California
resident, Keith Bradkowski. Lambda Legal's Pizer represented Bradkowski
in his difficult effort to receive money from victim compensation funds.
Bradkowski's powerful testimony in front of the California legislature was cred-
ited with helping ensure the passage of AB 2216 in 2002, which provided
domestic partners with inheritance rights.1
79
By 2003, the timing appeared auspicious for comprehensive domestic
partnership legislation. In 1999, the Vermont Supreme Court held in Baker
v. State'" that under the Vermont Constitution, same-sex couples were entitled
to all of the rights and benefits of marriage, even if the state was not required to
open up the actual institution of marriage to these couples.'8' In response to the
court's decision, Vermont had successfully instituted a civil union regime,
81
giving legislators some confidence that California could safely follow suit. A civil
union bill (drafted with the assistance of Lambda Legal's Davidson and Pizer)
was introduced by Assembly Member Paul Koretz, a Democrat from West
Hollywood, in 2001, but failed to gain sufficient support to move forward.'83
The concept of a comprehensive relationship recognition bill, however,
was far from dead. Instead, the framework and findings underlying the civil
union legislation were revised and repackaged into domestic partnership. The
177. In Sharon Smith's civil suit, the superior court in San Francisco ruled that a same-sex partner
had standing to sue for wrongful death. Shannon Minter, Expanding Wrongful Death Status and Other
Death Benefits to Same-Sex Partners, HUM. RTS., July 1, 2003, available at http://www.abanet.org/irr/hr/
summer03/expanding.htm; see also Solomon v. District of Columbia, 21 Fam. L Rep. (BNA) 1316 (D.C.
Super. Ct. 1995) (allowing a deceased woman's same-sex partner to prove that she was next of kin in
a wrongful death action).
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reformulated bill needed a legislative champion, which turned out to be promi-
nent Los Angeles progressive Jackie Goldberg, who arrived in the assembly in
2001 after a long tenure on Los Angeles's city council. As a member of the
assembly's LGBT caucus, she was approached in 2001 by Governor Davis, who
asked that the caucus not run any LGBT-focused bills the next year when
Davis was up for reelection.'" Goldberg agreed but extracted a deal: After Davis
was reelected, she wanted "the whole ball of wax"-comprehensive domestic
partnership.' Davis agreed, and Goldberg was assigned to be the principal
author. She then asked Lambda Legal's Davidson and Pizer, whom she knew
through other legislative efforts, to assist in drafting the legislation, which
would come to be known as AB 205.86 Although Goldberg had the assis-
tance of legislative counsel, she determined that "this was too delicate and
needed the hands of people for whom this was a passion and not just a job.' '187
Movement lawyers provided assistance,'88 Goldberg worked to line up votes, and
Equality California's Kors coordinated outside pressure on legislators.
In negotiating the bill, LGBT advocates gained important leverage from
the pending recall election against Davis, which made him reluctant to risk
alienating a core constituency.'89 Although Goldberg believed there was never
a risk that Davis "wasn't going to sign" the final legislation since "he never went
back on his word, 19 Kors thought that "had it not been for the recall of
Davis, the bill wouldn't have been signed.' 9 ' Despite Goldberg's efforts to
"~get votes,,' 92 the bill stalled in the assembly, where supporters were one
vote short.9 LGBT advocates were focusing resources on persuading liberal
Assembly Member Hannah-Beth Jackson from Santa Barbara, who was seeking
to run for state senate in a more conservative district. After multiple protests,
Jackson met with some of the bill's supporters and claimed that she would not
vote for the bill because Governor Davis had told her he would veto it. This
was news to LGBT advocates, who understood they had a deal. After a story
ran in the Santa Barbara News-Press reporting on the governor's purported
184. Telephone Interview With Jackie Goldberg, Faculty Adviser, UCLA TEACH/Compton
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opposition,'94 LGBT rights groups pressured Davis to demonstrate his
commitment to domestic partnership by convincing Jackson to support the bill,
which he was able to do.'95
In terms of the bill's provisions, there were a number of strategic decisions
and compromises. Davidson and Pizer, drawing on the Koretz civil union bill
as a model, convinced Goldberg early on to draft the bill as a blanket provision
of all the rights of spouses, rather than to enumerate rights individually.'
96
Davidson was afraid that amending individual statutes "would leave certain
things out because we would miss some issues and [fail to capture issues] every
time a new statute was passed. Also, we wanted [domestic partnership to apply]
pervasively throughout the law, [not just to statutes, but also] to the common
law, rules, regulations, and guidelines."' 97 The issue, then, became what would
be excluded from this general grant of rights.
A key struggle was over the rights to community property and spousal
support, which Davis considered "too marriage-y,,' 98 and therefore wanted out
of the final bill.' The lawyers believed that including these rights was essential
to creating financial parity within the domestic partnership regime: Because
domestic partners would be responsible for each other's debts, they should
also be entitled to each other's assets in the event the relationship did not work
out."to In the absence of such parity, there was a "risk that the financially weaker
party could end up with the responsibility for the debts of the wealthier one
without the right to claim community property or spousal support."20 '
The opportunity for a compromise on this issue came after the Williams
Project, a national research institute on sexual orientation law and policy that
had been recently established at the UCLA School of Law, released an impor-
tant report. At the legislature's request, Williams Project researchers provided an
analysis of the financial consequences of comprehensive domestic partnership.
Their overall conclusion-that the law would positively impact the state budget
194. Rhonda Parks Manville, Concened Gay Parents Lobby Assemblywonum, SANTA BARBARA
NEWS-PRESS, May 31, 2003.
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16, 2010).
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by up to $10.6 million per year °2-was tempered by the fact that one reason
for this gain was that AB 205 would effectively increase taxes on some same-
sex couples who would no longer be able to separately claim deductions for
dependent children.2 ' That the increase would be more than counterbalanced
by a reduction in tax revenues based on the ability of same-sex couples to use
the "married filing jointly" status presented Davis with the worst of both
political worlds 24-he would lose needed state tax revenue while still "being
hoisted on the petard of raising taxes."20 5 The parties therefore agreed to a com-
promise: Goldberg would drop the joint tax filing provision from the bill in
exchange for Davis's support for community property and spousal support.
While the tax issue offered important leverage in negotiating for commu-
nity property and spousal support, advocates also used stories from their own
litigation to show how the lack of such rights imposed real harms on financially
vulnerable partners. 216 On a related issue-whether a child born to a registered
domestic partnership should be presumed the child of both partners-advocates
were helped by the case of Lydia Ramos, whose partner died in a car accident
and whose youngest daughter was taken by relatives of the deceased partner.
Lambda Legal represented Ramos, who ultimately received custody, and her
testimony in support of AB 205 was credited with helping advance the bill's
provision applying the presumption of parentage to domestic partners.0
With all of these details worked out by late September 2003, Governor
Davis signed AB 20 5 ,"08 which stated in sweeping language that domestic
partners
shall have the same rights, protections, and benefits, and shall be
subject to the same responsibilities, obligations, and duties under law,
whether they derive from statutes, administrative regulations, court rules,
202. See M.V. LEE BADGEFF & R. BRADLEY SEARS, EQUAL RIGHTS, FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY:
THE IMPACr OF AB 205 ON CALIFORNIA'S BUDGEr (2003); see also Appropriazon Comm. Tesrimony on
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government policies, common law, or any other provisions or sources of
law, as are granted to and imposed upon spouses."'
The start date of the law was deferred until January 1, 2005, in order to
allow time for those already registered as domestic partners, but who did not
want the full panoply of rights and responsibilities created by AB 205, to
delist themselves from the registry."' Although the bill left out some rights, such
as the ability to file joint tax returns,"' it was hailed as a major advance for LGBT
rights, second only to Vermont's civil union statute."' Given that same-sex
couples had no state rights only four years earlier-and "the very notion that
211you would treat gay couples as a family was extremely controversial" to some -
AB 205 was a significant advance.2 4
Although the domestic partnership bills were important on their own
terms, the lawyers who drafted them did so with an eye toward eventual
marriage litigation. "We were able to create through the legislative process a
body of findings and policy on same-sex couples [showing] how they are equal
in every way... [in order to] set up suspect class arguments.""2 5 These findings
were designed to support constitutionally based marriage arguments by showing
that the state's interest in denying marriage was invalid. For instance, AB 205
noted both the significance of discrimination and the reality of same-sex-couple-
headed families:
The Legislature hereby finds and declares that despite longstanding
social and economic discrimination, many lesbian, gay, and bisexual
Californians have formed lasting, committed, and caring relationships
with persons of the same sex. These couples share lives together, partici-
pate in their communities together, and many raise children and care for
other dependent family members together.1 6
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2010)); see also Grace Ganz Blumberg, Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Conjugal Relationships: The 2003
California Domestic Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act in Comparative Civil Rights and Family Law
Perspective, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1555 (2004).
210. See Jones & Vogel, supra note 208.
211. This was later amended in SB 1827, which required domestic partners to use the same tax
filing status as married couples beginning in 2007.
212. Jones & Vogel, supra note 208. But see Carol A. Docan & Richard F. Sperling, California's
Domestic Partnership Law: Incremental Progress or Dramatic Social Change?, 14 WM. MARY J. WOMEN
& L. 153 (2007); Enrique A. Monagas, California's Assembly Bill 205, The Domestic Partner Rights and
Responsibilities Act of 2003: Is Domestic Partner Legislation Compromising the Campaign for Marriage
Equality?, 17 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 39 (2006).
213. Codell Remarks, supra note 129.
214. Id.
215. Kors Remarks, supra note 83.
216. 2003 Cal. Legis. Serv. 2586-2595, 2588 (West).
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Thus, while they were advancing a separate legislative system to govern same-
sex relationships, advocates were also laying the groundwork to argue for their
ultimate inadequacy: If same-sex couples were equal to their heterosexual
counterparts in terms of their ability to care for one another, inherit property,
and raise families, then to deny them marriage "had to be animus. '
C. The Best Laid Plans: Litigating Marriage by Necessity
1. Cooler Heads Prevail: Rejecting Litigation (Again) by Consensus
Whether or not to pursue marriage litigation was the agenda of a January
2003 meeting of lawyers and academics at the UCLA School of Law
convened by the Williams Project. The project was headed by Brad Sears, a
1995 Harvard Law School graduate who had received an Echoing Green fel-
lowship to start the HIV Legal Checkup Project in Los Angeles and then joined
the staff of the HIV/AIDS Legal Services Alliance of Los Angeles before becom-
ing the Williams Project's founding executive director. At the time, Sears was
joined by the Williams Project's faculty chair, Professor Bill Rubenstein, who
was the author of a leading casebook on sexual orientation law and widely
considered one of the country's foremost authorities on LGBT legal issues.
The 2003 meeting, called the California Marriage Litigation Roundtable,
was an invitation-only event designed to bring together legal scholars and
movement lawyers to evaluate the possibility of litigation based on the best
research available. 1 ' The meeting was prompted by the interest of some lawyers
and activists-moved by the ongoing Massachusetts case-in pursuing marriage
litigation in California. The formal goal was to "have a state-wide discussion
about whether same-sex marriage litigation, similar to the cases brought in other
states such as Vermont and New Jersey, should be brought in California.,
219
The meeting was attended by all of the major LGBT rights lawyers-including
Coles, Davidson, Kendell, Kors, Minter, Pizer, and ACLU lawyers Jordan Budd
(Legal Director of the ACLU in San Diego), Maggie Crosby (Staff Attorney
at the ACLU-NC), and Martha Matthews (Staff Attorney at the ACLU-SC)-
and leading legal academics whose work touched on LGBT themes.2
217. Kors Remarks, supra note 83.
218. Telephone Interview With Brad Sears, Executive Dir., Williams Inst. (Jan. 7, 2010).
219. Invitation Letter, California Marriage Litigation Roundtable (on file with author).
220. The academics were Devon Carbado (UCLA), Erwin Chemerinsky (USC), Barbara Cox
(California Western), David Cruz (USC), Isabelle Gunning (Southwestern), Chris Littleton (UCLA),
Bill Rubenstein (UCLA), Michael Wald (Stanford), and Tobias Wolff (UC Davis). Also in attendance
were other lawyers affiliated with the movement-David Codell and Laura Brill from Irell & Manella,
Jay Kohorn of the California Appellate Project, Molly McKay from Gordon & Rees, M.E. Stephens
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The sessions included in-depth discussions of potential legal theories and
venues, the likelihood of success and the risks of losing, and alternative
121political strategies. In preparation for the meeting, advocates wrote briefing
papers on aspects of the contemplated litigation, which included analyses of
California doctrine related to LGBT rights and marriage law, an evaluation
of California Supreme Court justices, and an overview of marriage litigation
nationwide.222 Included in these conference materials was also an extensive
analysis of the possibility of a ballot initiative banning marriage by constitutional
amendment if litigation were successful. That memo concluded with the fol-
lowing admonition:
[Any decision to file a marriage case in California... needs to include
[consideration of] whether political, donor and public support for allowing
same-sex couples to marry has increased sufficiently that such an initiative
could be defeated at the polls, and whether now is the right time to
undertake this potential battle .... Failure to consider these matters could
make affirmative marriage litigation not only futile, but it could set back future
attempts to obtain both judicial and legislative reform to the marriage laws. 223
As a result of the roundtable discussion, the participants decided that the
timing was not yet right for marriage litigation in California.224 In particular, they
concluded that although it might be possible to prevail on the merits in the
California Supreme Court, it would be too difficult to defeat a subsequent
initiative,225 which was certain to occur, because public opinion was not yet
on the side of marriage for same-sex couples. As one participant noted: "Sure
we can litigate it and make beautiful arguments [but that would] draw all the
crazies out of the woodwork at the next election and that's not helpful." '226
The conclusion to avoid litigation was thus carefully considered and systematic,
from Stock Stephens, Los Angeles litigator Carol Sobel, and Clyde Wadsworth from Heller, Ehrman,
White & McAuliffe-as well as activists such as Toni Broaddus from Californians for Civil Marriage.
The Williams Project, Marriage Litigation on Behalf of Same-Sex Couples in California: A Roundtable
Discussion, Participants Guide P3-P16 (Jan. 10, 2003) [hereinafter Marriage Litigation Roundtable].
221. Agenda, Marriage Litigation Roundtable, supra note 220.
222. Marriage Litigation Roundtable, supra note 220, at 61-189.
223. Memorandum on Amendment of the California Constitution From Jon W. Davidson, Legal
Counsel, Lambda Legal, to California Marriage Litigation Roundtable, Dec. 16, 2002 (on file with author)
(emphasis added).
224. Telephone Interview With Pizer, supra note 83.
225. This was based in part on polling data indicating that while support for same-sex marriage
had gone up nearly 15 percent since 1996, it was still nearly 5 percentage points lower than opposition.
226. Telephone Interview With Martha Matthews, Supervising Attorney, Children's Law Ctr.
of Los Angeles (Feb. 12, 2010).
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guided by the lawyers' core strategic principle, which was to "maximize success
and minimize loss .... Success breeds success, and a loss holds us back.,
227
2. Litigating in Defense of Domestic Partnership
The strategy coming out of the AB 205 battle was to defend domestic
partnership against anticipated legal attack and allow the public to gradually
get used to the reality of domestic partnership as the law took effect beginning
in 2005.2 Marriage litigation was deliberately deferred, with advocates eyeing
2212006 as the earliest possible date for a frontal legal challenge to marriage.
As Lambda Legal's Pizer put it: "Smart people had thought about it. We had
a plan.
'210
Initially, the strategy unfolded according to plan. The day after the pas-
sage of AB 205, Senator Knight, under the auspices of the Proposition 22
Legal Defense and Education Fund (which he founded),231 sued the state in
Sacramento Superior Court to enjoin the law as a violation of Proposition 22.232
Arizona-based Alliance Defense Fund (ADF) and affiliated attorney Andrew
Pugno, Knight's former chief of staff,23 served as counsel. ADF, which was
founded in 1994 by evangelical leaders, 3 ' engaged in litigation devoted to
"guarding the sanctity of human life," "protecting marriage and the family,"
and "defending religious freedom.
23
ADF's central argument was that AB 205, by "extend[ing] the rights and
duties of marriage to persons registered as domestic partners," contravened
Proposition 22's language limiting marriage to a man and woman. 36 Specifically,
they claimed that AB 205 constituted a legislative amendment to the marriage
initiative, which, under the California Constitution, was invalid without the
227. Telephone Interview With Pizer, supra note 83; see also Evan Wolfson, Marriage Equality
and Some Lessons for the Scary Work of Winning, 14 LAW & SEXUALITY 135, 141 (2005).
228. Pizer Remarks, supra note 94.
229. Id.
230. Id.; see also Erika Hayasaki, Activists Look for Ways to Establish Gay Marriage in California,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2003, at B3.
231. See Lee Romney, Foes of Gay Marriage Can't Join Case, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2004, at B6.
232. Nancy Vogel, Foes of Partner Law File Suit, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2003, at B1.
233. See Jenifer Warren, State Sen. Knight Laments Gay Son's Commentary, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 15,
1999, at A3.
234. See AllianceDefenseFund, History, http://www.alliancedefensefund.org/about/History/
Default.aspx (last visited June 6, 2010).
235. AllianceDefenseFund, Issues, http://www.alliancedefensefund.org/issues/Default.aspx (last vis-
ited June 6, 2010); see also Douglas NeJaime, Inclusion, Accommodation, and Recognition: Accounting for
Differences Based on Religion and Sexual Orientation, 32 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 303,322-23 (2009).
236. Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 26, Knight v. Davis, No.
03AS05284 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 8, 2004), 2003 WL 25776689.
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separate approval of the voters."7 A similar lawsuit against AB 205 was filed
in Los Angeles by the Campaign for California Families (CCF),238 a self-
described "pro-family" organization founded by social conservative activist and
Proposition 22 organizer Randy Thomasson 39 Opponents also introduced a
referendum to reverse the law, but the referendum was quickly dropped, as
polling suggested that it would fail. The legal cases were consolidated in the
Sacramento court, which granted permission to Equality California and a
group of registered domestic partners (represented by LGBT rights lawyers) to
intervene in the case,2" Knight v. Superior Court.24" '
David Codell, a private attorney who had been a partner at Irell & Manella
before starting his own firm in 2003, was lead counsel in the case, joined by
Lambda Legal's Davidson and Pizer, NCLR's Minter, and several attorneys
from the ACLU, including Peter Eliasberg in Los Angeles, Christine Sun in San
Francisco, and Budd in San Diego. Codell was a highly accomplished lawyer-
a Harvard Law School graduate who had clerked for Justice Ginsburg on the
Supreme Court-and had been heavily involved in LGBT rights litigation
on a pro bono basis while at Irell.242
In arguing in support of AB 205, lawyers were faced with a strategic choice.
The court of appeal in Sacramento, where the case would be decided, was
considered to be a conservative court not likely to be moved by arguments
about the merits of domestic partnership as a distinct legal status."' For Codell,
"the key was to convince [the court] that ours was the more conservative posi-
tion" under California initiative law.2" It was also important for lawyers to make
it very clear that domestic partnership was not marriage. Because ADF argued
that AB 205 was intended to establish rights tantamount to marriage, distin-
guishing domestic partnership was crucial to undercutting ADF's core claim.
Yet advocates had another reason for asking the court to rule that domestic
partnership was not marriage: "Because then, when marriage litigation was before
237. Id. T 31.
238. See Knight v. Schwarzenegger, Nos. 03AS05284, 03AS07035, 2004 WL 2011407, at *1
(Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 8, 2004).
239. See Motion by Campaign for California Families to Intervene as Respondent With Supporting
Memorandum of Points and Authorities and Declaration of Randy Thomasson in Support at 15, Strauss v.
Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009) (No. S168047); Campaign for Children and Families, About, http://
savecalifomia.com/about.html (last visited June 6, 2010).
240. Codell Remarks, supra note 129.
241. 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 687 (Ct. App. 2005).
242. See Law Office of David C. Codell, http://www.codell.com/codell.html (last visited
June 6, 2010).
243. Codell Remarks, supra note 129.
244. Id.
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the courts, there would no longer be a question that gay couples were being
denied equal protection of the laws." '245
The lawyers therefore decided to lead with what could be viewed as a
conservative argument rooted in the initiative process-"that to protect the
people's initiative power, you have to construe the measure to mean what
the voters would have understood it to mean" 246-and then to follow that up
with an argument about the difference between domestic partnership and
marriage. The lawyers stressed that their lead argument was consistent with the
interpretation set forth in the Proposition 22 ballot materials, which emphasized
that the initiative did not take away rights (such as domestic partnership), but
rather precluded the recognition of same-sex marriages. The trial court agreed,
dismissing the case on summary judgment on the grounds that "the domestic
partners act does not amend the defense of marriage initiative and, therefore,
its enactment without subsequent voter approval does not violate California's
Constitution.
2 47
In December 2004, ADF filed a petition for writ of mandate with the
appellate court to block enforcement of AB 205, which was to go into effect
on January 1, 2005. The appellate court denied the request for a stay, but issued
another writ asking the movement lawyers to show why the trial court should
not be reversed. 248 The lawyers filed the brief and were prepared for the worst.
24 9
However, to their relief, the court of appeal issued a ruling that agreed with
their position, holding that "the initiative was intended only to limit the status of
marriage to heterosexual couples and to prevent the recognition in California
of homosexual marriages that have been, or may in the future be, legitimized
by laws of other jurisdictions., 250 The appellate court adopted the conservative
argument proffered by Codell and his cocounsel, holding that if Proposition
22 was intended to repeal or limit the legislature's power to enact laws regulating
domestic partnership, "the electorate was not given the opportunity to vote
on that undisclosed objective, and courts are precluded from interpreting
Proposition 22 in a manner that was not presented to the voters., 251 Having
so held, the appellate court declined to review Proposition 22's constitutional
merits.252 The decision was upheld against a collateral challenge in 2006."' 3
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Knight v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 687, 689 (Ct. App. 2005).
248. Id.
249. Codell Remarks, supra note 129.
250. Knight, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 690.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Knight v. Schwarzenegger, No. C048596, 2006 WL 650659 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2006).
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The success in the AB 205 case was important on two levels. First, it was
a key victory on its own terms, as it cemented the legal validity of the domes-
tic partnership regime that advocates had worked so hard to build. Second,
it paved the way for a future push toward establishing marriage as a legal
right in California. As lawyers had planned, the Knight decision created a
judicial record that domestic partnership was deliberately established as a legal
status "inferior to marriage." '254 This would serve to strengthen the lawyers' posi-
tion that the California marriage laws violated equal protection-an argument
that was already in play at the California Supreme Court by the time Knight
was resolved.
3. Game Change: Marriage Equality in San Francisco
The drive toward marriage-which would appear imminent when the
AB 205 case ended in 2006-was still considered a distant goal when the case
began three years earlier. The initial catalyst came from Massachusetts,
where GLAD had also been laying the groundwork for a marriage challenge
since the late 1990s.2 5' Like Vermont, the Massachusetts Constitution was
relatively difficult to amend, and the state had increasingly recognized the rights
of lesbians and gay men.256 On November 18, 2003, just a few months after
the U.S. Supreme Court struck down Texas's antisodomy law in Lawrence
v. Texas, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held in Goodridge v.
Department of Public Health258 that same-sex couples had the right to marry
under the Massachusetts Constitution. While the legislature and other officials
immediately attempted to frame the decision as requiring only Vermont-style
civil unions, the court clarified in a separate opinion on February 3, 2004,
that only full marriage equality would satisfy constitutional mandates. 59 Same-
sex couples began to marry on May 17, 2004, and the legislature defeated
repeated attempts to send a constitutional amendment prohibiting same-sex
marriage to the voters.26
254. Codell Remarks, supra note 129.
255. Bonauto declined a marriage case during her first week at GLAD in March 1990 and did
not file the Goodridge challenge until April 2001. See Bonauto Memo, supra note 55, at 3.
256. The legislature had enacted an antidiscrimination law, and the courts had announced signifi-
cant parental rights at the same time that they expanded the rights of unmarried different-sex couples.
See Bonauto, Goodridge in Context, supra note 55, at 10-16.
257. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
258. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
259. See In re Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004).
260. See Andrea Estes & Scott Helman, Legi/azure Again Bcks Bid to Ban Gay Maniage, BOSTON
GLOBE, Nov. 10, 2006, at Al.
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The Massachusetts decision energized both those supporting the right
of same-sex couples to marry and those opposed. In his State of the Union
address delivered on January 20, 2004, President George W. Bush vowed to
"protect" the institution of marriage from "activist judges., 261 A movement was
launched to create a Federal Marriage Amendment, which would change the
U.S. Constitution to prohibit states from allowing same-sex couples to marry.262
And more states adopted their own constitutional amendments restricting
marriage to different-sex couples.
On the other side, officials in more progressive areas of the country wel-
comed the Goodridge decision. In California, after the decision was announced,
Democratic State Assembly Member Mark Leno from San Francisco called
Kors of Equality California (with whom Leno had worked in passing AB 205)
and developed a plan to introduce a marriage equality bill.2" While Leno
"wasn't convinced we needed to fight a war over a word," Goodridge changed
his mind "irrevocably" by asserting that the "only remedy is marriage and
marriage alone .... [Goodridge] struck a chord in me and I said, 'I want to do
a marriage bill.""'26
Movement lawyers, however, were not so convinced. Their concerns cen-
tered both on timing-the bill would come up during a presidential election
year-and the risk of failure. With respect to the latter, the lawyers were worried
that if the state legislature rejected the bill, it would create a negative public
record at a time when they were trying to carefully build forward momentum.266
Several "weeks of conference calls" ensued among Leno, Kors, Lambda Legal's
Davidson and Pizer, and NCLR's Kendell and Minter.2 67 A compromise was
struck in which it was agreed that the bill would be passed out of the Assembly
Judiciary Committee as a first step, but that Leno would ask the Appropriations
Committee to hold the bill there to prevent it from reaching the full assembly
before the presidential election in 2004.268 As Leno recalls:
I knew it was a presidential election year and likely we didn't have
the votes. But I knew we'd be making history, just to get out of the first
committee. I proactively stated that I, not the [Assembly] Speaker [Fabian
261. PINELLO, supra note 168, at 75.
262. See S.J. Res. 26, 108th Cong. (2003), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/
z?c108:S.J.RES.26:.
263. See Bonauto, Goodridge in Context, supra note 55, at 64.
264. Telephone Interview With Mark Leno, Cal. Senator (Feb. 9, 2010).
265. Id.
266. Telephone Interview With Jennifer Pizer, Dir., Marriage Project, Lambda Legal (Feb. 13,
2010).
267. Telephone Interview With Leno, supra note 264.
268. Id.
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Nunez], would be the heavy and hold the bill in Appropriations with
the promise that we would be back in December 2004 after the election
with a newly introduced bill for 2005 with the intent of getting it to the
governor's desk 69
Drafting the bill was simple, since it only required "chang[ing] a few words in
the Family Code. 2' 0 Although Leno and Kors knew the bill "didn't have the
necessary floor votes," their idea was "to build momentum, educate the public,
and push moderate Democrats. '271 They planned to introduce the bill around
Valentine's Day in 2004.272
This plan was disrupted, however, by San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom,
who had attended President Bush's speech as a guest of San Francisco
Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi and was particularly dismayed by Bush's posi-
tion on marriage. 27' Although Newsom had only been in office for twelve
days, his "disbelief' at Bush's divisive rhetoric strengthened his resolve "to do
something. '274 After reviewing the Goodridge decision in tandem with the
California Constitution's equality guarantee, Newsom concluded that a proper
interpretation of the state constitution would allow same-sex couples to marry.
Newsom approached his chief of staff, Steve Kawa, and said, "We're going to
do this. Figure out how."'275 In early February 2004, he decided to order the San
Francisco County Clerk to begin issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples.276
Although the later press accounts suggested that it was "political suicide, 27
Newsom's decision was motivated in part by a calculation of the political
benefits.17  After barely defeating a progressive challenger in the mayoral
contest, Newsom's decision would serve to shore up his progressive base in
San Francisco.2 79 In the long term, Newsom was betting that "by the time [he]
is ready to be a United States senator, in a decade, [this] will ... have been




271. Kors Remarks, supra note 83.
272. Telephone Interview With Leno, supra note 264.
273. See PINELLO, supra note 168, at 74-76.
274. Id. at 75.
275. Id.
276. See id. at 76-77.
277. Rone Tempest, S.F.'s Hero of the Moment, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2004, at B1.
278. See Lee Romney, World Beats a Path to S.F. Mayor Newsom's Door, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 13,
2004, at Al.
279. See PINELLO, supra note 168, at 77-79 (quoting an anonymous member of San Francisco's
Board of Supervisors and NCLR's Kate Kendell).
280. Id. at 78 (quoting an anonymous member of San Francisco's Board of Supervisors).
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Although LGBT rights leaders subsequently lauded Newsom's decision as
"chang[ing] the nature of the debate,"28 ' they were not included in the delib-
erations leading up to it and initially expressed serious concerns about the
national and local implications. While some were publicly calling Newsom a
hero, others were privately asking, "How the hell could he do this?... How
much consultation was there with the gay community?
'282
On Friday, February 6, 2004, Kawa called NCLR director Kendell to inform
her that the mayor was planning to start issuing marriage licenses to same-sex
couples on the following Monday. 23 Kendell worried about the consequences.
She was "shocked" and "started expressing reservations about the idea .... So
I said, 'Steve, we've really got to check this out in Massachusetts. In addition,
we've got the whole Federal Marriage Amendment situation. You really need to
think about this a little bit more."'2  Kendell also warned that issuing marriage
licenses "could trigger support for a [state] constitutional amendment., 285
Kendell's first call was to Minter,8 6 who (along with staff attorney
Courtney Joslin) deliberated and "initially tried to talk [Newsom] out of
it. '28 7 However, when Kendell talked again to Kawa, he made it clear that the
call "was an act of notification, not consultation." '88 During the weekend,
Kendell consulted with GLAD and the Human Rights Campaign, the main
national LGBT political group. 289 Her discussions with GLAD attorneys in
Massachusetts-where the legislature was dealing with a variety of proposals
in the wake of the court's order that civil unions were insufficient 29 -- made
Kendell think that perhaps it was a good idea from a national political perspec-
tive: "The Massachusetts people.., liked the idea of a Western front opening
up, so that there would be more of a national conversation, instead of
'Massachusetts is an outlier and not part of the natural politics of the country.""'29
GLAD lawyers made clear that they did not think Newsom's decision in San
Francisco would harm their result in Goodridge.292 Kendell and her staff had
281. Id. at 79 (quoting Molly McKay, Associate Executive Director of Equality California).
282. Telephone Interview With Davidson, supra note 105.
283. Kate Kendell, The Right to Marry and the San Francisco Experience, 44 FAM. CT. REv. 33,
37 (2006).
284. PINELLO, supra note 168, at 76.
285. Telephone Interview With Kate Kendell, Executive Dir., Nat'l Ctr. for Lesbian Rights (Feb.
22, 2010).
286. Id.
287. Telephone Interview With Minter, supra note 125.
288. PINELLO, supra note 168, at 77.
289. Telephone Interview With Kendell, supra note 285.
290. See In re Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004).
291. P1NELLO, supra note 168, at 77.
292. See Bonauto Memo, supra note 55, at 3.
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further discussions during the weekend that led Kendell to "be completely
convinced that we should do this. 293 The NCLR team concluded: "Why should
we try to talk [Newsom] out of it? Who are we to do that? We agree with
him on the substance." '294 Kendell switched from reticence to "a 'game on' sensi-
bility. If this is what's up, let's go for it."'29 With Newsom's decision, "[tihere was
this sense of possibility. This could be a game-changing moment."'2 96 Although
Minter was "nervous about where it would end up," he concluded that it "was
the right thing to do."'297
Other LGBT rights groups were not contacted directly by Newsom, and
when they found out about his plans, some were not as positive as NCLR. On
Monday, February 9, Kendell called the ACLU's Coles,29 who agreed with
Newsom "on the substance, but disagreed with the strategic decision."299 For
NCLR lawyers, however, by the time they met with the mayor's senior staff
that same day, the political calculus was clear: Since "the mayor was defi-
nitely going to [issue licenses]," 3°° NCLR could not be in the position of
opposing what would be a watershed decision in the struggle for martiage
equality. Kendell concluded that, "What this demands is that people be engaged
and take some risks on their own initiative in order to move issues forward in a
difficult political environment."3 '01 In collaboration with other LGBT rights
advocates, NCLR's best hope was to shape the debate once it unfolded and to
harness the opportunity to advance public education and prepare for the legal
challenge that would surely come.
In the heat of the moment, NCLR did not foresee "an affirmative
marriage case," but rather was busy "prepping the mayor with talking points
about the history of marriage litigation" to get him ready for the media
attention his decision would create."2 Kendell also focused on the public educa-
tion piece. She had met Del Martin, 83, and Phyllis Lyon, 79-a lesbian couple
who had been together for over fifty years-when she first moved to San
Francisco in the mid-1990s. Del and Phyllis were considered "pioneers" of the
movement, and Kendell believed that they "had to be" the first couple to be
293. PINELLO, supra note 168, at 77.
294. Telephone Interview With Minter, supra note 125.
295. Telephone Interview With Kendell, supra note 285.
296. Id.
297. Telephone Interview With Minter, supra note 125.
298. Telephone Interview With Kendell, supra note 285.
299. Telephone Interview With Coles, supra note 99.
300. PINELLO, supra note 168, at 77 (quoting NCLR's Kate Kendell).
301. Id. at 94.
302. Telephone Interview With Kendell, supra note 285.
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married in San Francisco. 3 Kendell called Del and Phyllis, and they agreed-
a decision that involved becoming spokespeople for the national cause in what
would quickly become a media frenzy. Kendell then worked with the mayor's
office to orchestrate Del and Phyllis's ceremony on the steps of City Hall and
sought to avoid an immediate legal challenge, "so that we could at least get them
married."3"
Kendell and other movement lawyers knew that marriage opponents
would seek to enjoin the issuance of licenses-an issue that would fall to the
San Francisco Office of the City Attorney to defend. The city attorney's legal
team was led by Chief Deputy Therese Stewart, who joined the office in 2002
to oversee litigation, after doing pro bono work on its behalf. Stewart had a
strong background in LGBT rights, although she did not come to the office to
pursue that work.3"5 Prior to joining the city attorney's office, she had been a
partner at Howard, Rice, Nemerovsky, Canady, Falk & Rabin, where she had
been chair of the San Francisco Bar's LGBT Committee and active on LGBT
pro bono issues.) 6 Stewart and her staff met with Newsom on Monday, February
9-after the mayor's staff had already spoken with NCLR-when "the train
was already well on its way" with respect to Newsom's marriage license plans.0 '
Stewart presumed that the mayor's prior deliberations and conversations with
NCLR had sorted out "the political implications," and thus focused her dis-
cussion on the legal "pros and cons, what was likely to happen, and the
uncertainties."3" After the meeting, Stewart "pulled the smartest people" she
could find to figure out how to "stave off an immediate injunction .... It was
completely insane."3"
On February 10, after his meeting with the city attorneys, Newsom sent
a letter to the San Francisco County Clerk asking that she "determine what
changes should be made to the forms and documents used to apply for and issue
marriage licenses in order to provide marriage licenses on a non-discriminatory
basis, without regard to gender or sexual orientation.""31 The letter suggested
that Newsom was acting to uphold the California Constitution, which he
claimed prohibited discrimination against lesbians and gay men with respect to
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Telephone Interview With Therese Stewart, Chief Deputy, San Francisco City
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marniage.' The clerk designed a gender-neutral marriage application and on
February 12 Newsom announced that he would order the clerk to begin giving
marriage licenses to same-sex couples."' Senator Leno introduced his marriage
bill that same day, but it received little notice.3 3
Newsom's announcement was met with both shock and jubilation.
Democratic leaders warned of its repercussions in an election year in which
Democrats wanted to unseat President Bush and make gains in Congress."4 Yet
its most immediate effect was to unleash a flood of same-sex marriages (over
four thousand in the end) that began with the much-publicized union of Del and
Phyllis, who instantly became icons."5
"It was a magical and heady time" 3' 6-one that LGBT rights advocates
tried to use to send a powerful public education message: "[T]here were all these
lesbian and gay couples in long-term, committed relationships, with their chil-
dren, with their parents, with family there celebrating, and who'd been together
at least as long as most nongay couples. And the sky didn't fall."3 '7 Some lawyers
were more skeptical about how the images of same-sex couples marrying would
be received. Coles, for instance, believed that "most Americans didn't react to
the pictures of couples marrying in San Francisco by saying, 'This is great.""'3 8
Nonetheless, in the wake of Newsom's decision, movement leaders
sought to use the "winter of love"3 '9 to make the case that allowing same-sex
couples to marry caused no harm to the institution of marriage and therefore
denying them the right to do so was sheer discrimination. It was an argument
that would be crucial to convincing the public to support marriage for same-
sex couples against a voter initiative to impose a constitutional ban that leaders
feared would come.320 It was also potentially relevant to a constitutional analysis
of marriage equality, which the Newsom decision had placed on an inexorable
path toward a state supreme court ruling.
311. Id.; see also Lee Romney, In S.F., a Test Case for Gays, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11,2004, at B1.
312. Lockyer, 95 P.3d at 465.
313. Kors Remarks, supra note 83.
314. Tempest, supra note 277.
315. Kendell, supra note 283, at 38.
316. Id.
317. PINELLO, supra note 168, at 79-80 (quoting Molly McKay, Associate Executive Director
of Equality California).
318. Telephone Interview With Coles, supra note 99.
319. PINELLO, supra note 168, at 80.
320. See id. at 97 (quoting Molly McKay, Associate Executive Director of Equality California).
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4. Winning Despite Themselves: In re Marriage Cases
For the lawyers who had labored to carefully control the timing and nature
of any marriage challenge, the Newsom decision immediately transformed
the political landscape. Overnight, the question for the lawyers became: "What
part of our strategy can we salvage?""32 The answer emerged out of a thicket
of legal wrangling over the San Francisco marriages. On February 13, 2004,
two legal challenges were filed, one by the Proposition 22 Legal Defense and
Education Fund,322 and the other by CCF.3 23 ADF represented the Proposition
22 Legal Defense and Education Fund.3"4 CCF was represented by Florida-
based Liberty Counsel, 2' a Christian Right legal organization tied to Jerry
Falwell's Liberty University that was founded in 1989 to protect "religious
freedom" and advance "traditional family values."326 San Francisco Chief Deputy
City Attorney Stewart led the team of government lawyers defending the
legality of the marriages. Neither the ADF nor the Liberty Counsel suit directly
raised the constitutionality of California's existing marriage scheme. 27 Instead,
the challenges focused on the question of local government authority to issue
marriage licenses,328 and sought a writ of mandate (and immediate stay) directing
the San Francisco County Clerk to cease issuing marriage licenses to same-sex
couples.329
Yet the premise of the writ actions-that the underlying marriage laws
were valid-only begged the constitutional question, which quickly erupted
to the surface and produced an intense period of in-court squabbling. After
the marriages began, the lawyers-led by City Attorney Stewart-were in court
every day for about a week with the immediate goal of "staving off a [temporary
restraining order] or immediate writ and gaining more time to brief and argue
321. Pizer Remarks, supra note 94.
322. Proposition 22 Legal Def. & Educ. Fund v. City of San Francisco, No. 503943, 2005 WL
583129 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 14, 2005).
323. Thomasson v. Newsom, No. 428794, 2005 WL 583129 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 14, 2005).
324. See Proposition 22 Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 2005 WL 583129.
325. See Thomasson, 2005 WL 583129.
326. HANS J. HACKER, THE CULTURE OF CONSERVATIVE CHRISTIAN LITIGATION 65 n.22
(2005); see Liberty Counsel, About Us, http://www.lc.org/index.cfm?pid= 14096 (last visited June 6, 2010).
327. See Verified Amended Complaint for Writ of Mandamus, Declaratory and Injunctive Relief,
Thomasson v. Newsom, No. CGC-04-428794 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 14, 2005); First Amended Verified
Petition for Writ of Mandate and Immediate Stay, and Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief,
Proposition 22 Legal Def. & Educ. Fund v. City of San Francisco, No. CPF-04-503943 (Cal. Super.
Ct. Mar. 14, 2005).
328. See Sylvia A. Law, Who Gets to Interpret the Constitution? The Case of Mayors and Marriage
Equality, 3 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1 (2007); see also Richard C. Schragger, Cities as Constitutional Actors:
The Case of Same-Sex Marriage, 21 J.L. & POL. 147 (2005).
329. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 402 (Cal. 2008).
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the merits.""33 NCLR, Lambda Legal, and the ACLU intervened in the ADF
suit on behalf of same-sex couples and argued that the requested relief could
not be granted without holding the existing laws constitutional.31 In response,
ADF moved to file an amended brief requesting a declaration of the con-
stitutionality of the marriage statutes. 32 The trial court rejected the motion on
the ground that the existing complaint sufficiently raised the constitutional
question.33 On February 17, the trial court in the ADF suit denied the motion
for an immediate stay due to a lack of irreparable harm,334 and instead issued an
alternative writ ordering the city to stop giving marriage licenses or show
cause for not doing so."'
Two days later, San Francisco, represented by Stewart, 36 responded by fil-
ing a cross-complaint seeking to declare the marriage laws unconstitutional. 37
Stewart "filed the cross-complaint in declaratory relief.., because we thought
it would be important to our defense of the Mayor's action at that point.., and
if we were going to litigate the constitutionality of the marriage [laws] as a
defense it made sense to seek affirmative relief to the same effect.038 Then,
on February 23, high-profile Los Angeles employment law attorney Gloria
Allred brought suit in Tyler v. County of Los Angeles339 on behalf of two Los
Angeles same-sex couples denied marriage licenses, challenging the denial on
330. Email From Therese Stewart, Chief Deputy, San Francisco City Attorney, to Scott L.
Cummings, Professor, UCLA Sch. of Law (Mar. 15, 2010 5:09 PM PST).
331. See Appellant Proposition 22 Legal Defense and Education Fund's Opening Brief at 2
n.1, Proposition 22 Legal Def. & Educ. Fund v. City of San Francisco, No. Al 10651 (Cal. Ct. App.
Dec. 20, 2006) [hereinafter Appellant Proposition 22 Opening Briefi; Intervenors' Cross-Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 9, Thomasson v. Newsom, No. CGC-04-428794 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Mar. 10, 2004); Lee Romney & Patrick Dillon, S.F. Judge Won't Halt Marriages, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 18,
2004, at Al.
332. Appellant Proposition 22 Opening Brief, supra note 331, at 2 n.1.
333. See id.
334. See Romney & Dillon, supra note 331. The Thomasson court similarly denied CCFs motion
for an immediate stay. Lockyer v. City & County of San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459, 465-66 (Cal. 2004).
335. See Lockyer, 95 P.3d at 466 n.6.
336. Stewart, the Chief Deputy City Attorney, was joined by Deputy City Attorneys Julia
Friedlander, Kathleen Morris, and Sherri Sokeland Kaiser, as well as pro bono attorneys from Howard,
Rice, Nemerovsky, Canady, Falk & Rabin. Danny Choi, Chief of Appellate Litigation, and Deputy City
Attorney Vince Chhabria joined the team on appeal.
337. City and County of San Francisco's Cross-Complaint for Declaratory Relief at 5, Proposition
22 Legal Def. & Educ. Fund v. City and County of San Francisco, No. 503943 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar.
14, 2005).
338. Email From Therese Stewart, Chief Deputy, San Francisco City Attorney, to Professor Scott
L Cummings, UCLA Sch. of Law (Feb. 16,2010). On March 10, NCLR, Lambda Legal, and the ACLU
also filed a cross-complaint on behalf of the intervenor same-sex couples. Intervenors' Cross-Complaint
for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Thomasson v. Newsom, No. CGC-04-428794 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Mar. 10, 2004).
339. Case No. BS088506 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Feb. 23, 2004).
the ground that the marriage statutes violated the state constitution." Equality
California, represented by Codell, NCLR, Lambda Legal, and the ACLU, imme-
diately moved to intervene in that case.
341
Having asserted its legal authority, the City of San Francisco continued
to issue marriage licenses. On February 27, under pressure from Republican
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, California Attorney General Bill Lockyer
filed his own petition for a writ of mandate and immediate stay to halt the
marriages.342 In so doing, he requested that the court resolve the city's constitu-
tional challenge as a threshold issue.143 The attorney general's suit, Lockyer v.
City and County of San Francisco, was joined by a taxpayers' suit, filed two days
earlier, also seeking to compel the county clerk to stop issuing marriage licenses
to same-sex couples.3"
On March 11, 2004, the California Supreme Court handed down an order
splitting the litigation onto two tracks: one limited to the question of local
government authority and the other focused on the constitutionality of existing
marriage laws. With respect to the local government authority issue, the court
eventually ordered San Francisco officials to stop issuing marriage licenses and
adhere to existing state law pending a final resolution on the legal merits.345
In order to avoid potentially conflicting rulings, the court stayed the ADF
and CCF suits. The court also made clear that it invited a constitutional chal-
lenge to the marriage laws, noting that the stay did "not preclude the filing of
a separate action in superior court raising a substantive constitutional challenge
to the current marriage statutes."
346
With the constitutionality of the marriage statutes now clearly in play,
the immediate question-for both the government and LGBT rights lawyers-
was "do we file?, 342 For City Attorney Stewart, the decision was an easy one.
When the California Supreme Court's March 11 order came down, Stewart
believed that her office was well-positioned to argue the constitutional ques-
tion, given its resources and expertise. Although she was certain that there
would be a backlash to a positive court decision, she believed that "the cat
was already out of the bag" with respect to the constitutional issue, and if it was
340. See Petition for Writ of Mandate or Prohibition at 5, Tyler v. County of Los Angeles, No.
BS088506 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 23, 2004) (complaint paragraph 17 in the first cause of action).
341. See Robin Tyler et al. v. County of Los Angeles, Case Summary, No. BS088506.
342. See Lockyer, 95 P.3d at 466.
343. Id.
344. See Lewis v. Alfaro, No. S122865, 2004 WL 473258, at *1 (Cal. Mar. 11, 2004).
345. Lockyer, 95 P.3d at 467.
346. Id.
347. Telephone Interview With Stewart, supra note 305.
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going to be litigated "it should be done as well as it could.""34 The city attorneys
therefore moved quickly-and thus did not coordinate strategy with the
movement lawyers-filing their constitutional challenge to California's marriage
laws on the same day the supreme court issued its order.349
Movement lawyers also acted decisively to challenge the marriage laws'
constitutionality. As Pizer recalled, "There was no question that we would
accept [the court's invitation] and file that case."'' 0 Like the city attorneys, the
movement lawyers recognized the risks of litigating the constitutional ques-
tion, but believed that if they did not strike at that moment, someone else
would, with potentially damaging effects. "This is a state with a great many
lawyers and LGBT people who wanted marriage. [The court's invitation] would
receive a response, if not by us then by others."'5 ' Indeed, Allred had already
filed the Tyler suit at this point. In addition, the public pressure in favor of pur-
suing litigation was also a factor: "There was too much public engagement
and community expectation .... We couldn't have really decided to drop the
issue of marriage equality at that point because that would have meant aban-
doning all those married couples" who had already taken advantage of Newsom's
decision.352 On the merits, the lawyers interpreted the court's invitation as a
positive signal that gave them "reason to hope for a good decision." '353 And
there was a sense that the political landscape had changed in ways that might
allow them to fend off a subsequent voter initiative: "There were changes in
public opinion according to our polling. There was a better-organized political
structure in the state. We'd done public education and had more support from
mainstream forces in the state .... It seemed more possible that we could both
win and preserve the win.
354
Moreover, lawyers at NCLR had already contemplated filing an affirma-
tive constitutional challenge in 2005 or 2006."' Although "left to [their] own
devices, [NCLR lawyers] wouldn't have filed a lawsuit in March [2004]," it
"would have happened" soon thereafter: "Our community would have demanded
it."'56 While premature, a constitutional challenge was therefore not viewed by
348. Id.
349. See Complaint for Declaratory Relief, City of San Francisco v. California, No. CGC-04-
429537 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 11, 2004).




354. Telephone Interview With Davidson, supra note 105. Not everyone shared this view, particu-
larly the ACLU's Matt Coles. Interview With Coles, supra note 143.
355. Telephone Interview With Kendell, supra note 285.
356. Id.
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NCLR as the risk it once was, particularly after the "winter of love" produced
images of same-sex couples getting married that lawyers believed "[were] going
to accelerate public acceptance" and therefore strengthen their ability to fight
back against a constitutional amendment."7 Accordingly, when the court's order
came down, LGBT rights lawyers were "up all night preparing the lawsuit. We
didn't want to let one more day go by." '358 On March 12, the day after the San
Francisco City Attorney's suit was filed, NCLR, Lambda Legal, and the ACLU,
along with Codell and pro bono lawyers from Heller Ehrman, brought a similar
constitutional challenge, Woo v. Lockyer,39 on behalf of Equality California and
twelve same-sex couples.3"
All of the pending cases were transferred to San Francisco Superior
Court Judge Richard Kramer, who ultimately consolidated them into a single
proceeding, entitled In re Marriage Cases.36 ' NCLR's Minter was lead counsel
in Woo; City Attorney Stewart was lead counsel in the city's constitutional
challenge. The decision to have Minter serve as lead counsel in Woo was an
"organic" one: "Things were transpiring in San Francisco, which was our home
base. We were present on the scene with Newsom, so it just made sense." '362
There were efforts by the city attorneys and movement lawyers to coordinate
legal strategy. At the beginning, Stewart participated in regular conference
calls with the Woo lawyers, but as the case progressed dealt primarily with
Minter, with whom she was "joined at the hip." '363 There was an early dis-
agreement over whether to ask for a trial, with Stewart of the view that a
factual hearing would expose the irrationality of the ban on marriage for
same-sex couples, but the issue was mooted when the court decided to bypass
trial." Despite the court's ruling, the city attorneys still sought to make an
evidentiary record by filing several expert witness declarations on issues such
as the history of discrimination against lesbians and gay men, the history of
marriage, the immutability of sexual orientation, and the economic harm to
same-sex couples denied the right to marry. The city attorneys also filed
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. Case No. CPF-04-504038 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 12, 2004).
360. Dena Narbaitz and Clyde Wadsworth, from Steefel, Levitt & Weiss in San Francisco, were
also on the briefs for plaintiffs. Christine Sun, Peter Eliasberg, and Clare Pastore were counsel from
the ACLU-SC, while Tamara Lange, Alex Cleghom, and Alan Schlosser were counsel from the ACLU-
NC. In addition to Gloria Allred's Tyler suit, another private lawsuit was filed later. See Complaint
for Declaratory Relief by Same-Sex Married Couples Challenging the Constitutionality of the Family
Code, Clinton v. California, No. CGC-04-429548 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 13, 2004).
361. 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
362. Telephone Interview With Minter, supra note 125.
363. Telephone Interview With Stewart, supra note 305.
364. Id.
declarations from married same-sex couples and their teenage children,
explaining why the status of marriage was so important to them.6
As the case progressed, the movement lawyers and city attorneys talked
constantly in order to make sure they "weren't operating at cross-purposes." '366
And while the working relationship was productive, Stewart had the impres-
sion that the movement lawyers "would have liked it if we would have been
off in the comer in a narrow role." '367 There was no technical division of issues,
and each team worked on its own briefs independently. In the lead-up to oral
arguments, there were strategy discussions about who should emphasize which
issues and how best to answer anticipated questions from the court. However,
in the end, both teams prepared to argue all aspects of the case since it was cru-
cial that each team "be ready for anything.
3 68
The city attorneys focused their arguments on their concern that "the
Court would believe the difference [between marriage and domestic partnership]
was in name only and therefore was not constitutionally significant."369
According to Stewart:
[W]e feared the Court would feel that because the [domestic partnership]
bill was so comprehensive it meant the Court should not interject itself
because gays were being taken care of in the political process and did
not need protection from the Court. We focused our arguments on the
importance of marriage, its meaning, the evolution of the institution
over time without its destruction. We also hit heavily on the history of
discrimination against lesbians and gay men, because most people, includ-
ing the jurists, are not familiar with that history.... We argued strongly
that the Court could strike the law down as irrational because the
findings of the [domestic partnership] bill and its provisions were impos-
sible to square with excluding gays and lesbians from marriage .... We
hoped the Court would apply strict scrutiny but it was known as an incre-
mentalist, cautious court, and no other high court in any state or the
U.S. system had ever applied strict scrutiny to gay people. But even if
it did not apply strict scrutiny, the arguments about those factors would
make it want to decide in our favor and possibly give it the fortitude to
do so.37°
365. Email From Therese Stewart, Chief Deputy, San Francisco City Attorney, to Scott L.
Cummings, Professor, UCLA Sch. of Law (Mar. 15, 2010 5:52 PM PST) (on file with author).
366. Telephone Interview With Stewart, supra note 305.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Email From Stewart, supra note 330.
370. Id.
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The movement lawyers in Woo made two strategic decisions to advance
their case. First, they decided to lead with their statutory interpretation argu-
ment and frame the constitutional challenge as an alternative ground, thus
giving the court a way to avoid the constitutional issue and still rule in their
favor. The choice to lead with the statutory argument--despite its relative
weakness-reflected the lawyers' ongoing reluctance to seek constitutional
review. The statutory argument focused on Family Code § 308.5, enacted
by Proposition 22, which stated that "[o]nly marriage between a man and a
woman is valid or recognized in California., 37' The movement lawyers argued
that § 308.5 was only designed to preclude the recognition of marriages entered
into outside of California, but did not purport to limit marriages entered into
inside of California.7 Therefore, the lawyers argued, "California got to make
the choice" of whether to enact its own law authorizing the marriage of same-
sex couples without running afoul of § 308.5."' The lawyers thus urged the court
to avoid the constitutional question and instead allow the state to enact marriage
legislatively.
Then, in setting up the constitutional arguments, the lawyers made their
second key strategic decision: to frame arguments in a way so that marriage
for same-sex couples would be viewed as a "small step" for the court to take.
This subtle argument relied on both the prospect of a favorable outcome in
the simultaneously pending Knight v. Superior Court74 litigation over AB 205
and a careful marshalling of the legislative findings incorporated in that bill and
the other domestic partnership legislation. The simultaneous Knight litigation
required a delicate balancing act. On the one hand, the lawyers wanted to estab-
lish in Knight that domestic partnership was legally distinct from-and inferior
to-full marriage in order to set up their constitutional challenge in the Marriage
Cases. On the other hand, they wanted to directly argue in the Marriage Cases
that the rights and benefits accorded under domestic partnership were so
close to marriage that it really just "boiled down to the word marriage." '375 The
key was therefore maintaining these two positions--that domestic partnership
was practically so close to marriage, while legally still so far-without appearing
inconsistent. The lawyers hoped that the Knight lawsuit would be resolved
first, since it would allow them to establish the legal inferiority of domestic
371. CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5 (2004).
372. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 409-10 (Cal. 2008).
373. Codell Remarks, supra note 129; see also Third Amended Petition for Writ of Mandate and
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 39(a), Woo v. Lockyer, Case No. CGC-04-504038
(Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 1, 2004).
374. 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 687 (Ct. App. 2005).
375. Codell Remarks, supra note 129.
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partnership under more favorable conditions, which included a legal presump-
tion in favor of AB 205 and the alliance of the state attorney general.376
The lawyers in Woo also wanted to set up sexual orientation as a suspect
classification, thus triggering strict scrutiny of the marriage ban. To do this,
they relied on the legislative and litigation record that they had so carefully
crafted. For evidence of discrimination, advocates pointed in part to the legis-
lative findings in AB 205 and other domestic partner statutes. To demonstrate
the irrelevance of sexual orientation to social participation, advocates pointed
out that "California ha[d] enacted over fifty laws banning discrimination based
on sexual orientation, in schools, government, employment, child custody
matters, adoption matters. 377 In addition, the legal groups had successfully liti-
gated suits establishing that California parenting statutes had to be applied
equally to same-sex parents; these cases "took off the table rationales related to
procreation and parenting used to uphold other marriage bans. 378 As a result,
when the "question came to the court, they weren't making some huge step"
in holding California's ban on same-sex marriage unconstitutional.379
What the lawyers did not have by the time the case reached the supreme
court were married same-sex couples whose experiences could be used as evi-
dence. Movement leaders had hoped that as Californians had time to become
accustomed to the four thousand same-sex couples issued marriage licenses in
San Francisco-and to see that such marriages did not affect different-sex
marriages--they could point to this experience to show the irrationality of
California's law. However, on August 12, 2004, those four thousand marriages
were nullified by the California Supreme Court in the Lockyer case, which
held that San Francisco city officials had in fact exceeded their power in
issuing marriage licenses."e Although the city attorneys had argued that the
court should leave the existing marriages intact pending resolution of the consti-
tutional question, the court's decision to rule separately on the issue of local
government authority led it to nullify the marriages solely on that ground.3" '
Leaders from Equality California attempted to turn the Lockyer decision into
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Telephone Interview With Minter, supra note 125. NCLR won a trio of cases in 2005 holding
that "children born to same-sex couples must be treated equally to other children and thus have a legally
protected relationship to both partners." Press Release, NCLR, National Center for Lesbian Rights
Applauds California Supreme Court Decisions in Groundbreaking Parenting Cases (Aug. 22, 2005),
available at http://www.nclrights.org/site/PageServer?pagename=press-pr-parenting-082205.
379. Codell Remarks, supra note 129.
380. Lockyer v. City of San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459, 499 (Cal. 2004).
381. Id. The court's decision mooted the initial lawsuits by ADF and CCF, which were denied
the right to formally intervene in the Mania& Cases, but were nonetheless kept in the case as appellants
challenging the dismissal of their cases. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 404-08 (Cal. 2008).
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an opportunity for public education: "We had talking points ready and had
statewide meetings with our different community partners. So the moment
the court ruled, we put into place a plan we'd set up."3"2 Media coverage was
widespread, and LGBT advocates used it "to put a human face on the issue. We
let people know, 'This is our pain .... These are our families at stake."'383
The Lockyer decision also influenced efforts to revive a marriage bill in
the state legislature-refocusing attention on how the legislative process might
interact with the pending litigation. After the initial Leno marriage bill passed
the Judiciary Committee in April 2004,"' it was allowed to die in the
Appropriations Committee as planned.85 As Leno prepared to reintroduce
the marriage bill at the beginning of 2005,386 the Marriage Cases litigation
gave it new urgency but also posed new risks. In the wake of Lockyer, the justi-
fication for a marriage bill was strengthened, as it offered the last hope to create a
record of same-sex marriages before the inevitable supreme court decision and
ensuing ballot initiative.
Yet the pendency of the Marriage Cases also made the lawyers cautious
about ensuring that the marriage bill reinforced the legal arguments that
lawyers were making in court. Particularly because there was skepticism
that Governor Schwarzenegger would ultimately sign the bill, known as AB
849, lawyers wanted the debate within the legislature to help the litigation.87
The lawyers wanted any legislative findings in support of a marriage bill to
make clear that Family Code § 308.5, enacted by Proposition 22, only banned
the recognition of out-of-state same-sex marriages, and did not preclude
California from affirmatively deciding to permit same-sex couples to marry on
its own terms.38 This was important because it would create a legislative record
in support of the statutory argument in court that California could institute
marriage without contravening Proposition 22 (thus rendering it unnecessary
for the supreme court to reach the constitutional question).389 In addition, per-
suading reluctant assembly members that the marriage bill was legally consistent
with Proposition 22 was necessary to garner their support.3" Lambda Legal's
382. PINELLO, supra note 168, at 89 (quoting Molly McKay, Associate Executive Director of
Equality California).
383. Id. at 90.
384. See Robert Salladay, Legislators Support Same-Sex Marriage, LA. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2004, at A l.
385. See Robert Salladay, Gay Mariage Bill Expected to Die in Assembly, LA. TIMES, May 18, 2004,
at B6.
386. See William Wan & Lee Romney, Marriage Debate in a New Arena, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 14,
2004, at B1.
387. Telephone Interview With Davidson, supra note 105.
388. Telephone Interview With Pizer, supra note 266.
389. Id.
390. Id.
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Davidson led the effort to provide legal analysis to Leno and other assembly
members on the interpretation of Proposition 22. 3"'
Meanwhile, Leno worked to win votes in the assembly, positioning
marriage as a civil rights issue and creating a coalition of groups that included
the NAACP, the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, the
ACLU, Asian Law Caucus, Legal Momentum, and the Anti-Defamation League
to lobby for the bill's passage.392 After failing in the assembly on a floor vote in
June, the Senate Democratic Caucus-under the leadership of Sheila Kuehl
from Santa Monica-revised the marriage bill in a process known as "gut and
amend" and presented it to the full senate, which passed the bill in a historic
August vote. The senate's approval created new momentum for the marriage
bill, which in September was re-sent to the full assembly. In the assembly, it
passed over unified Republican opposition by one vote in a dramatic final
scene in which Democrat Simon Salinas, from a heavily Latino district in
the Central Valley, "hesitated for several seconds as the tally hung at 40
'ayes'-one short of passage" before finally voting yes.393 Although Governor
Schwarzenegger had earlier stated that he did not care if same-sex couples
married394-and advocates believed they had given the governor "legal and
constitutional cover" to pass the bill 3---Schwarzenegger ultimately vetoed AB
849, citing the primacy of Proposition 22.396 In an ironic twist on the typical
conservative argument against "judicial activism," the governor issued a
statement that he believed "the matter should be determined not by legislative
action-which would be unconstitutional-but by court decision or another
vote of the people of our state." '397 The following year, Leno reintroduced the
marriage bill, which again passed the senate and assembly,39 only to be vetoed
in October 2007 on the same grounds.3"
Yet by this time, supporters of marriage for same-sex couples believed that
they had accomplished an important goal. With the California Supreme Court
391. Id.
392. Telephone Interview With Leno, supra note 264.
393. Nancy Vogel, Legislature OKs Gay Marriage, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2005, at Al. The bill had
passed the senate a week earlier. See Jordan Rau & Nancy Vogel, State Senate Votes to Let Gays Marry,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2005, at Al.
394. See Peter Nicholas, Schwarzenegger's Opinion on Same-Sex Marriage: "I Don't Care", L.A.
TIMES, June 25, 2004, at B5.
395. Telephone Interview With Leno, supra note 264.
396. See Michael Finnegan & Maura Dolan, Citing Prop. 22, Gov. Rejects Gay Marriage Bill, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 8, 2005, at Al.
397. Id.
398. See Nancy Vogel, Same-Sex Unions OKd by Assembly, L.A. TIMES, June 6, 2007, at B3.
399. See Veto Message, A.B. 43 (Oct. 12, 2007), available at http:llwww.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/07-
08/bill/asm/ab_0001-0050/ab_43_vt_20071012.html.
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reviewing the parties' briefs in the Marriage Cases, lawyers were able to point
to the legislative findings in the marriage bills in support of their arguments. 400
In fact, lawyers for the Woo plaintiffs specifically argued that AB 849 supported
the narrow construction of Family Code § 308.5 as only prohibiting "California
from recognizing marriages from other jurisdictions, not as a limitation on who
may marry in California," while also providing evidence that "excluding same-
sex couples from marriage discriminates based on sex.
' 0°l
These arguments made their way up to the California Supreme Court by
an arduous path. The trial court's March 2005 ruling that the marriage ban
violated the state Equal Protection Clause was reversed the following year by
the appellate court, which refused to hold that the marriage restriction relied
on a suspect classification and instead found that the state had met its burden
by showing a legitimate interest in upholding the "traditional" definition of
marriage. 4°2 By this time, however, the Knight lawsuit over AB 205 had become
final. The Marriage Cases were thus set to go up to the supreme court against
what movement lawyers believed to be a favorable legal backdrop in which it
was "clearly established and understood by every judge.., that [the domestic
partnership regime was] simply unequal."' 3
Petitioning the California Supreme Court, however, was not a foregone
conclusion. After the disappointing appellate court ruling, lawyers at NCLR,
Lambda Legal, and the ACLU had serious discussions about whether to
seek supreme court review." Some of the lawyers thought "of course we take
review" because if the court was not favorable, it would simply deny the
petition for review.4°' Others, however, were more cautious about their chances
of success on the legal merits and worried that even if they could win, the
political consequences would be devastating. 6 By the fall of 2006, "when
petitions were due in California, we had lost in Nebraska, lost in New York,
lost in Oregon, ... lost in Washington... and the only win any of us had
on marriage was Massachusetts. And so, at that point, we're like, 'Huh, hey
guys, this is not a manifestly successful program."' 7 Ultimately, however, the
400. Telephone Interview With Leno, supra note 264.
401. Respondents' Opening Brief on the Merits at 46 n.35, 82, In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d
384 (Cal. 2008) (No. S147999), available at http://www.nclrights.org/site/DocServer/RymerReply_
Brief Merits08l707.pdfdoclD= 1860.
402. In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 675, 706-14, 718-24 (Ct. App. 2006).
403. Codell Remarks, supra note 129.
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lawyers decided to move forward, motivated by the fact that other parties were
filing for review. "The case was going up, so why would we go from being
parties to sitting on the sidelines?""4 8
In preparation for the supreme court argument, Minter and his colleagues
took steps to shore up their position. For one, Minter and Stewart organized
a massive amicus brief campaign in support of marriage for same-sex cou-
ples.4" Support came from diverse quarters-African American pastors, public
interest groups, bar associations, civil rights groups, and law professors." ' In
one example, API Equality-LA, a marriage equality group formed in 2005,
helped organize an amicus brief of over sixty Asian American organizations,4 "
using it as an opportunity to build bridges between LGBT and Asian American
groups around a shared commitment to civil rights, while also generating
positive publicity about marriage equality within Asian immigrant communi-
ties.4"2 The city attorneys obtained some important briefs, including one from
Berkeley law professor Jesse Choper, arguing that the court should not defer to
the political branches,4"3 as well as others from California cities and counties,
state legislators, bar associations, and international law professors. The overall
goal of the amicus campaign was to normalize same-sex marriage for the
court by showing the broad range of supporters, though some of the lawyers
viewed the length of the amicus list in the case as too unwieldy.4"4
In addition, the lawyers fine-tuned their arguments to resonate more pow-
erfully with the emotional and social meaning of marriage. After the lawyers
had submitted their briefs to the appellate court, their client, Equality California,
conducted public opinion research that found that people generally did not
think of marriage as a bundle of legal rights and benefits, but viewed marriage
in more profound and personal terms. When Minter reviewed the data, it was
"one of those light bulb moments. While I was looking at that research about
the most effective public messages, I thought we should be using these themes
in our legal briefs."4 5 As a result, the lawyers changed their briefing dramati-
cally between the appellate and supreme court arguments to emphasize "the
408. Id.
409. See Lee Romney, Taking Sides on Same-Sex Marriage, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2006, at B4.
410. See id.
411. See Robert S. Chang & Karin Wang, Democratizing the Courts: How an Amicus Brief Helped
Organize the Asian American Community to Support Marriage Equality, 14 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J.
22 (2009).
412. Karin Wang, Vice President of Programs, Asian Pac. Am. Legal Cr., Remarks at the Seminar
on Problem Solving in the Public Interest, UCLA School of Law (Oct. 21, 2009).
413. Amicus Curiae Brief by Professor Jesse H. Choper in Support of Petitioners, In re Marriage
Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) (No. S14799).
414. See Pizer Remarks, supra note 94.
415. Telephone Interview With Minter, supra note 125.
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personal and social significance of marriage, which the court picked up on
profoundly in its decision."4 6
The supreme court decision, announced on May 15, 2008, was an epic
moment in the national marriage equality movement. Although the court
dismissed the statutory argument regarding the scope of § 308.5, it accepted
the plaintiffs' constitutional position in sweeping terms. Specifically, the court
held that California law limiting marriage to a man and a woman violated state
due process and equal protection guarantees since the right to marry is funda-
mental, sexual orientation constitutes a suspect classification, and no compelling
state interest supports the restriction.417 In the end, it seemed that the lawyers'
strategy of framing the decision as a "small step" and emphasizing the personal
dimension of marriage had paid off. In striking down the ban, the court
emphasized that while same-sex couples already had "virtually all of the legal
benefits, privileges, responsibilities, and duties" of married couples," 8 marriage
was not just a legal construct, but also had "substantive content": "[Olur cases
make clear that the right to marry is an integral component of an individual's
interest in personal autonomy.., and of their liberty interest." '419 In one fell
swoop, what was seen as a pipe dream only five years earlier, had become a
legal reality in California. Despite themselves, lawyers for marriage equality
had succeeded in establishing it as a constitutional right.
D. On the Sidelines: Proposition 8, Perry, and the Plan for 2012
As movement lawyers had predicted, opponents were quickly moving
to invalidate the supreme court decision through an initiative to amend the
California Constitution to read that "only marriage between a man and a
woman is valid or recognized in California."'42 Marriage equality opponents
ProtectMarriage.com and VoteYesMarriage.com had been attempting to qualify
such an initiative for statewide ballot as early as 2005.421 After the Marriage
Cases supreme court oral arguments on March 4, 2008, when Chief Justice
Ronald George made comments widely interpreted as signaling the court's
416. Id.
417. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 400-01 (Cal. 2008).
418. Id. at 413.
419. Id. at 425-26.
420. Official Title and Summary: Prop. 8, in CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION OFFICIAL VOTER
INFORMATION GUIDE 54 (2008), available at htpp:llwww.voterguide.sos.ca.gov/past/2008/generalltitle-sum/
prop8-title-sum.htm.
421. See PINELLO, supra note 168, at 99. The early versions of the initiative would have eliminated
domestic partnership rights as well as the right to marry. Email From Therese M. Stewart, Chief Deputy,
San Francisco City Attorney, to Scott L. Cummings, Professor, UCLA Sch. of Law (Mar. 15, 2010
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intent to invalidate the marriage ban,422 out-of-state money began flowing into
California in support of an initiative drive.423 Less than a month after the
Marriage Cases were decided, the anti-same-sex-marriage initiative, known
as Proposition 8, had qualified for the November 2008 statewide ballot.424
Marriage equality opponents, led by ProtectMarriage.com with ADF acting as
legal advisor, believed that even though they had lost the legal battle, they
could still win the political war.425
The Proposition 8 campaign was notable for both its expense and vitriol,
although there were echoes of the earlier Proposition 22 campaign. Fundraising
on both sides broke records for a social policy initiative, with large sums coming
from out of state, and money flowing in from over twenty foreign countries.
In the final tally, fundraising was roughly even, with each side raising more than
$40 million.426
There was early legal wrangling over the proper title of the initiative for
the state ballot, with Yes on 8 objecting to the title, which Attorney General
Jerry Brown had changed to read: "Eliminates (the) Right of Same-Sex Couples
to Marry.'"2" ADF sued to modify the title, but the challenge was rejected by a
Sacramento Superior Court judge, who held that the title accurately summarized
the measure.42 The judge also ruled that the Yes on 8 campaign had to change
its ballot materials, which erroneously stated that the Marriage Cases decision
would "require" schools to teach about same-sex marriage.429
Movement lawyers also began jostling over the impending vote. During
the summer, the lawyers filed suit attempting to block Proposition 8, but the
supreme court rejected it.43 They then "retooled and revamped [the lawsuit]
and expanded it and had papers ready to file the next day after the vote."'3 In
422. See Adam Liptak, Definition of Marriage Is at Heart of California Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5,
2008, at A14.
423. See Lisa Leff, Gay Marriage Amendment Headed to California Ballot, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Apr. 24, 2008.
424. See Jack Leonard, Voters Will Decide on Gay Marriage, L.A. TIMES, June 3, 2008, at B1.
425. See Glen Lavy, A State Marriage Amendment Is Needed, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., May 16,
2008, available at http://Iegacy.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/200805 16/news_lz e 16lavy.html.
426. Jessica Garrison, Cara Mia DiMassa & Richard C. Paddock, Nation Watches as State
Weighs Ban, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2008, at Al; California Secretary of State, Campaign Finance:
ProtectMarriage.coni--Yes on 8, A Project of California Renewal, http:llcal-access.sos.ca.gov/Campaign/
Committees/Detail.aspx?id= 1302592&session=2007 (last visited June 6, 2010).
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at B1.
428. See id.; see also Bob Egelko, Prop. 8 Backers Drop Chalenge on Wording, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 12,
2008, at B3.
429. See Egelko, supra note 427.
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addition, the lawyers moved to undercut what they anticipated would be pow-
erful pressure to file a federal constitutional challenge should Proposition 8
pass. In June 2008, they issued a joint statement, entitled "Make Change,
Not Lawsuits," in which they argued that "[t]he fastest way to win the freedom
to marry throughout America is by getting marriage through state courts... and
state legislatures .... But one thing couples shouldn't do is just sue the federal
government. 43 2 While the statement was explicitly directed to those in other
states who wanted to press for marriage equality through the federal courts,
the subtext was clear: If Proposition 8 passed in California, a federal lawsuit was
not the vehicle to challenge it.
As the superior court ruling over the issue of schools on the ballot materials
portended, the Proposition 8 battle turned on messaging, with the Yes on 8 cam-
paign making a strategic decision not to emphasize the value of preserving
the "traditional" definition of marriage (as they had with Proposition 22)."'
Instead, marriage equality opponents aired ads painting Proposition 8 as a
measure to protect children from being taught about same-sex marriage in
schools.434 The No on 8 campaign was slow to respond to this argument, which
badly damaged its efforts.435
On November 4, 2008, California voters narrowly passed Proposition 8,
by a 52-48 percent margin.436 The measure's passage revealed deep divisions
and provoked recriminations. A National Election Pool (NEP) exit poll showed
70 percent African American support for Proposition 8, which led some to
place blame on African American voters.437 Post-election analysis, however,
revealed that African American support was overstated and that the NEP
poll was an outlier.43 Instead, voter preferences correlated more with religi-
osity than with race.439 Nonetheless, the No on 8 Campaign faced criticism
for its lack of outreach to African American and Latino voters." Support for
432. ACLU ET AL., MAKE CHANGE, NOr LAWsurrs, http://data.lambdalegal.org/publications/
downloads/fs _make-change-not-lawsuits.pdf (last visited June 6, 2010).
433. See Melissa Murray, Marriage Rights and Parental Rights: Parents, the State, and Proposition
8, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L 357,359 (2009); see also Queerty.com, Masterminds Behind "Yes on 8" Reveal
How They Did It, Feb. 24, 2009, http://www.queerty.com/masterminds-behind-yes-on-8-reveal-how-
they-did-it-20090224.
434. See Jessica Garrison, A Prop. 8 Fight Over Schools, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2008, at BL.
435. See discussion infra Part ILI.C.1.
436. See Kevin Fagan & John King, National Protests Condemn Prop. 8, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 16,
2008, at Al.
437. See Cara Mia DiMassa & Jessica Garrison, Why Gays, Blacks Are Divided on Prop. 8, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 8, 2008, at Al.
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Proposition 8 drew heavily from the ranks of the Christian Right, including
evangelical Protestants and the Catholic and Mormon Churches, although the
measure also revealed rifts within religious communities."' The Progressive
Jewish Alliance and other Jewish groups joined Episcopal dioceses in oppo-
sition to Proposition 8, as did human and civil rights groups, unions, and
progressive companies."2
The passage of Proposition 8 unleashed a wave of protests both within
California and around the country, many of which were facilitated by activists
on social networking sites like Facebook." Join the Impact, a group created
immediately after the passage of Proposition 8, established a website used to
coordinate a National Day of Protest on November 15 that saw hundreds of
444thousands of protesters turn out across the country.
While these protests vividly highlighted the breadth of national outrage
over Proposition 8, they could not provide a direct challenge to the law-a
task that fell to movement lawyers. The day after voters approved the measure,
Lambda Legal, NCLR, and the ACLU challenged Proposition 8 in the state
supreme court-in a case called Strauss v. Horton445-arguing that the initia-
tive "revised," rather than "amended," the state constitution by abrogating
equal protection for same-sex couples.' As a constitutional revision, they
argued, the initiative required approval by two-thirds of the legislature before
submission to the voters."7 The supreme court rejected that argument, ruling
441. See Jessica Garrison, Black Clergy Both Attack, Defend Prop. 8, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2008,
at B4; Duke Helfand, Clergy Vocalize Stance on Prop. 8, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2008, at B4.
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that Proposition 8 merely amended the state constitution to change the
definition of marriage and did not "substantially alter" the basic consti-
tutional framework." The court, however, left intact the roughly eighteen
thousand marriages that had occurred between the Marriage Cases decision
and the passage of Proposition 8."
The Strauss ruling left open the question of whether out-of-state
marriages-performed both before and after the passage of Proposition 8-
were valid.45 To resolve this point, Equality California's Kors led a coali-
tion of advocates, including lawyers from NCLR and Lambda Legal, in an
effort to pass clarifying legislation. Senator Leno sponsored the bill, Senate
Bill (SB) 54, which stated that "a marriage between two persons of the same
sex contracted outside this state ... is valid in this state if the marriage was
contracted prior to November 5, 2008,""4 ' the date Proposition 8 passed. In
addition, the bill provided that marriages of same-sex couples entered after
that date would be accorded the same rights and responsibilities "as are granted
to and imposed upon spouses with the sole exception of the designation of
'marriage.""'4 2  Movement lawyers traveled to Sacramento to meet with
lawmakers and persuade them that such a law would not contravene Proposition
8."' Governor Schwarzenegger-convinced that SB 54 posed little political
risk since it merely clarified the status of out-of-state unions left unaddressed
by Proposition 8-signed SB 54 into law on October 11, 2009. SB 54 was
crucial to the ongoing movement because it meant that California was "not
simply in the position of being pushed back to a [domestic partnership] regime,
but [was] in the unique position of having legally married [same-sex] couples,
and a state law requiring full recognition of any marriages entered anywhere
prior to Prop. 8 and nearly full recognition of out of state marriages entered
after Prop. 8. SB 54 therefore offered some solace in the face of Strauss,
moving marriage forward, albeit by much less than advocates would have liked.
Nonetheless, the bill-combined with the decision in Strauss to validate the
eighteen thousand pre-Proposition 8 marriages-created a growing beachhead
that could be expanded.
by the San Francisco City Attorney's office. All three were consolidated for decision by the California
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Strauss itself also strengthened the educational and organizing dimensions
of the marriage equality movement, both in relation to Equality California's
efforts and outside of them. In the lead-up to the Strauss decision, there was a
coordinated effort to use the publicity generated by the case as a vehicle for
public education."' The case also further mobilized new technology-savvy,
bottom-up grassroots efforts led by younger activists.456 The group Freedom
Action Inclusion Rights (FAIR) emerged after Proposition 8 to facilitate activ-
ism via social networking sites, and was instrumental in organizing the Los
Angeles protests on the November 15 National Day of Protest."7 As the Strauss
decision drew nearer, FAIR organized discussions on Facebook about the case,
orchestrated a march to the Los Angeles City Hall to watch a live feed of the
oral argument, and organized a mass demonstration, called Day of Decision,
to respond to the anticipated unfavorable decision.45
In the lead up to the Strauss ruling, which most assumed would affirm
Proposition 8, there was pressure on the LGBT rights groups to file a federal
lawsuit. As they had become accustomed to doing across the country to protect
their strategy, movement lawyers fielded many calls from constituents who
wanted to file suit and "spent a lot of time talking people down from that
particular ledge.'" 9 Yet the lawyers also explicitly discussed the possibility of
bringing their own federal lawsuit. As Pizer quipped, "It's not as if we don't know
where the federal courthouse is. ''4" At issue was whether to constitutionally
challenge the unique nature of Proposition 8, which eliminated the right of
same-sex couples to marry despite the fact that the California Supreme Court
had clearly established it and the California legislature had conferred all the
same rights and responsibilities through domestic partnership. Movement
lawyers could not agree, however, that even a narrowly tailored challenge was
wise in light of the risk of a more sweepingly negative U.S. Supreme Court
ruling on the constitutionality of marriage bans.461 "By the time we're in spring
of 2009, this group of advocates had been over that ground and decided this
wasn't something [they] were putting together because of a combination of being
455. In a memorable moment outside the courthouse before the supreme court hearing, a gay
state legislator predicted: "If this supreme court does not overturn Prop. 8 entirely, there will be a million of
us on the streets nationally fighting for our right. We are not going away and we will not be invisible!"
Activists Ou  as California Court Weighs Gay Marriage (National Public Radio broadcast Mar. 6, 2009).
456. On the use of technology and the LGBT movement, see Philip C. Aka, Technology Use and
the Gay Movement for Equality in America, 35 CAP. U. L. REV. 665 (2007).
457. Suzy Jack, Co-Chair, Freedom Action Inclusion Rights, Remarks to Problem Solving in the
Public Interest Seminar (Nov. 5, 2009).
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concerned about prospects in federal court and thinking that a political solution
was the better way in California.""2
Yet no sooner was the supreme court decision upholding Proposition 8
issued, than another lawsuit was announced-not by movement lawyers, but
by legal elites, and ideological opposites: Ted Olson, who represented George
W. Bush in the 2000 recount and then served as his solicitor general,463 and
David Boies, a prominent trial lawyer who represented Al Gore in the 2000
recount. On May 27, 2009 (the day after the Strauss court ruling), Olson and
Boies announced that they had filed a federal lawsuit on behalf of two California
same-sex couples, arguing that Proposition 8 violated the federal equal protec-
tion and due process guarantees.' The case was orchestrated by Los Angeles
political strategist Chad Griffin, who had worked on Bill Clinton's 1992 presi-
dential campaign and then ran a foundation for filmmaker and liberal political
activist Rob Reiner.465 A mutual friend put Olson in touch with Griffin, who
selected the plaintiffs and set up the American Foundation for Equal Rights
(AFER) to fund the litigation.466 Olson's firm, Gibson Dunn & Crutcher, agreed
to take the case on a "hybrid" fee arrangement in which it would donate the
first $100,000 worth of services and then collect "flat fees for the various stages,"
ultimately amounting to millions of dollars."7 Olson then brought in Boies.'
In May 2009, Olson and his colleagues discussed the merits of a possible suit
with Lambda Legal's Davidson and Pizer and ACLU-SC Director Ramona
Ripston and Legal Director Mark Rosenbaum.469 After the conclusion of these
discussions, which were confidential, Olson decided to proceed with the suit,
Perry v. Schwarzenegger,47° which was filed four days prior to the announcement
of the Strauss decision.47" ' Leaders of LGBT legal groups claimed they did not
learn of the filing until it was officially announced.4"2 On the day after Strauss-
and without knowledge of the imminent announcement of Perry-LGBT rights
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lawyers reissued an updated version of their earlier joint statement, this time
called "Why the Ballot Box and Not the Courts Should be the Next Step on
Marriage in California," arguing that "we need to go back to the voters."4"
Immediately after Perry was announced, LGBT advocates had to decide
how to respond to the well-funded federal suit. Lawyers from NCLR, Lambda
Legal, and the ACLU, along with Equality California's Kors and lawyers from
the Office of the San Francisco City Attorney involved in the Marriage
Cases, collaborated with the Perry attorneys in charting strategy.4"4 Although
the movement lawyers disagreed with the decision to file the lawsuit, they
nonetheless wanted a voice in the litigation. When they considered the possi-
bilities of direct intervention or filing a parallel suit, they asked themselves:
"Would our participation make a difference?"" Based on their assessment of the
risks of the lawsuit, coupled with their respect for the litigation skills of Olson
and Boies, they determined that the answer was no.4"6 Instead, they decided
to play an amicus role and, after conversations with lawyers from the Olson-
Boies team, filed an amicus brief in June laying out their version of the case.477
The movement lawyers' decision not to intervene changed, however,
when a dispute erupted over whether the Perry lawyers should seek a hearing
to take evidence on issues of discrimination and inequality. Olson and Boies
were opposed to an evidentiary hearing, preferring to tee up the legal issue
for review." 8 On June 30, 2009, District Court Judge Vaughn Walker issued
a tentative ruling that indicated his intention to develop a factual record
through trial in order to determine a number of issues, including the appro-
priate level of judicial scrutiny. 49 The ACLU's James Esseks looked at that
ruling and said, "Oh my God, he totally gets it, he's totally into it. This is a guy
who might rule our way because he's asking the right questions." ' ° At the July
2 hearing on the matter, Olson resisted the need for a full-blown eviden-
tiary hearing, arguing that "there are many things that can be resolved by
agreement, by cross-motions, perhaps, for summary judgment, or perhaps some
473. See ACLU ET AL., WHY THE BALLOT BOX AND NOT THE COURTS SHOULD BE THE NEXT
STEP ON MARRIAGE IN CALIFORNIA (2009), available at https://www.aclu.org/pdfs/lgbt/ballot_box-
20090527.pdf.
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narrowing process.' 8' Concerned-that Olson's resistance portended a weak effort
at trial, the ACLU, Lambda Legal, and NCLR moved to intervene on July 8
in order to assist in the development of the factual record on the ground that
they had deep familiarity with the factual issues related to marriage for same-sex
couples.482 Their intervention motion was also a way to put pressure on Olson
and Boies to take the call for evidence seriously."3
The Perry lawyers resisted the intervention, not wanting to have "five
captains of the ship."" A letter from AFER President Griffin to leading LGBT
rights lawyers became public and revealed the basis for the opposition."' Griffin
took issue with the movement lawyers' public rejection of the AFER strategy,
asserting that "[in public and private, you have made it unmistakably clear that
you strongly disagree with our legal strategy."' 6 Griffin wondered whether their
intervention served as a way to derail the case. "Having gone to such great
lengths to dissuade us from filing suit and to tar this case in the press, it seems
likely that your misgivings about our strategy will be reflected-either subtly
or overtly-in your actions in court." '487 The district court denied the LGBT
rights groups' motion," relegating them to an amicus capacity. However, their
motion did succeed in helping to steer the case toward a trial, in which the
San Francisco City Attorney's Office played an important role. The city attor-
neys moved to intervene after receiving "a lot of calls from government actors
and community activists" and discussing the possibility with the Olson team,
which indicated it would not mount serious opposition.489 The goal of the city
attorneys was "to do as much as [they] could to assist in the overall effort and
make sure that the best case that could be put on was. '  The district court
permitted the city of San Francisco to intervene as a government entity that
would be charged with enforcing any legal change.49' On the other side, when
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Attorney General Brown refused to defend Proposition 8,492 ADF was permitted
to intervene in support of the law.493
Movement lawyers have responded to their exclusion from the trial in two
ways. One has been to re-engage the plaintiffs' lawyers after the ugly falling
out over the motion to intervene. Toward that end, movement lawyers have
provided background information and expert witnesses in support of the Perry
plaintiffs and have publicly stated that "[w]e are interested in doing whatever
we can to make sure their case is as successful as possible." '494 In their amicus
capacity, movement lawyers have sought to emphasize "the singular nature
of the case presented by Proposition 8, and the California-focused analysis
that accordingly is warranted."'4 95 In an effort to avoid a ruling on whether
sexual orientation classifications merit strict scrutiny under the federal Equal
Protection Clause, the lawyers have asserted that Proposition 8 "is unconsti-
tutional regardless of the level of scrutiny applicable to it," based on the fact
that it "amended the state's constitution after same-sex couples' right to
marry had been conclusively held to be a component of that constitution's
guarantee of equality," "while leaving the substantive, legal rights and obli-
gations of same-sex, state-registered couples ... intact." '496 By asking the court
to rule in favor of the plaintiffs on narrow, state-specific grounds, the lawyers
have sought to frame the issues in a way that has the greatest chance of being
upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court on review.
The trial got off to a dramatic start when the U.S. Supreme Court issued a
last second order banning video coverage (ostensibly to protect marriage equality
opponents from being harassed).4 9 The trial court then proceeded to take
extensive evidence on issues including the history of marriage, the effect of
same-sex marriage on children, the history of discrimination against lesbians
and gay men, and the political power of lesbians and gay men.498 Many of the
492. See Maura Dolan, Gov. Won't Defend Proposition 8, L.A. TIMES, June 18, 2009, at A4.
493. See Order at 3, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 09-CV-2292 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2009).
494. Svetvilas, supra note 467 (quoting James Esseks, Co-Director of the ACLU LGBT Project).
495. June 25 Amicus Brief, supra note 477, at 1.
496. Brief for American Civil Liberties Union, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1,
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 09-CV-2292 (Feb. 3, 2010). This brief was filed by Schlosser and Gill at
ACLU-NC, as well as Davidson, Pizer, and Borelli at Lambda Legal, and Minter, Stoll, and Turner at
NCLR.
497. See David G. Savage & Carol J. Williams, Supreme Court Bars Video of Prop. 8 Trial, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 12, 2010, at A9.
498. See, e.g., Transcript of Proceedings at 1523-736, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 09-CV-2292
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2010) (testimony of Gary Segura); Transcript of Trial-Day 05 at 13-213, Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, No. 09-CV-2292 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2010) (testimony of Michael Lamb); Transcript
of Trial-Day 2, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 09-CV-2292 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2010) (testimony of Nancy
Cott and George Chauncey).
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witnesses who testified in support of marriage for same-sex couples had also been
brought in by the city attorneys as experts in the Marriage Cases.4'
As the Perry suit unfolds, LGBT advocacy groups have set their sights on
another statewide ballot initiative, this time to repeal Proposition 8. While some
LGBT groups pushed for a 2010 initiative,01 the most influential groups, includ-
ing Lambda Legal and Equality California, have set forth a strategy-called
"Winning Back Marriage Equality"-aimed at the 2012 ballot.5 'O The key to
2012, according to Equality California, is maximizing the turnout of younger
voters:
Age is one of the top predictors of someone's position on marriage
equality-the younger one is, the more likely they are to support the
right of same-sex couples to marry .... [Because a presidential election
mobilizes young voters], all things being equal, based solely on the age and
demographic of likely turnout at the polls, we are 1-2 percentage points
better off in a presidential general election year ....
For movement lawyers, the decade of advocacy around the issue of marriage
equality in California ended in irony: excluded from the "trial of the century"
they had so vigorously fought to oppose, and forced to focus on the political
work of reversing Proposition 8, which they had so clearly seen and attempted
to avert. It was not a decade without movement miscues, but the overarching
story was one of movement lawyers struggling to protect their incrementalist
agenda from being derailed by activists and other lawyers who wanted to
move faster, on the one hand, and marriage equality opponents, on the other. In
the end, that strategy was only a partial success. The movement's comprehensive
domestic partnership victory was overshadowed by Proposition 8. Perry, too,
asserted a fundamental challenge to the movement, risking a negative decision
by the U.S. Supreme Court despite providing some positive publicity. LGBT
rights lawyers have moved on in the face of Perry, filing other cases designed
to advance the state-by-state strategy, 3 and additional federal challenges viewed
499. Telephone Interview With Stewart, supra note 305.
500. The group Love, Honor, Cherish spearheaded the push for a 2010 ballot initiative, but failed
to gather the required signatures. See Maura Dolan, Prop 8 Repeal Not on Ballot, L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 13,
2010, at AA5.
501. See Press Release, Lambda Legal, Lambda Legal Calls for More Education and Time to Restore
Marriage Equality in California (Nov. 30, 2009), http://www.lambdalegal.org/news/pr/xca_20091130_
lambda-calls-for-more.html.
502. EQUAL. CAL., WINNING BACK MARRIAGE EQUALrIY IN CALIFORNIA: ANALYSIS AND PLAN
7-8 (2009).
503. See, e.g., Lambda Legal, Sweeping gay Marriage Lawsuit in New Jersey Aims for U.S. History,
http://www.lambdalegal.org/news/pr/ny-20020626_sweeping-gay-marriage-suit-nj-aims-for-history.html
(describing suit challenging New Jersey's civil union regime as a constitutionally inadequate substitute for
marriage).
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as potentially complementing movement arguments in Perry. An important case
currently pending in the Ninth Circuit is Collins v. Brewer, which seeks to enjoin
Arizona's attempt to strip health benefits from the domestic partners of state
employees"'-and which movement lawyers believe will provide another vehi-
cle for the court to evaluate federal equal protection and due process claims
in relation to same-sex couples. Yet in the end, while their work continues in
other crucial venues, movement lawyers have been largely relegated to the
sidelines in Perry, watching the seemingly inexorable march of marriage equality
toward the Supreme Court-hoping for the best, but planning for the worst.
III. ANALYSIS: THE LIMITS OF BACKLASH
At one level, California appears to present a textbook case of backlash:
The seminal state case establishing the constitutional right of same-sex couples
to marry provoked Proposition 8, which took that right away and, by amending
the state constitution, made it more difficult to achieve in the future. Yet, as
we have suggested, for the backlash story to work as a way of critiquing the
legal strategy, it must be the case that other good options outside of litigation
existed to advance marriage for same-sex couples, and lawyers chose not to pur-
sue them, opting for litigation instead-thereby causing the movement to suffer.
A close analysis of the California case, however, reveals that the crucial premises
underlying the backlash account-that lawyers controlled the litigation agenda,
ignored or deemphasized nonlitigation alternatives, and won a legal decision
that caused the marriage ban to be passed-are not supported. Accordingly, it
is not possible, on the basis of the litigation record alone, to blame movement
lawyers for the bad outcome of Proposition 8.
A. Control Over Ends and Means
1. Constructing the Agenda: The Path to Marriage
Gerald Rosenberg asserts that marriage equality is the "self-stated" goal
of movement lawyers and thus judges their efforts accordingly. He is, of course,
504. See Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, Collins v. Brewer, No. CVO9-
2402-PHX-JWS (filed Jan. 7, 2010); Press Release, Lambda Legal, Lambda Legal Files Federal Lawsuit
Seeking to Block Elimination of Domestic Partner Benefits for Gay and Lesbian State Employees,
http://www.lambdalegal.org/news/pr/xaz-20091117_lambda-files-suit-block.html (Nov. 17, 2009).
Lambda Legal has also been involved in a case by a federal court employee seeking to enforce an
order, issued in connection with the Ninth Circuit's employee dispute resolution process, that DOMA
does not bar the provision of federal health benefits to the employee's same-sex spouse. See Complaint,
Golinski v. OPM, C 10 0257 (filed Jan. 20, 2010).
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correct to state that by the time movement lawyers settled upon a state-by-
state approach after Baehr v. Lewin"' many in the movement contemplated
the right to marry as the best outcome. However, this was not a consensus view,
and even those who supported marriage did so for diverse reasons. Throughout
the 1990s and into the 2000s, there was intense debate within the LGBT
community about whether embracing marriage meant assimilating to het-
erosexual norms,' °6 with some prominent marriage critics arguing that the
LGBT community should stand for diverse family arrangements." 7 For instance,
in the early phase of this discussion, Lambda Legal's Pizer personally rejected
marriage but recognized its importance to the movement; she later came to
believe that marriage was important and that her previous views were
inadequately informed. 8
In California, the marriage debate played out in the contest over the
meaning of domestic partnership and its relationship to marriage. Although
advocates generally viewed marriage as a long-term movement goal and
worked assiduously toward its achievement, 9 there was genuine disagreement
about whether marriage should be the exclusive objective, supplanting other
legal statuses such as domestic partnership. This disagreement was evident
in the initial push to pass a statewide domestic partnership registry (AB 26) in
1999. Although some marriage advocates had already begun to view domes-
tic partnership as a "stepping stone" toward marriage, others saw domestic
partnership as an end in itself-a distinct system of legal protections that
would make sense for those for whom marriage was undesirable or inapplicable.
Lambda Legal's Davidson and the ACLU's Coles, in particular, objected to
appropriating domestic partnership as a means to the end of marriage, opting
instead to view domestic partnership as a way of promoting multiple family
forms."0 AB 26, therefore, was deliberately crafted to apply to different-sex
couples in need of alternative ways of arranging their domestic affairs with
respect to issues like hospital visitation. Although Governor Davis's concern
about undermining marriage for different-sex couples ultimately led to the bill's
505. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
506. See Elizabeth B. Cooper, Who Needs Marriage?: Equality and the Role of the State, 8 J.L & FAM.
STUD. 325 (2006); Katherine M. Franke, The Politics of Same-Sex Marrige Politics, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER
& L. 236 (2006); Polikoff, Equality and Justice, supra note 65.
507. See generally MicHAEL WARNER, THE TROuBLE WITH NORMAL (1999). For race- and class-
based critiques of the centrality of marriage, see Craig Willse & Dean Spade, Freedom in a Regulatory
State?: Lawrence, Marriage and Biopolitics, 11 WIDENER L. REv. 309,325 & n.70 (2005).
508. See Pizer Remarks, supra note 94.
509. Indeed, Lambda Legal had established its Marriage Project in 1992.
510. Telephone Interview With Coles, supra note 99; Telephone Interview With Davidson, supra
note 105.
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modification to apply only to different-sex senior couples, the effort to cast
the bill in broad family diversity terms reflected not simply political cal-
culation, but also a genuine difference of opinion about appropriate scope.
The incrementalist strategy that followed emphasized short-term steps to
build new rights into the nonmarital relationship recognition regime. These
steps mattered, not simply as a means to an end, but as meaningful ends in their
own right.
Over time, calls for marriage became more univocal, but this occurred in
part as a result of complex interactions both inside and outside the LGBT
rights movement. Within movement circles, an important development was
marriage proponents' success in pushing their agenda in the face of broader
ambivalence about alternative family structures. In Coles's view, while the
"leadership was divided" about whether to pursue marriage to the exclusion of
other statuses, "there was a deeply motivated minority who wanted marriage, and
so their view became the more important view.,
511
In California, the key moment came with the passage of comprehensive
domestic partnership, which was hailed as a policy watershed for same-sex
couples, conferring "the same rights, protections, and benefits" as heterosex-
ual spouses. Marriage proponents deliberately drafted the bill with an eye
toward marriage, incorporating legislative findings on discrimination against
same-sex couples that were designed to "set up suspect class arguments.""5 2 Yet
for those who were uneasy with giving priority to marriage, the merger of
domestic partnership and marriage was less a strategic innovation than a cause
for concern. From this point of view, domestic partnership "was hijacked by
marriage folks.
13
Outside the movement, the ferocity of opponents' efforts to deny marriage
rights to lesbians and gay men had the effect of heightening its importance as
the ultimate symbol of LGBT equality. The spectacle of Baehr's initiative-driven
reversal, combined with Senator Knight's successful effort to ban recognition
of same-sex couples' marriages in California through Proposition 22, reinforced
movement support for marriage as a goal worth fighting for. Because same-sex
marriage opponents were actively staking out marriage as the right to be
denied, the LGBT rights movement responded by turning more of its attention
to marriage. In addition, as Baehr highlighted, marriage was becoming the
focal point of legal and political struggle whether movement lawyers wanted
it to or not. Accordingly, advocates embraced marriage, in part, as a way of
511. Telephone Interview With Coles, supra note 99.
512. Kors Remarks, supra note 83.
513. Telephone Interview With Coles, supra note 143.
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seizing control of the issue, shaping the terms of the debate, and maximizing
opportunities for success.
External funding considerations also influenced the primacy of marriage.
As marriage equality emerged as a powerful national issue, philanthropic
foundations began directing increasing resources for marriage-related advo-
cacy, 14 which allowed LGBT rights organizations to devote more attention to
the issue. At NCLR, for example, funding for marriage litigation "increased
hugely" after Goodridge v. Department of Public Health"5 in Massachusetts,
coming from donors that included the Gill Foundation in Denver, the Haas
Foundation in San Francisco, the Arcus Foundation in New York, and the
Ford Foundation."6
Even as marriage gained currency as a movement goal, issues of form,
timing, and its relationship to other legal statuses remained fluid. Movement
lawyers did not exclusively fix on achieving marriage as a constitutional right
(as opposed to a statutory one), or view outcomes short of marriage, like civil
unions or domestic partnership rights, as policy failures.1 7 The focus on securing
the right of same-sex couples to marry thus evolved from within the movement
in a complex and organic way.
2. Controlling the Tactics: Litigation Triggers and Movement Responses
The backlash account of marriage equality presupposes the familiar test-
case strategy in which movement lawyers select the appropriate case to raise
precisely the issue they want to resolve through the courts. This framework col-
lapses different types of lawsuits (affirmative and defensive) by different actors
(movement lawyers, nonmovement lawyers, and countermovement lawyers),
and ignores the circumstances under which they arise (with or without
movement support) 518
The California experience was contrary to the test-case paradigm.
Movement lawyers did not drive litigation efforts around marriage equality
(they actively sought to avoid them), but once litigation was commenced, they
became involved out of necessity in order to shape the results. Aside from the
state law challenge to Proposition 8, movement lawyers did not initiate the cru-
cial California same-sex relationship cases: They intervened to defend AB 205
514. Telephone Interview With Kendell, supra note 285.
515. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
516. Telephone Interview With Kendell, supra note 285.
517. See Purvis, supra note 19, at 34.
518. See id. at 6.
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against the lawsuit filed by ADF, filed Woo v. Lockyer19 after the San Francisco
City Attorney and Gloria Allred had already filed similar suits, and attempted
but were denied intervention in Perry v. Schwarzenegger.520 In each instance,
the litigation was launched as the result of actions outside of the movement
lawyers' immediate control. We identify three specific litigation triggers: (1)
countermobilization (suits initiated by opponents), (2) contingency (unpre-
dictable events), and (3) contestation (suits initiated by nonmovement
lawyers). Movement lawyers responded to these triggers in three ways: (1) direct
intervention, (2) remonstration, and (3) indirect involvement.
a. Causes of Litigation
(1) Countermobilization
Contemporary social struggles often feature opposing movements reacting
to one another. 52' The California marriage equality movement, opposed by
a well-organized and well-funded Christian Right countermovement, is an
illustrative case. As evidenced by the Proposition 22 campaign, Christian Right
activists were organizing around the issue of same-sex marriage in advance
of litigation and before LGBT rights lawyers themselves had coalesced around
the pursuit of marriage. 22 In part, Christian Right activists were responding
to the litigation in Hawaii and Vermont, which they believed might force
California to eventually recognize out-of-state marriages of same-sex couples.
At the same time, they were reacting to domestic partnership reform in the
California legislature.
This countermovement was responsible for initiating key legal battles
over same-sex unions. ADF sued to enjoin the implementation of the com-
prehensive domestic partnership bill, AB 205, on the ground that it violated
Proposition 22's marriage ban. It then sued to stop Newsom's decision to issue
marriage licenses to same-sex couples in the case that provoked In re Marriage
Cases.523 The one affirmative case movement lawyers filed, Strauss v. Horton,524
was in direct response to the opposition's successful passage of Proposition 8.
519. Case No. CPF-04-504038 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 12, 2004).
520. Case No. 09-CV-2292 (N.D. Cal. filed June 30, 2009).
521. See David S. Meyer & Suzanne Staggenborg, Movements, Countennovemens, and the Structure
of Political Opportunity, 101 AM. J. SOC. 1628,1632-33 (1996).
522. See Ingram, supra note 147.
523. 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
524. 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009).
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(2) Contingency
In the Marriage Cases, ADF acted only after San Francisco Mayor Newsom
unilaterally decided to issue marriage licenses. ADF thus seized upon an oppor-
tunity that, from the vantage point of movement lawyers, was unpredictable
and unwanted. Movement lawyers therefore found themselves litigating
marriage equality at a time they did not choose and in a procedural posture
they did not desire-although once Newsom made the decision, the lawyers
expressed support and sought to use it strategically to promote public educa-
tion around the legitimacy of marriage for same-sex couples. While lawyers
had, up to that point, succeeded in controlling the affirmative litigation
agenda, Newsom's unforeseen decision undercut that control and set off a
chain of events that led to three California Supreme Court decisions: the first
enjoining Newsom's issuance of marriage licenses, the second declaring a right
to marry for same-sex couples, and the third upholding Proposition 8. While
the movement lawyers successfully litigated the issue of marriage equality at the
California Supreme Court, their earlier strategic decision regarding timing
in California proved correct: The judicial victory was quickly taken away by
constitutional amendment.
(3) Contestation
Just as movement lawyers could not prevent Newsom from issuing marriage
licenses, they ultimately could not control private lawyers willing to repre-
sent constituents eager to litigate. Preventing private lawyers from filing suits
inconsistent with movement lawyer goals has been a long-standing issue
across different litigation campaigns. 2 Historically, the concern has been about
nonmovement lawyers, lacking the sophistication and big-picture perspective,
taking cases for a fee that could result in negative precedent undermining the
impact litigation campaign. In the marriage equality context, the initial impetus
for asserting movement lawyer control over the national campaign came from
the failure to prevent a nonmovement attorney from litigating the Hawaii case.
In California, there were two significant instances of private attorney
intervention that influenced the course of advocacy. The first occurred in
the immediate aftermath of the Newsom decision, when employment law
attorney Allred filed the Tyler v. County of Los Angeles. 6 suit challenging the
525. See, e.g., MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS
MOVEMENT, 1960-1973 (1995); MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP'S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST
SEGREGATED EDUCATION (1987).
526. Case No. BS088506 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Feb. 23, 2004).
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constitutionality of the marriage laws.52 That suit was a factor influencing the
movement lawyers' subsequent decision to file Woo, which they viewed as
necessary, in part, to prevent the constitutional issues from being shaped by
Allred (and the private lawyers in another case, Clinton v. State of California,528
filed in August 2004). The Allred suit to some degree tracked the historical
model of nonmovement challenges to movement lawyer control. Although
Allred had cultivated a high-profile television personality (particularly after her
representation of the family of Nicole Brown Simpson during the O.J. Simpson
case), as a small-firm attorney, she lacked the political expertise of the movement
lawyers and the professional resources of the elite corporate bar.
However, the second instance of private attorney intervention-the Perry
case-was much different. There, control over litigation strategy was wrested
not by smaller-scale private attorneys, as in Baehr and Tyler, but by legal titans
(and large-firm attorneys) Olson and Boies, acting at the behest of an activist
client with the resources to pay for the best counsel money could buy and the
hubris to disregard the collective judgment of the movement lawyers.
b. Mechanisms of Control
(1) Direct Intervention
Although movement lawyers did not generally initiate lawsuits in the
California campaign, they nonetheless attempted to shape the outcomes
through various assertions of control. The most direct was intervention in
pending cases to shape the legal theories and decisions. ADF's suit to strike
down AB 205, formally against the state of California, drew in movement
lawyers as intervenors representing the interests of same-sex couples who bene-
fited from the law. In that case, movement lawyers used litigation defensively
to protect their hard-won legal status. Similarly, movement lawyers intervened
in ADF's initial suit to stop the San Francisco marriage licenses and in the
Tyler suit filed by Allred. After the California Supreme Court's order inviting a
constitutional challenge to the marriage laws (and the city attorneys' affirmative
lawsuit), the movement lawyers filed Woo to preserve their ability to participate
in the resolution of the constitutional question in the consolidated cases.529 In
key cases in which the movement lawyers intervened, their arguments on the
527. See Gloria Allred, Same Gender Marriage (Mar. 3, 2008), http://www.gloriaallred.com/CM/
Media/Same-Gender-Marriage.asp.
528. Case No. CGC-04-429548 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Aug. 13, 2004).
529. See Lee Romney, Two Christian Advocacy Groups Put Faith in Courts, LA. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2004,
at Al.
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merits were largely successful: that AB 205 did not violate Proposition 22 and
that the California marriage laws were unconstitutional."' Efforts to intervene
in Perry were denied.
(2) Remonstration
In the face of potential legal or political challenges, movement lawyers
attempted to exert control by using the credibility developed through years of
experience to dissuade dissonant action. This approach proved less successful.
Prior to Perry, movement lawyers issued a joint statement in opposition to a
federal challenge to Proposition 8 and, once it was clear that a federal case was
being contemplated, met with Olson and his colleagues to advise them not to
file-advice that went unheeded. Lawyers took this same approach in response
to Newsom's earlier decision to issue marriage licenses, attempting to dissuade
him from what they perceived as a high-risk strategy. This ultimately did not
work: While Kendell gave her advice to Newsom's chief of staff, it became clear
that she was simply receiving notice of the mayor's decision.
(3) Indirect Involvement
When remonstration failed, movement lawyers tried to put the best face
on difficult situations by positive media messaging, sharing resources, and
filing amicus briefs in pending cases. After the Newsom decision, they publicly
supported the issuance of marriage licenses and intervened to defend their
legality. Kendell and the NCLR staff, in particular, became the most enthu-
siastic supporters of Newsom and attempted to turn his decision to their strategic
advantage; seizing on the moment's public education potential, Kendell and
her colleagues tried to shape media coverage by highlighting the marriage of
Del and Phyllis, and then using the fact that four thousand same-sex couples
had been married without event to argue that there was no threat to marriage
as an institution. In Perry, movement lawyers issued strong statements in support
of the litigants and the merits ('We think they've got it right about the law""53 ),
while providing backup resources and support. Simultaneously, movement
lawyers have sought to provide an alternative, California-specific basis for
530. Movement lawyers also successfully used intervention to argue against deciding on the merits a
federal challenge to DOMA. See Smelt v. County of Orange, 374 F. Supp. 2d 861,864 (C.D. Cal. 2005),
aff d in part and vacated in part, 447 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 2006). On appeal, NCLR and Lambda Legal,
representing Equality California, moved to intervene, and successfully argued that the plaintiffs lacked
standing and that the court should abstain. See id. at 686.
531. Svetvilas, supra note 467 (quoting James Esseks, Co-Director of the ACLU LGBT Project).
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resolving the case-both through amicus briefs and media statements-in
order to increase the chances for a favorable U.S. Supreme Court decision."2
They also filed additional lawsuits-in particular, Collins v. Brewer, the federal
challenge to Arizona's elimination of health benefits for state employees'
domestic partners-designed to provide alternative cases for the Ninth Circuit
to shape constitutional law on same-sex relationship recognition.
B. Multidimensional Advocacy
In contrast to the backlash account's presumption that litigation receives
tactical priority by movement lawyers, the California case reveals lawyers who
are deliberately engaging in multidimensional advocacy across legal and political
domains. Specifically, LGBT movement lawyers prioritized a nonlitigation strat-
egy over litigation, and conceptualized litigation as a tactic that succeeds only
when it works in conjunction with other techniques-specifically, legislative
advocacy and public education. Accordingly, lawyers constructed a legislative
record that would further eventual litigation efforts at the same time that they
pursued litigation that aided their legislative agenda and public education efforts.
1. Legislation to Enhance Litigation
Beginning in the mid-1990s, lawyers affirmatively decided to forego
litigation because they were not confident that the California Supreme Court
would support a marriage equality claim, and they were even more worried
about the ease with which a favorable decision could be reversed through the
initiative process. There was recurrent pressure on this "no-litigation" position.
Senator Knight's initial effort to pass a marriage ban through the legislature
motivated some activists to press for litigation, but Baehr's reversal strengthened
advocates' arguments to stand down. The passage of Proposition 22 presented
another moment when lawyers had to resist community pressure to litigate to
reverse the regressive law. Then, after the Vermont case was decided and the
Massachusetts litigation was launched, movement lawyers had to reiterate their
opposition to a constitutional challenge at the 2003 UCLA California Marriage
532. Another example of public advocacy occurred in the latest iteration of the Smelt DOMA
challenge, in which movement groups used the Obama administration's surprisingly strenuous initial
support of the law to shame the administration, ultimately compelling it to change its legal position,
to include married same-sex couples in the 2010 Census, and to provide a limited set of domestic partner
benefits to federal employees. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Smelt
v. United States, No. SACV04-1042 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2009), available at http://www.domawatch.org/
cases/9thcircuir/smeltvorangecounty/20040924_complaint.pdf; see Jake Sherman, White House Looks
to Include Same-Sex Unions in Census Count, WALL ST. J., June 19, 2009, at A4.
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Litigation Roundtable. Finally, the same message was conveyed both before
and after Proposition 8 in the movement lawyers' joint statement against a
federal lawsuit.
33
Instead of pursuing a high-risk litigation strategy, movement lawyers
focused on incremental legislative change. The lead legislative advocate,
Equality California's Kors, is a trained litigator who had transitioned into a
policy position. His appreciation for the role of litigation, combined with his
political savvy, produced a sophisticated campaign to take domestic partnership
in California from a regime of minimal rights to one including substantially
all the state-based rights and benefits of marriage. Kors worked closely with
movement lawyers, particularly Coles, Pizer, Davidson, Minter, and Kendell,
who were involved in the drafting phase of domestic partnership and marriage
legislation and in broader discussions about how best to secure and defend legis-
lative gains.
Movement lawyers pursued a legislative strategy mindful of the prospect
of future marriage litigation, carefully creating a record that would aid such
litigation when it occurred. There were two facets to this strategy. First, in the
context of domestic partnership, lawyers made sure that the legislative record
supported the potential legal arguments that the state did not have any legiti-
mate interests in withholding marriage from same-sex couples, and that such
a denial was based on animus. In according same-sex couples all the rights and
benefits of marriage, the comprehensive domestic partnership law emphasized
the prevalence of discrimination against same-sex couples while affirming the
legitimacy and value of same-sex-couple-headed families. The law also clearly
(and deliberately) demonstrated that domestic partnership remained an
institution separate from, and inferior to, marriage. This put movement lawyers
in a strong position during the Marriage Cases, allowing them to argue that
domestic partnership was separate and unequal, but that full-blown marriage for
same-sex couples was, in a sense, only a small-albeit crucially important-step
for the courts to take.
The second facet of the legislative strategy-advancing a marriage bill-
was ultimately unsuccessful, but also showed how lawyers viewed the interplay
between legislation and litigation. In the wake of the Newsom decision, it
became clear to movement lawyers that it would be valuable to have married
same-sex couples in California in order to show that "the sky didn't fall." '534
This would be helpful in making the constitutional case that there was no
533. See ACLU ET AL., supra note 432; ACLU ET AL., supra note 473.
534. PINELLO, supra note 168, at 80 (quoting Molly McKay, Associate Executive Director of
Equality California).
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harm in same-sex marriage and thus any exclusion based on sexual orientation
was irrational. However, when the California Supreme Court nullified the
four thousand San Francisco marriages in Lockyer v. City and County of San
Francisco,"' that strategy was upended. In response, advocates revived Senator
Leno's marriage bill in 2005 in order to achieve the right to marry-which
was an end in itself-and to produce marriages in the lead-up to the court's
resolution of the constitutional merits. The bill was ultimately vetoed, and thus
the marriages were not achieved through that means. Nonetheless, the pursuit
of the bill was still helpful to the broader advocacy campaign and reinforced
the movement lawyers' effort to move forward on multiple tactical fronts. In
particular, the fact that the marriage bill had won majority support in the
legislature allowed the movement lawyers to argue to the California Supreme
Court that marriage was consistent with the state's interests.
2. Litigation to Enhance Legislation
LGBT rights lawyers also litigated with a keen eye to how it might advance
their legislative agenda. Toward this end, the lawyers engaged in strategic liti-
gation relating to nonmarital relationship recognition, asserting relatively modest
legal claims that produced compelling human interest stories that could be mobi-
lized to move the legislative process. The strategy was to present a "wrenching
story, with powerful evidence, in which the legal step was relatively small.""' 6
The stories of Sharon Smith and Keith Bradkowski, told in high-profile cases,
resonated with the legislature's consideration of wrongful death claims and
inheritance rights, respectively. And Lydia Ramos's case highlighted the
importance of creating a presumption of parentage to protect the rights of
nonbiological parents in same-sex-couple-headed families. These cases increased
the salience of the issue of LGBT family recognition by replacing abstract legal
concepts with powerful stories of real human suffering. These stories, in turn,
served the movement's legislative agenda as advocates relied on them in seeking
additional rights from the legislature.
3. Litigation as a Legislative Shield
Movement lawyers also used litigation to protect legislative gains. Most
significantly, when countermovement forces sued to invalidate comprehensive
domestic partnership based on Proposition 22, movement lawyers successfully
535. No. S122923, 2004 WL 473257 (Cal. Mar. 11, 2004).
536. Pizer Remarks, supra note 94.
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protected their legislative achievement through litigation. Defending a legisla-
tively enacted, nonmarital relationship-recognition law produced less publicity
and presented less risk than affirmative marriage litigation since the lawyers
were not asking the courts to affirmatively declare relationship rights, but rather
to defer to the results of representative democracy.
4. Public Education
Litigation and legislative advocacy were also used to advance the
movement's public education aims, which were geared toward garnering
sufficient public support to withstand a voter initiative to ban marriage for same-
sex couples. For movement lawyers, the litigation was "part of a bigger strategy
of changing the narrative of gay people that existed before Baehr, [which
portrayed] gay people as individuals, usually a man, on the search for sex, not
in a relationship, and lonely .... What was transformative across gay rights was
relationship litigation that started and made an incredible difference in mak-
ing people think of lesbians and gay men as people with families." '37
One aspect of this project was the effort by advocates to promote the four
thousand San Francisco marriages after the Newsom decision in 2004.
NCLR's Kendell, for instance, sought to harness the powerful images of same-
sex couples rushing to get married: "I was confident at the time that people
seeing couples night after night joyous with their families, kids, and parents
in tow standing in the rain just to get a marriage license was going to be
transformative."'53
The lawyers also attempted to structure the ultimate marriage litigation
with an eye toward its public education potential. Although the Woo case was
by necessity put together in haste, the lawyers attempted to select plaintiffs
who would be more broadly reflective of the state's gay population than the
stereotyped version of the white, urban gay man: "[W]e were trying to find
plaintiffs who would be good spokespeople and representative of different parts
of the state." '39 But the educative value of cases was not always fully realized.
For instance, in Woo, the plaintiffs did not reflect broad socioeconomic diver-
sity. Furthermore, because California already had a domestic partnership regime,
the movement lawyers could not argue that the LGBT community suffered
complete legal exclusion, which might have been more easily packaged into
public relations sound bites." °
537. Telephone Interview With Davidson, supra note 105.
538. Telephone Interview With Kendell, supra note 285.
539. Telephone Interview With Davidson, supra note 105.
540. Id.
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The focus on public education also had organizational impacts. Lambda
Legal, for instance, set up a Department of Education and Public Affairs to
promote its message." Equality California emerged as the key public education
organization, attempting to bridge the education, legislative, and litigation
facets of the campaign with programs like Let California Ring, which focused
on door-to-door canvassing, media relations, and engaging youth. 12 In addi-
tion, more grassroots groups like FAIR attempted to use litigation-such as
the Strauss v. Horton 41 case-as a vehicle to mobilize young people to protest the
deprivation of marriage rights.
Finally, UCLA's Williams Institute emerged during the course of the
California marriage equality movement as an important player in the public edu-
cation field.5" Although not an advocacy organization, the Williams Institute
uses data analysis and research to support LGBT rights efforts, providing policy
analysis relevant to legislation and authoring amicus briefs bearing on marriage
equality litigation. For instance, during the debate over AB 205, its analysis
of the financial consequences of comprehensive domestic partnershil--showing
that it would effectively raise taxes on some same-sex couples while reducing
tax revenue overall545-was a key factor in forcing Governor Davis to compro-
mise by agreeing to community property and spousal support in exchange for
dropping the provision allowing domestic partners to jointly file their taxes as
married couples. Although the analysis ultimately proved helpful in moving
the legislative process forward, it came with a tradeoff since the findings on tax
increases were not necessarily what advocates and legislators wanted to hear.
This may have ruffled the feathers of movement allies at the time, but it also
reinforced the Williams Institute's independence, which has been crucial to
its credibility in providing subsequent policy research. For instance, during the
Marriage Cases litigation, Williams Institute researchers Lee Badgett and Gary
Gates filed an amicus brief showing that California same-sex couples were raising
more than seventy thousand children 546-a fact that Chief Justice George cited
in his opinion.547 The Williams Institute also compiled the data for the estimate
that eighteen thousand same-sex couples were married in the wake of the
541. Id.
542. See Let California Ring, About Let California Ring, http://www.letcalifomiaring.org/site/
c.ItJTJ6MQIuE/b.3348071/k.C79A/AboutUs.htm (last visited June 6, 2010).
543. 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009).
544. The Williams Project changed its name to the Williams Institute in 2006.
545. See BADGETT & SEARS, supra note 202.
546. See Application for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief and Brief of Amici Curiae MV. Lee
Badgett and Gary J. Gates in Support of the Parties Challenging the Marriage Exclusion, In re Marriage
Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 675 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (No. S147999).
547. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 433 n.50 (Cal. 2008).
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Marriage Cases, and has continued to conduct influential studies on LGBT
demographics, the extent of discrimination, and the economic impact of pro-
LGBT laws. 48
5. Beyond (But Not Without) Litigation
Overall, the LGBT rights lawyers' approach in California-generally
avoiding affirmative litigation, cultivating litigation's indirect effects, and
understanding litigation in relation to other institutional domains-shows
that the backlash account's stereotyped vision of the nave rights-crusading
public interest lawyer is inaccurate. LGBT rights lawyers in California appre-
ciated the relationship between litigation and nonlitigation strategies and made
decisions based on how to maximize overall success. They understood that court-
centered disputes constitute one of the many ways in which ongoing social
conflicts play out.49 Accordingly, they did not look to courts as saviors, but
rather saw them as just one of the many players in the marriage equality
movement. Similarly, they viewed litigation as just one tactic in their repertoire,
seizing upon the dynamic relationship among courts, other governmental
branches, elites, and the public.
There are two important implications of these findings. First, the
California marriage equality case suggests that the scholarly focus on litigation
as the social reform vehicle-of-choice for movement lawyers is outmoded.
Contemporary legal advocacy in the marriage context does not fit the top-down,
litigation-centric framework developed to address the civil rights campaign
of the mid-twentieth century.55 This finding should make us rethink the
appropriateness of the conventional emphasis on litigation in other advocacy
contexts and investigate the degree to which the multidimensional model of
advocacy deployed in the marriage equality movement applies across different
substantive domains.55" ' To the extent that lawyering in other fields embraces
548. See Bob Egelko, Same-Sex Marriage Issue Back to State Top Court, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 6, 2008,
at A19 (noting Williams Institute researchers' estimate of eighteen thousand married same-sex couples
in California).
549. See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and
Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373 (2007); see also GENE BURNS, THE MORAL VETO 12 (2005).
550. For a critique of the historical accuracy of this view, see Kenneth W. Mack, Rethinking Civil
Rights Lawyering and Politics in the Era Before Brown, 115 YALE L.J. 256, 258-59 (2005).
551. Cf. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK, supra note 47; Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of
Rights and Politics: Perspectives From the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589 (1986); Ann
Southworth, Lawyers and the "Myth of Rights" in Civil Rights and Poverty Practice, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J.
469, 473 (1999).
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multidimensionality, it should reinforce the rejection of theories that focus
exclusively on litigation in favor of a more nuanced scholarly approach.
However-and this is the second point-it is important to emphasize that
moving beyond the focus on litigation is not to diminish its importance as a
movement strategy. It is true that LGBT rights lawyers in the California case
generally sought to avoid marriage litigation and ultimately resorted to it only
by necessity. But that is not to suggest that litigation is "bad" and legislative
advocacy and other strategies are necessarily "good." To so conclude would
simply reproduce the critique of litigation. Rather, the lesson to draw from the
California case is that litigation is an essential, albeit partial, tactic in social
change struggle. It may well be of limited efficacy by itself, but when strate-
gically deployed in tandem with organizing, political advocacy, and public
education campaigns, it is an important tool. When LGBT rights lawyers
believed that they could use litigation to advance the cause-for instance, by
defending AB 205 or filing Woo in response to the California Supreme Court's
invitation for a constitutional challenge-they did so with skill and success.
And, as the affirmative litigation in Vermont and Massachusetts highlights, it
was not simply that movement lawyers disdained litigation, but instead that
they held a well-researched view that in the California context it would produce
negative movement results if used prematurely.
C. Backlash Mechanics and the Causation Problem
1. Judicial Exceptionalism?
In his broad critique of social reform litigation, Rosenberg relies on both
the courts' lack of enforcement power and the backlash thesis to support his
claim that courts offer only a "hollow hope." For instance, with Brown v. Board
of Education,552 he points to the lack of actual school desegregation due to
powerful Southern opposition and ineffective judicial implementation.553
Marriage for same-sex couples, however, does not present judicial enforcement
problems since after the right to marry is achieved, "nothing else needs to be
done." '54 Local registrars do not enjoy discretion and therefore must issue
marriage licenses to same-sex couples so desiring. For instance, even when clerks
552. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
553. See Rosenberg, Courting Disaster, supra note 18, at 809-10. Klarman seeks to tie implementa-
tion to backlash. He argues that decisions like Brown and Goodridge "not only mandate changes in
the abstract, but they inspire activists to take concrete steps to implement them, thus further inciting
political backlash." Klarman, supra note 9, at 480.
554. ROSENBERG, supra note 9, at 351; see also Keck, supra note 7, at 157.
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in California's Kern and Merced Counties protested the Marriage Cases decision
by refusing to preside over any marriage ceremonies, they continued to issue
gender-neutral marriage licenses to both same-sex and different-sex couples.5 '
It is precisely because enforcement is not an issue in the marriage equality
context that the debate about court-centered strategies has focused on
backlash. The backlash thesis presumes that there is a clear causal relationship
between court decisions and political outcomes.
Lawyers assert Court decision Opposition Regressive
legal right vindicating right galvanized policy enacted
Within this model, the court decision is the "but for" cause of countermobili-
zation: It is court action against public sentiment that ignites opposition, which
succeeds in enacting regressive policy. The argument thus rests on a notion
of "judicial exceptionalism"-that the unique countermajoritarian nature of
court decisions produces backlash where other forms of lawmaking, such as
legislation, would not.
Yet, in California, the evidence in support of this causal relationship is thin.
It is instructive to look at the two anti-same-sex marriage statewide initiatives:
Proposition 22, which banned marriage for same-sex couples by statute in
2000, and Proposition 8, which banned it by constitutional amendment in 2008.
In the case of Proposition 22, the causal relationship is fuzzy. From the backlash
perspective, the strongest argument would be that the Baehr decision in Hawaii
caused political reverberations in California, where opponents worried that
Hawaii marriages would have to be recognized in California. This motivated
Senator Knight to advance AB 1982 in 1996, which was defeated, and then to
resurrect the statutory ban in Proposition 22, which was approved for the
statewide ballot in 1998. The Vermont Supreme Court decision in December
1999 added fuel to the fire and helped mobilize marriage equality opponents
to pass Proposition 22 by a convincing margin in March 2000.
However, it is not clear that this was the actual causal chain. By the time
Proposition 22 qualified for the ballot, Hawaii had passed its constitutional
amendment permitting the legislature to prohibit marriage by same-sex
couples (which it had already decided to do), thus withdrawing the threat of
forced recognition of out-of-state marriages. Vermont's Baker v. State556 decision
may have provided additional impetus, but by the time California voters
555. See Amanda Fehd, 2 Offlias Say "I Don't" to Same-Sex Marriages, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
June 7, 2008 available at http://recall.uniontrib.com/uniontrib/20080607/news-ln7samesex.html.
556. 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
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went to the polls in 2000, it was clear that Vermont was heading toward civil
unions, not marriage, for same-sex couples. Moreover, part of the motivation
for Proposition 22 appeared to be the legislative efforts to establish domestic
partnership, particularly the 1999 passage of California's domestic partner
registry, which opponents viewed as a step toward marriage. Indeed, once
comprehensive domestic partnership was passed in 2003, opponents attempted
to negate it by arguing that it contravened Proposition 22.
In the Proposition 8 context, the causal chain is even more attenu-
ated. There are two separate court linkages. The first runs from Goodridge v.
Department of Public Health557 to the Marriage Cases; the second from the
Marriage Cases to Proposition 8. There is reason to be dubious of both. With
respect to the first, the argument would be that Goodridge provoked Mayor
Newsom's issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex couples in San Francisco,558
and that this decision, in turn, provoked the ADF litigation that ultimately
ended up squarely presenting the constitutional challenge against California's
statutory marriage ban. Yet, if the causal chain is supposed to run from the court
decision to public opposition, one must strain to fit the Goodridge link into
that framework. In fact, the Newsom decision, rather than representing public
opposition, was just the opposite: an expression of elite political support for
Goodridge and an attempt to extend its reach. Tracing a line from Newsom's
action to the California Supreme Court decision also fails to neatly follow the
backlash story, since the court decision is the result of countermobilization (ADF
filed the injunction action that led to the Marriage Cases decision), not its cause.
Even if we take the California Supreme Court decision in the Marriage
Cases on its own terms, it is not at all clear that it caused Proposition 8 in
any meaningful sense. It is the case that Christian Right advocates seized
on the supreme court oral arguments to mobilize constituents and raise funds
to place Proposition 8 on the ballot.59 However, the picture is complicated.
These same countermovement advocates were organizing the Proposition 8
effort before marriage equality litigation had commenced.5"
Furthermore, if it were true that there was something unique about court
decisions that caused backlash, we would expect public support for Proposition
8 to increase precisely because it was the California Supreme Court that affirmed
the legality of marriage for same-sex couples. However, the public opinion
data on Proposition 8, at best, only support a more limited claim: that the
557. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
558. See Klarman, supra note 9, at 481.
559. Jesse McKinley, California Ruling on Same-Sex Marniage Fuels a Battle, Rather Than Ending
It, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2008, at A18.
560. See id.
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countermajoritarian nature of the judiciary was one factor among many that
influenced public opposition. 6' And there is reason to suspect that the judicial
origin of the marriage equality law was less important than other factors, namely
the specter that schools would be compelled to teach about homosexuality and
same-sex relationships.
One way to evaluate the influence of the Marriage Cases decision on public
opinion is to look at how it was used by the Yes on 8 campaign in its messag-
ing. Although the Yes on 8 campaign used multiple venues to get its message
out, including online videos and "viral" emails, we focus on television advertis-
ing, on which the campaign invested heavily during the two months before
the Proposition 8 vote.562 Figure 1 tracks the three major public opinion polls
leading up to Proposition 8 and indicates the first air date for the five major
Yes on 8 television advertisements.
FIGURE 1: PERCENT IN SUPPORT OF CALIFORNIA PROPOSITION 8
--- Field Poll -- Survey USA - Public Policy Institute of California X LA Times 0 Prop. 8 Vote
Yes on 8 TV Advertisements
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561. For an example of how Yes on 8 used the countermajoritarian nature of the judiciary, see
Arguments: Prop 8, in CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 56
(2008), available at http://www.voterguide.sos.ca.gov/past/2008/generallargu-rebut/argu-rebutt8.htm.
562. For an insightful analysis of the Yes on 8 advertising campaign, see Murray, supra note 433.
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As Figure 1 shows, there was only one poll in the immediate wake of the
May 15, 2008 Marriage Cases decision, by the Los Angeles Times; it did not ask
specifically about Proposition 8 (which had not yet been named), but rather
asked if the respondent would vote in favor of a proposed amendment that
would "reverse the court's decision and state that marriage is only between
a man and a woman," to which 54 percent answered yes.563 As the election
drew near, three separate polls-the Field Poll, Survey USA, and the Public
Policy Institute of California poll-started tracking support for Proposition
8. In the first of these, the July Field Poll, support for Proposition 8 was at a
relatively low 42 percent, suggesting that the impact of the court decision on
public opposition to marriage equality softened as the immediacy of the decision
faded. Support for Proposition 8 began to increase in September and generally
continued to trend upward as the election drew near."
This period of increased support for Proposition 8 corresponded to the
Yes on 8 television advertising campaign, leading commentators to suggest that
the ads had an important impact on public opinion."' The Yes on 8 proponents
563. May 2008-Los Angeles Times/KTLA California Same-Sex Marriage Poll, L.A. TIMES, May
23, 2008, at Al. A Field Poll taken shortly thereafter showed support for same-sex marriage at 51 percent.
See MARK DICAMILLO & MERVIN FIELD, FIELD RESEARCH CORP., #2268: GROWING TREND IN
SUPPORT OF ALLOWING SAME-SEX MARRIAGE IN CALIFORNIA 1 (2008).
564. In the Field Poll, support for Proposition 8 decreased from mid-July to mid-September (from
42 percent to 38 percent), but then increased by six points by the end of October. See Mark DiCamillo
& Mervin Field, Prop. 8 (Same-Sex Marriage Ban) Dividing 49% No-44% Yes, With Many Voters in
Conflict, FIELD POLL, Oct. 31, 2008; Mark DiCamillo & Mervin Field, 55% of Voters Oppose Proposition
8, the Initiative to Ban Same-Sex Marriage in California, FIELD POLL, Sept. 18, 2008; Mark DiCamillo
& Mervin Field, By a 51% to 42% Margin Voters Appear Ready to Vote No on Proposition 8, the "Limit
on Marriage" Constitutional Amendment, FIELD POLL, July 18, 2008. In the Public Policy Institute of
California (PPIC) polls, support for Proposition 8 increased from 40 percent in mid-August, to 41 percent
in mid-September, to 44 percent in mid-October. See PUB. POL'Y INST. OF CAL., PPIC STATEWIDE
SURVEY: CALIFORNIANS AND THEIR GOVERNMENT 3 (2008) (showing, in a poll conducted Aug. 12-
19, support for Proposition 8 at 40 percent and opposition at 54 percent); John Wildermuth, Poll: Same-
Sex Marriage Ban Not Wooing Voters, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 25, 2008, at B2 (reporting on a PPIC poll
conducted Sept. 9-16 showing 41 percent support for and 55 percent opposition to Proposition 8); PUB.
POL'Y INST. OF CAL., PPIC STATEWIDE SURVEY: CALIFORNIANS AND THEIR GOVERNMENT 5 (2008)
(showing, in a poll conducted Oct. 12-19, support for Proposition 8 at 44 percent and opposition at
52 percent). The Survey USA poll figures showed support for Proposition 8 increasing from late Septem-
ber to early October (from 44 percent to 47 percent), increasing slightly by mid-October (to 48 percent),
and then dipping by one percentage point-within the margin of error-by late October. See Results of
SurveyUSA Election Poll #14761, SURVEYUSA, Nov. 1, 2010 (showing, in a poll conducted Oct. 29-3 1,
support for Proposition 8 at 47 percent and opposition at 50 percent); Results of SurveyUSA Election Poll
#14613, SURVEYUSA, Oct. 17, 2008 (showing, in a poll conducted Oct. 15-16, support for Proposition
8 at 48 percent and opposition at 45 percent); Results of SurveyUSA Election Poll #14503, SURVEYUSA,
Oct. 6, 2008 (showing, in a poll conducted Sept. 23-24, support for Proposition 8 at 44 percent and
opposition at 49 percent).
565. See Mark DiCamillo, Why Prop. 8 Confounded Pre-election Pollsters, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 10,
2008, at B5.
mobilized several arguments to make their public case. At the outset of the
television campaign, the supreme court decision played a clear-though
partial-role. The first ad, which began airing on September 29, 2008, depicted
a grinning Gavin Newsom uttering the phrase, "It's gonna happen, whether
you like it or not!," and explicitly emphasized the anticourt theme ("Four judges
ignored four million voters and imposed same-sex marriage on California.").5"
This ad, however, did not simply rest on the "activist court" theme, but also
raised two other arguments: that marriage equality would undermine the
free exercise of religion ("churches could lose their tax exemption") and
affect public school programming ("gay marriage taught in public schools"). 67
It is not possible to say which argument had the most public impact, but the
Yes on 8 campaign's choice of which ads to air next is suggestive of the argu-
ments it believed had the most traction. The next three ads (It's Already
Happened, October 8; Everything to Do With Schools, October 24; and Finally
the Truth, October 28) did not mention the court decision and instead focused
exclusively on the impact of Proposition 8 on school programming, all suggesting
that its defeat would mean that "gay marriage" would be taught in schools
and that parents would have no legal right to remove their children from such
instruction.568 The final ad of the campaign, "Have You Thought About It?,"
began airing on October 29, and returned to the trio of arguments (religious
freedom, the activist court, and schools) that were raised in the first ad a month
earlier. Whereas polling put support for Proposition 8 at between 38 and 44
percent when the Yes on 8 ads began to air, by the time of the election on
November 5, 2008, Proposition 8 passed with 52 percent of the vote.
What does this tell us? Consistent with the backlash account, Yes on 8
proponents mobilized the court decision in their ad campaign, suggesting that
it struck a public chord. However, the strong backlash claim-that the court
decision caused the bad outcome-is unsupported. The "activist court" theme
was never presented in the television ads as a stand-alone reason to vote for
Proposition 8. And during the crucial month before the vote, the three suc-
cessive ads aired by the Yes on 8 campaign focused exclusively on schools,
566. ProtectMarriage.com, First Yes on 8 TV Ad, http://www.protectmarriage.com/video/view/2
(last visited June 6, 2010).
567. Id.
568. ProtectMarriage.com, It's Already Happened, http://www.protectmarriage.com/video/view/5
(last visited June 6, 2010) ("Teaching children about gay marriage will happen here unless we pass
Proposition 8."); ProtectMarriage.com, Everything to Do With Schools, http://protectmarriage.com/video/
view/7 (last visited June 6, 2010) ("Gay marriage will be taught in our schools unless we vote Yes on
Proposition 8."); ProtectionMarriage.com, Finally the Truth, http:llwww.protectmarriage.com/video/view/8
(last visited June 6, 2010) ("Children will be taught about gay marriage unless we vote Yes on
Proposition 8.").
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suggesting they were having the most impact-a conclusion supported by exit
polling showing that parents with school-age children voted for Proposition 8
in disproportionately high numbers. 69 Of course, we do not know whether in
a close vote those motivated by anger toward the "activist court" tipped the
scales. However, the focus of the advertisements in the final stage of the cam-
paign suggests that Proposition 8 proponents did not believe that the "activist
court" message was their strongest closing argument.
Even if the court decision was related to the passage of Proposition 8,
the backlash thesis only stands up as a critique of courts if it can prove the
counterfactual" t : that the same events would not have transpired if Governor
Schwarzenegger had signed the legislature's marriage bill and there had been
no court decision. This counterfactual, of course, cannot be proved. But there
is reason to suspect that a marriage bill, passed by the legislature and signed
by the governor, would have produced a similar backlash effect. It is clear that
if marriage passed through the legislature, opponents would have sought to
reverse it via the initiative process and were already attempting to place the
issue on the 2006 ballot. 7' As Senator Leno was preparing to introduce the mar-
riage bill in 2005, an ADF attorney predicted that if either the courts or the
legislature established the legal right for same-sex couples to marry, the voters
would reverse it.57 2 Likewise, Randy Thomasson of the Campaign for California
Families stated that passage of a marriage equality bill by the legislature "will
ignite the majority of California" to vote for a constitutional amendment to
"override the politicians.""57 Thus, opponents were mobilized to place a consti-
tutional ban on the ballot irrespective of the form in which marriage equality
was passed. And one could imagine that had the bill been enacted against the
backdrop of Proposition 22, there would have been a similarly harsh media
campaign: "the unaccountable bureaucrats in Sacramento, captured by pro-gay
special interests, have thwarted the will of the people. .... "
Then, the question becomes: Would voters have been less likely to
overturn a marriage bill enacted by the legislature? While this question is
569. See THE THOMAS & DOROTHY LEAVEY CBrrER FOR THE STUDY OF LOS ANGELES, LCSLA
2008 EXIT POLLS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY AND NATIONAL ELECTIONS IN THE CITY OF Los
ANGELES; RESULTS OF THE LCSLA NATIONAL ELECTION EXIT POLL: ALL CITY, VALLEY, AND NON
VALLEY (2008), available at http://www.Imu.edu/AssetFactory.aspx?did=32036 (finding that according
to exit polls, only 55 percent of Los Angeles voters with school-age children voted against Proposition
8, compared to 70 percent of other Los Angeles voters).
570. See Meyer & Staggenborg, supra note 521, at 1636.
571. See Nancy Vogel, '06 Ballot is a Goal for Foes of Gay Marriage, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 27,
2005, at B3.
572. See Wan & Romney, supra note 386.
573. Vogel, supra note 571.
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impossible to answer with certainty, there is at least circumstantial evidence
suggesting that a marriage bill would have fared no better than the court's deci-
sion in front of the voters. This evidence emerges from recent events in Maine,
where the legislature-in the absence of any court decision-passed a marriage
equality bill, which the governor signed. However, voters reversed the deci-
sion in November 2009."'4 The campaign to overturn the law relied on the
same playbook developed during California's Proposition 8 campaign."'
The same advertisements linking marriage equality to gay-inclusive school
curricula stoked parents' fears. 76 And instead of pointing to a "handful of
judges," the campaign for voter repeal argued that a "handful of politicians
cannot be the only ones to decide what the definition of marriage should mean
for the entire state of Maine." '77 In the end, voters in both California and
Maine narrowly overturned the legalization of marriage for same-sex couples,
and the different institutional postures of the initial legalization did not
578determine the ultimate outcomes.
2. Baselines and Metrics
How do we measure the success of litigation campaigns? Rosenberg assesses
the effectiveness of LGBT rights advocacy by focusing on the ultimate end
goal: marriage.579 Thomas Keck, in his analysis of LGBT rights, focuses on the
starting point-the absence of legal status for same-sex unions-and compares
this to the rising number of state-based relationship recognition laws, including
both marital and nonmarital regimes.ss If we measure success in relation to
the goal of establishing a right for same-sex couples to marry, the gulf between
aspirations and reality may seem large. But if instead we base success on how far
574. See Kevin Miller & Judy Harrison, Gay Marriage Repealed in Maine, BANGOR DAILY NEWS,
Nov. 4, 2009, at Al.
575. See Bob Drogin, In Maine, h's Like Prop. 8 All Over Again, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2009, at Al.
576. See StandforMarriageMaine.com, About the People's Veto and Question 1, http://standfor
marriagemaine.com/?page_id=256 (last visited June 6, 2010) ("Without Question 1, teachers will be
required to teach young children that there is no difference between homosexual marriage and traditional
marriage and parents will lose control over what their kids learn in school about marriage and sexual
orientation.").
577. See StandforMarriageMaine.com, Myths and Facts About the People's Veto of Homosexual
Marriage Legislation (LD 1020), http://standformarriage.com/?pagejid=271 (last visited June 6, 2010).
578. There are other important examples of Christian Right groups using the initiative process
to reverse legislative gains for lesbians and gay men, including Colorado's Amendment 2 (ultimately
struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court), which barred the state and municipalities from enacting antidis-
crimination laws based on sexual orientation. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
579. See ROSENBERG, supra note 9, at 353.
580. See Keck, supra note 7, at 171.
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from the starting point the movement has come, the progress appears quite
impressive.
The same issue of baseline affects our analysis of California. Judging by
the metric of full marriage equality, the movement in California has come
up short and, in a real sense, must now surmount a difficult new hurdle in
repealing Proposition 8. However, measuring success relative to the starting
point of nonrecognition paints a different picture. Whereas same-sex couples
had no statewide legal rights in early 1999, by the end of 2009, they had won
comprehensive domestic partnership and, in addition, full legal recognition
for in-state and out-of-state marriages performed prior to Proposition 8, and full
recognition (without the label "marriage") for out-of-state marriages entered after
Proposition 8 (per SB 54). California thus went from having no legally
recognized same-sex unions in 1999 to having over forty-eight thousand regis-
tered domestic partners by 2008,8 eighteen thousand same-sex couples legally
married inside California prior to Proposition 8, an unknown (but possibly sig-
nificant) number of pre-Proposition 8 legally recognized out-of-state marriages,
and an unknown, but growing, number of same-sex couples married out of state
after Proposition 8, who are entitled to full legal status in California, albeit
without the marriage label.
While the ultimate appraisal of the movement's "success" or "failure" may
depend on one's vantage point, our own view is that this record demonstrates
substantial progress measured relative to the starting point of no rights. It is
also relevant to note that through the eyes of those most keenly attuned to the
marriage equality movement in California-the lawyers themselves--the picture
is far from the grim portrait depicted by backlash proponents. To the contrary,
the lawyers view their accomplishments in both creating domestic partnership
and creating limited marital recognition as major advances. Even after the
passage of Proposition 8, movement lawyers generally remain positive about
what they have accomplished-and optimistic about what lies ahead. Minter,
the lead lawyer for the LGBT rights groups in the Marriage Cases, put it this
way: "[L]ook at where we are. Things have moved forward more quickly and dra-
matically than anyone would have dreamed. We are so much further along
now than where we were in 2004. '82 Other lawyers expressed similar views,583
and there is a sense that, given the shifting demographics-with younger people
more supportive of marriage for same-sex couples-it is only a matter of time
581. See GARY J. GATES, M.V. LEE BADGETT, & DEBORAH HO, WILLIAMS INST., MARRIAGE,
REGISTRATION AND DISSOLUTION BY SAME-SEX COUPLES IN THE U.S. 5 (2008).
582. Telephone Interview With Minter, supra note 125.
583. See Telephone Interview With Kendell, supra note 285; Pizer Remarks, supra note 94.
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before marriage is achieved.5" It may be possible to discount such optimistic
appraisals because they come from participants with a vested interest in telling a
positive story of their involvement. But they are nonetheless sincerely held and
suggest that those closest to the fight believe that much has been won-and the
struggle is by no means over.
Even if one credits this progress, a distinct criticism of the movement
still remains: that the focus on achieving marriage as a legal right-waged by
relatively well-off, mostly white, elite-educated lawyers in relatively well-
resourced organizations-may have had the effect of de-radicalizing the
movement and narrowing the field of possible alternatives within the broader
arena of LGBT activism.85 This is a legitimate concern-outside the domain
of backlash-that we cannot address systematically here; however, we do offer
two observations. First, there is evidence that the push for marriage created some
political space for alternatives like domestic partnership, which were made to
appear more moderate by comparison.586 This may not be precisely what critics
of marriage have in mind, but it suggests that there might be some broader
benefits of the marriage equality movement. Second, the critique of rights-based
strategies must always be evaluated in light of the question: As opposed to
what?87 In the LGBT rights context, it is worth asking what alternatives were
politically possible and how the marriage equality movement interacted with,
and potentially negated, those options.
CONCLUSION: TOWARD A THEORY OF MOVEMENT
LAWYERING-IN THE FACE OF BACKLASH
In the urge to understand and appraise the complex forces that have driven
the marriage equality movement, it is easy to overlook the elemental heroism
that has defined the work of lawyers and activists who-in the face of impla-
cable opposition and virulent hostility-have moved marriage from the margins
to the mainstream in California. Working for relatively little pay and recogni-
tion, they asserted the right to be treated equally and fought for its realization.
That they have not fully succeeded in achieving it speaks more to the power
and perseverance of their opponents than to their own sophistication and
tenacity. What we are to make of their efforts is a question that will continue
584. Kors Remarks, supra note 83.
585. See, e.g., Sandra R. Levitsky, To Lead With Law: Reassessing the Influence of Legal Advocacy
Organizations in Social Movements, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 145, 146 (Austin
Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold eds., 2006).
586. See, e.g., Keck, supra note 7, at 158-59.
587. See id. at 175.
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to be vigorously debated. In California, though marriage equality has not yet
been achieved, the legal landscape for same-sex couples has been transformed
over the past decade, from a regime of no rights to one of equality in all but
name, with a significant number of married same-sex couples. Although the
future is still uncertain, an analysis that obscures these gains offers an incomplete
picture of the marriage equality movement that diminishes advocates' efforts
and presents a false accounting of what has been won and lost-so far.
The story of the national marriage equality movement is still being writ-
ten, which means that an overall appraisal cannot yet be fully completed. What
we do know is that the echoes of California activism continue to reverberate
in legislatures and courts around the country, as advocates continue to pursue
a state-by-state strategy (while closely watching Perry).588 The Vermont and
New Hampshire legislatures, as well as the Washington, D.C. Council, recently
approved marriage for same-sex couples,"' while Iowa and Connecticut saw
state supreme court decisions awarding same-sex couples full access to
marriage9-bringing the total number of states with marriage equality to five
plus the District of Columbia. New York began recognizing same-sex cou-
ples' marriages from other jurisdictions, and Maryland is poised to do the
same.591 Meanwhile, some states with marriage bans have enacted relationship
recognition regimes. 92 There have also been recent losses: In addition to
the Maine marriage repeal, the New York and New Jersey legislatures voted
down marriage equality bills. The New Jersey action prompted movement
lawyers to return to the New Jersey Supreme Court to vindicate the right to
equal treatment announced in an earlier decision.593 In the wake of Proposition
8 and the voter repeal in Maine, there has been renewed criticism of the
588. In 2009, GLAD filed a challenge to DOMA in Massachusetts federal district court. See
Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, or Other Relief and for Review of Agency Action, Gill v. Office
of Pets. Mgt., Case No. 09-CV-10309 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Mar. 3, 2009).
589. See S.B. 115, 2009 Leg., 2009-2010 Sess. (Vt. 2009); H.B. 73, 2009 Leg., 161st Sess. (N.H.
2009); Ian Urbina, Nation's Capital Joins 5 States in Legalizing Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4,
2010, at A19.
590. Kerrigan v. Comm'n of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Vamum v. Brien, 763
N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
591. See Aaron C. Davis & John Wagner, Maryland to Recognize Gay Marriages From Other Places,
WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 2010, at Al; Danny Hakim, Gay Spouses Due Benefits in the State, Court Finds,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2009, at A29.
592. The Nevada, Oregon, and Washington legislatures passed domestic partnership laws that
provide all of the stare-based rights and benefits of marriage. See S.B. 283, 2009 Leg., 75th Sess. (Nev.
2009); S.B. 5688, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2009); H.B. 2007, 74th Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess.
(Ore. 2007). Wisconsin passed a limited domestic partnership law, and Colorado enacted a designated
beneficiaries regime. See WIS. STAT. § 765 (2009); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-22-101 (2010).
593. See Press Release, Lambda Legal, Lambda Legal Returns to New Jersey Supreme Court Seeking
Marriage Equality (Mar. 18, 2010), http:/Iambdalegal.org/news/pr/nj_20100318_lambda-retums-nj.html.
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state-by-state approach,594 with some leaders arguing that direct action is
necessary and others favoring a federal strategy focusing on the repeal of
DOMA. 95
These multiple and contested efforts underscore the central lessons
from our analysis of the California case. Movement advocacy around marriage
equality is multidimensional, contextual, and unpredictable. Litigation plays
an important, but not decisive, strategic role: It is part of an overall arsenal that
includes legislative advocacy and public education, and it is always undertaken
in the context of a careful analysis of the likely political consequences and
how they might be addressed. Opposition is constant and sophisticated, so that
there is never a clear "win," only moves that are certain to be countered. In this
sense, the model of lawyering in the marriage equality context is not one of
avoiding backlash, but managing its inevitable onset by influencing its form
and intensity.
These insights point toward a theoretical framework for understanding
and evaluating movement lawyering that moves beyond the litigation-centric
model of the backlash thesis and other prominent post-civil rights accounts
of law and social change,596 and builds upon the work of post-structuralist and
legal mobilization theorists who have drawn attention to the complex rela-
tionships between legal advocacy and multiple levers of political power."'
Our contribution to this ongoing theoretical development is to position
movement lawyers as sophisticated political agents within a complex field
characterized by: (1) multiple actors, including allies and opponents, as well as
political decisionmakers and the general public, whom lawyers seek to persuade
to support their goals;598 (2) a range of tactical choices to advance policy ends
in which litigation is an important option, but not preordained, and one that
is complemented by legislative advocacy, public education, and grassroots orga-
nizing; and (3) multiple and overlapping institutional domains within which
594. See Abby Goodnough, Gay Rights Rebuke May Result in a Change in Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
5, 2009, at A25.
595. See Jeremy W. Peters, Debate on Gay March Exposes Division in Rights Movement, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 10, 2009, at A14.
596. For the classic historical accounts, see JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE
LEGAL SYSTEM: A THEORY OF LAW REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1978); STUART A. SCHEINGOLD,
THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE (1974).
597. See MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK, supra note 47; Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, What
Cause Lauryers Do For, and to, Social Movements: An Introduction, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS, supra note 585, at 1; Lucie E. White, To Learn and Teach: Lessons From Driefontein on
Lawyering and Power, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 699.
598. See Dieter Rucht, Movement Allies, Adversaries, and Third Parties, in THE BLACKWELL
COMPANION TO SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 197 (David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule & Hanspeter Kriesi
eds., 2007).
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policy ends may be advanced, including courts, legislatures, administrative
agencies, the ballot initiative system, extralegal channels (public pressure,
boycotts), and private bargaining processes, all of which operate at different
scales-local, state, federal, and international-that present distinct oppor-
tunities and challenges for advocates seeking reform. It is beyond the scope
of our study here to provide a comprehensive analysis of how movement
lawyers navigate within this field. Yet this framework does suggest a set of
empirical questions that we lay out as a guide for future research.
Actors. Who are the movement lawyers? What is their background,
motivation, organizational affiliation, access to power, and strategic philosophy?
How representative are they of the constituency they seek to help? What
mechanisms exist to hold them accountable? Who are their likely allies in terms
of cocounsel for cases, community activists, political elites (politicians, gov-
ernment lawyers, and judges), and private sector elites (business supporters,
foundations, and influential private citizens)? Who are their opponents, how
well are they organized, financed, and connected to power? What strategies
and tactics are opponents likely to pursue? How important is public support to
the cause, where does public opinion currently stand, and what are the key
levers of public influence? Are nonmovement lawyers likely to become involved
in related cases that could affect the movement and, if so, how can they be
influenced not to intervene?
Tactical Choices. What is the range of tactics available to movement
lawyers? Which tactics are likely to be the most and least powerful in the cir-
cumstances? What are the counterstrategies likely to be employed by opponents
and what are the expected results? With respect to litigation, what is the likely
outcome, in terms of the judicial decision, countermobilization, and public
reaction? Is litigation initiated by movement lawyers, nonmovement allies, or
opponents? What opportunities exist to influence the course of litigation that
is not affirmatively launched by movement lawyers? How is litigation used to
enhance bargaining power or extract concessions in other domains? Are there
legislative or nonlegal political alternatives? How might lawyers use multiple
tactics in mutually reinforcing ways? What is the distribution of effort and
resources across tactical choices?
Institutional Domains. What lawmaking and extralegal arenas exist for
advancing policy goals? Which are likely to be most effective for achieving the
desired outcome? Which venues (for example, courts versus legislatures) have
the most sympathetic decisionmakers and which are most vulnerable to
opponents' countermobilization efforts? Which jurisdictions present the greatest
opportunities for gains (for example, federal versus state government)? Which
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jurisdictions present the greatest risk of loss and how can those losses be
minimized or avoided? Can pressure from one jurisdiction be mobilized to
influence another?
Ultimately, the answers to these questions will provide the building blocks
for a more nuanced appraisal of the challenges movement lawyers face, the
choices they make, and the results they accomplish. In the end, the lawyers will
be judged by how-and how much-they are able to bend the existing vectors
of power to benefit those who lack it. Such judgment should not sugarcoat
the truth, but neither should it diminish what has been achieved by presenting
only a partial version.

